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Abstract
This thesis comprises three research papers on the allocation of health care re-
sources in resource-poor settings. I first examine the effects of aid conditionality in
a theoretical framework where the donor has imperfect information about the local
health needs while the central and local governments do not engage in self-interested
efforts upon receiving aid. The novelty of the model is to introduce foreign aid in
a decentralised health system in order to explore the implications of conditionality
of aid on local health expenditures, intergovernmental transfers and social welfare.
I analyse the conditions under which aid conditionality increases local health ex-
penditures but reduces at the same time the welfare of the high-need populations;
the outcomes of this setting are then compared to the situation where aid is uncon-
ditional. I finally discuss these consequences in a health system with two levels of
care when the donor restricts aid on Primary Health Care. The findings highlight
the potentially detrimental effects of aid conditionality on local health outcomes
and underscore the need for establishing close collaboration between donors and all
levels of federal governments in the recipient country.
To empirically assess the predictions of the model, I examine the effectiveness
of donors in targeting the highest burden of malaria in the Democratic Republic of
Congo when the health information structure is fragmented. I exploit local vari-
ations in the burden of malaria induced by mining activities as well as financial
and epidemiological data from health facilities to estimate how local aid is match-
ing local health needs. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find significant but
quantitatively small variations in aid to health facilities located within mining areas.
iii
Comparing local aid with the additional cost of treatment and prevention associ-
ated with the increased risk of malaria transmission, I find suggestive evidence that
local populations with the highest burden of the disease receive a proportionately
lower share of aid compared to neighbouring areas with reduced exposure to malaria
infection.
Finally, the last chapter explores to what extent colonial medical missions ex-
plain contemporaneous disparities in hospital performance in sub-Saharan Africa.
Using archival data from colonial Belgian Congo between 1929 and 1956, this study
investigates the effects of colonial health investments on modern health facility per-
formances. I document a strong persistent effect on physical and human capital.
Government allocation to colonial hospitals is also substantially higher even when
controlling for the medical staff and bed capacity. The ability of the colonial regime
to mobilise large health investments and skilled resources appears to be a strong
channel of persistence of the colonial effects.
iv
Acknowledgements
I express my sincere gratitude to my advisors Rodrigo Moreno-Serra and Arne
Risa Hole for their guidance, support and feedback throughout my research disser-
tation. I also thank Antonio Navas, Peter Smith, Rosella Levaggi, Nicolas Van de
Sijpe and Bradley Parks for precious comments. I am grateful to Nathalie Zorzi and
Michael Borowitz for their guidance during my placement at the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. I thankfully acknowledge financial support
from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) White Rose scholarship.
Finally, I thank my parents for their continuous support throughout my studies,
and Mina, for her love, help and understanding. This journey would not have been
possible without her.
All praise belongs to God the Almighty for giving me the blessing, the chance
and endurance to complete my dissertation.
v
Contents
List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
1 Introduction 1
2 Aid conditionality in a decentralised health system 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Recipient’s public behaviour and fiscal federalism . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 The model with primary health care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Determination of local public provision of health care with
domestic resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 Public provision of health care resources with foreign aid . . . 29
2.4 Introducing two levels of health care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Are donors targeting the greatest health needs? Evidence from
mining sites in the D.R.Congo 50
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.1 Malaria situation and artisanal small-scale mining . . . . . . . 55
3.2.2 Health funding landscape in the DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.3 Evidence of local malaria funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
vi
3.4 Empirical framework and estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.1 Setting the RD design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.2 Estimation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4.3 Mining threshold and fuzzy RD design . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.1 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.2 Mining effect on local malaria funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5.4 Decomposition by commodity and additional tests . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4 Colonial origins and hospital performance in the D.R.Congo 88
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.1 Colonial legacy of public health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.2 Health system and the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 OLS estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5.1 Health facility performance data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.5.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5.4 Intensity of colonial health investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.6 Matching estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6.1 Variables for balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.6.3 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Instrumental variables estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.7.1 Sleeping sickness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.7.2 Effects on hospital indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
vii
4.8 Additional channel: Does DAH systematically support colonial hos-
pitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.9 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5 Conclusion 126
5.1 Optimal allocation of health resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2 Health facility performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.3 Policy implications and future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Appendix A Appendix for chapter 2 154
A.1 Local public provision of health care with domestic resources . . . . . 155
A.2 Public provision of health care resources with foreign aid . . . . . . . 158
Appendix B Appendix for chapter 3 165
Appendix C Appendix for chapter 4 198
C.1 Data Sources and variables definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
C.1.1 DHIS2 data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
C.1.2 Historical and modern maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
C.2 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
viii
List of Tables
B.1 Summary statistics and difference-in-means, full sample . . . . . . . 182
B.2 Summary statistics and difference-in-means, 8km window around the
border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
B.3 Summary statistics and difference-in-means, 3km window around the
border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
B.4 Manipulation Density tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.5 Parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.6 Non-parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas . . . . . . . 187
B.7 Robustness: Parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas with
restriction on the distance between health facilities . . . . . . . . . . 188
B.8 Robustness: Non-parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas
with restriction on the distance between health facilities . . . . . . . 189
B.9 Parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas by antimalarial
commodity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
B.10 Non-parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas by antimalar-
ial commodity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
B.11 Effect of mining areas on stock-outs, consumption and stock . . . . . 192
B.12 Effect of mining areas on antenatal care and malaria prevalence . . . 193
C.1 Summary statistics and difference-in-means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
C.2 Colonial investment effect on health facility performance . . . . . . . 215
C.2 Colonial investment effect on health facility performance (continued) 216
C.2 Colonial investment effect on health facility performance (continued) 217
ix
C.3 Colonial investment effect on input utilisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
C.4 Robustness to different cutoff radii for spatial clustering . . . . . . . 219
C.5 Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source . 220
C.5 Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
C.5 Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
C.5 Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
C.5 Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
C.6 Colonial investment effect with provincial hospital and ancient colo-
nial settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
C.7 Matching estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
C.8 Matching estimates by hospital ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
C.9 First-stage IV estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
C.10 IV estimations for public hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
C.11 IV estimations for General Referral Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
C.12 Aid support to colonial hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
x
List of Figures
A.1 Health benefits based on conditional and unconditional health resources155
B.1 Share of donors and domestic spending in total malaria investment . 166
B.2 Mapping of the full sample of health facilities and mines in the DRC 167
B.3 Mapping of health facilities and mines in North Kivu . . . . . . . . . 168
B.4 Paths from health facilities to mines with elevation feature . . . . . . 169
B.5 Administrative map of the DRC and the selected provinces . . . . . 170
B.6 Malaria prevalence as a function of the distance to mines . . . . . . . 171
B.7 Local polynomial estimations of malaria prevalence as a function of
the distance to mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
B.8 Density of the running variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
B.9 Cumulative Distribution Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
B.10 RD effect on the stock value of artemisinin-based combination therapy
and sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
B.11 Evidence on continuity condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B.12 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.13 Local polynomial estimations of aid for malaria as a function of the
distance to mines within mining areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
B.14 Prices of antimalarial commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
B.15 Evolution of aid needed with the additional risk of malaria transmis-
sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
B.16 Stock value of antimalarial commodities and total malaria investment 181
xi
C.1 Daily cost of European and Congolese hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C.2 Development Assistance for Health in the DRC, 1990-2017 . . . . . . 200
C.3 Administrative boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C.4 Mapping of colonial medical structures in 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
C.5 Mapping of Christian missions in 1929 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
C.6 Mapping of the full sample of colonial and post-independence hospi-
tals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
C.7 Distribution of hospitals in the data sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
C.8 Share of domestic health spending in total budget, 1927-2016 . . . . 206
C.9 DRC Gross National Income per capita in 2018 USD, 1948-2018 . . . 207
C.10 Communication channels in 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
C.11 QQ plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
C.12 Evidence of common support assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
C.13 Matching estimate sensitivity to bandwidth selection . . . . . . . . . 211
C.14 Kernel density of colonial settlements and the presence of sleeping
sickness in 1933 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
C.15 Distribution of sleeping sickness in the DRC in 2016 . . . . . . . . . 213
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Financing health care is central to population health. Listed by the World Health
Organisation (WHO) as one of the six building blocks of health systems, the funda-
mental aim of a health care financing system is to promote universality and equity in
health. Health financing is divided between raising revenue and allocating resources.
In resource-poor countries with high disease burdens, the allocation of health re-
sources plays a crucial role in addressing the intertwined challenge of poverty and
ill health. Since the government budget constraint of these countries often bind at
very low levels of domestic health expenditures, donors are essential actors in financ-
ing health care. Discussions surrounding health care resources, therefore, inevitably
involve the role and nature of foreign assistance.
During the last three decades, global health actors have mobilised to reduce
health inequalities between North and South, with Development Assistance for
Health (DAH) increasing from US$ 2.6 billion in 1990 to US$ 37 billion in 2017
(Dieleman, Haakenstad, et al., 2018).1 In Sub-Sahara Africa, which hosts some of
the highest disease burdens, governments finance on average 34% of total health
spending, while DAH represents 16%. Nonetheless, large discrepancies exist within
this region and the share of DAH in total health care spending can even exceed 40%
in countries like Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Guinea (Dieleman,
1The United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals set by the UN members states in
2000 explains the dramatic increase of DAH and foreign aid in general.
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Haakenstad, et al., 2018). In these settings, understanding the contributing factors
through which DAH, and public health spending in general, achieve their objectives
of disease burden reduction is primordial in order to make better use of the limited
existing resources.
However, the presence of multiple donors with different and sometimes conflict-
ing interests, the fragile fiscal and institutional state of recipient countries and the
difficulty to track the dynamics of disease spreading pose serious challenges to the
optimal allocation of resources and health system performance as a whole (Gottret
and Schieber, 2006). The prominent role of DAH also raises concerns about the
sustainability of health care financing and recipient government leadership.
As the United Nations set ambitious health objectives for 2030 with the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs), building well-functioning health systems with
extended coverage requires more effective and efficient use of existing resources.2
Prioritised interventions and programmes that reach the maximum health benefits
and inequity reduction in accessing care are increasingly used to cope with recent
stagnation in total health care funding (WHO, 2018b). Donor governments and
health aid agencies (such as Global Health Initiatives) are coming under acute pres-
sure to demonstrate evidence of maximised health impacts from the funds disbursed,
a term also coined ”value for money”.3 Under these considerations, studies on the
cost-effectiveness of health interventions or programmes offer insights on the ways to
increase health gains through better use of money. Nonetheless, these studies are, by
their nature, limited in scope to efficiency considerations and an important question
persists: how can DAH be more effective? The related issue of aid effectiveness is
addressed in the foreign aid literature, but significant gaps remain when applied to
the global health landscape.
2Note that funds are effective when they successfully achieve their intended goals, while effi-
ciency refers to the optimal combination of inputs used and outputs produced. Efficiency is further
decomposed between allocative efficiency, which consists of maximising the outcome for a given
distribution needs, and technical efficiency that either minimises the costs for a given production
of output or maximises the production quantity given the resource constraint.
3Note that there is no consensus on the definition of value for money among actors in global
health. It can refer either to efficiency, effectiveness or both. See Glassman et al. (2013) for a
detailed discussion.
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The large flows of foreign aid poured into Sub-Sahara African countries have
received contrasting interpretations. While some observers expressed hope in the
capacity of the international community to mobilise more funds to eradicate poverty
and disease burdens (Sachs, 2005), others criticise foreign aid for its limited achieve-
ments with respect to money disbursed. Easterly (2006) suggests that lack of ac-
countability of donors, large-scale plans that poorly fit with local needs and political
and economic interests are harming recipient countries. Aid would be intrinsically
associated with inefficiencies that it cannot depart from. Another strand of research
adopts a more nuanced approached and rather advocates for structural reforms
accompanying foreign assistance: it puts forward the importance of strategic in-
volvement of the recipient government, the need for capacity building and effective
use of resources through targeting the greatest needs (Collier, 2007). To this aim,
efforts should be dedicated to funding evidence-based projects that are effective in
achieving their goals (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).
Following this latter line of research, my dissertation attempts to bring new per-
spectives on the optimal allocation of health funds in resource-poor settings and
the conditions under which DAH operates. What I loosely term ”conditions” refers
to the environmental setting that contributes to shaping the effective use of health
resources in the structure of health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although inef-
fectiveness can have multiple forms and dimensions, this research investigates three
determinants that might have wide implications for health care financing: public
sector behaviour, decentralisation and colonial legacy. This thesis devotes partic-
ular attention to aid effectiveness, which largely contributes to the effectiveness of
health care financing in low-income countries.
What causes aid ineffectiveness? Despite the existence of multiple factors ham-
pering the impact of aid, a large strand of the development literature has focused
on public sector behaviour and the donor-recipient relationship.4
The relationship between the donor and the recipient involves a set of objectives
4Other primary causes identified in the literature are aid predictability, aid fragmentation,
absorptive capacity and government participation in health funding (Wagstaff and Claeson, 2004;
Gottret and Schieber, 2006).
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to be reached, the development goals targeted by the donor, and a set of usable
resources, the foreign aid. When the preferences between donors and recipient differ,
aid resources might simply end up financing items that were not originally intended
by the donor if they do not supplement government spending. For instance, the
recipient can decrease spending on a programme if a donor finances it, and reallocate
resources for other purposes. This phenomenon, called ”aid fungibility”, is often
identified in the literature as the primary cause of aid ineffectiveness (Bauer, 1972).
The fungible nature of DAH may mean that the external resources do not have the
desired effect on health outcomes. A large body of empirical studies has attempted
to identify the phenomenon, which is examined in chapter 2.
The theoretical approach to the fungibility issue emphasises how the existing
divergences between the donor and the recipient’s objectives can reduce the impact
of external funding (Martens et al., 2002; Azam and Laffont, 2003). In cases where
donor and recipient’s preferences are misaligned and the donor has perfect informa-
tion about the needs in the country, the implementation of an aid contract enables
the donor to incentivise the recipient to act according to the donor’s intended ob-
jectives and restore the optimality of aid. Importantly, this contract is expected
to increase aid effectiveness under the assumption that the donor’s allocation de-
cisions achieve the highest health impact in the recipient country. In other words,
the donor sets its objective through its presupposed perfect knowledge of the local
health needs. In the global health landscape, the widespread use of Performance-
based Results (or Performance-based Financing, Pbf) between national governments
and multilateral institutions is a direct application of the aid contract. The scheme
designs allocation decisions from the highest level and ensure the accountability of
the recipient through close monitoring and evaluation of implemented programmes.
What is the validity of this assumption? First, the literature on decentralisation
and federalism suggests that high-level decisions tend to ignore local-specific infor-
mation (Oates, 1972). Second, empirical studies find little evidence to support the
view that donors systematically make optimal decisions to maximise health benefits.
On the contrary, the findings suggest that donors may disproportionately prioritise
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some disease-specific programmes (Shiffman, 2007) and that the overall health re-
source allocation might be weakly aligned with countries’ needs (Dieleman, Graves,
et al., 2014). A report from the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2018b) on pub-
lic health spending similarly acknowledges that for some diseases like HIV, external
funding does not reflect well the national health needs. Although the burden of
non-communicable diseases is gradually growing in low-income countries, the report
further states that ”donors clearly have less appetite for funding activities specif-
ically earmarked as addressing non-communicable diseases”. These facts clearly
contradict the predictions of the theoretical model with a perfectly knowledgeable
donor that maximises the overall health benefit in the country: changes in disease
patterns among local populations should ignite a reallocation of health resources to
meet the highest needs.
What mechanisms could explain donors’ suboptimal decisions? The effective
integration of global health actors into local health care systems can be jeopardised
in several ways. Donors may fail to accurately identify the local socio-economic
contexts in which their interventions are rolled-out, or may ignore the role of local
health practitioners and community leaders in promoting and providing care (Mason
et al., 2017). Importantly, these local actors may receive little opportunity to send
”feedbacks” on the implemented programmes (Easterly, 2006). These shortcomings
may compromise the functioning of local structures and impede the efficient use of
health care resources.
Chapter 2 examines the effects of foreign aid on a decentralised health system.
The model presents an alternative approach to the conventional donor-recipient
modelling, where the donor has imperfect information about the local health needs
while the central and local governments do not engage in self-interested efforts upon
receiving aid. An important innovative feature of this model is the introduction of
a federal system in the recipient country with two-tier governments. While most
health systems have now been decentralised in low-income countries, discussions
around the aid allocation mechanisms have ignored this feature. The presentation
of the model is followed by discussions on the implications of conditionality of aid
5
on local health expenditures, intergovernmental transfers and social welfare. The
findings of chapter 2 highlight the potentially detrimental effects of aid conditionality
on local health outcomes and underscore the need for establishing close collaboration
between donors and all levels of federal governments in the recipient country.
The second part of this thesis comprises empirical studies on the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). The country presents distinctive epidemiological, political
and socio-economical characteristics of interest in this research. The DRC is the
second largest African country with one of the highest child mortality rate in the
world; it is also among those with the highest burden of malaria, HIV, tuberculosis
and, combined with its low domestic capacity to fund health care, its health system
is one of the highest externally funded in Africa. The Congolese health care system
is heavily decentralised, with a central government that designs national health
policies and national disease programmes and provincial governments which are
responsible for their own health budget and allocate health resources among their
districts (health zones). Furthermore, the recent troubled history of the country
has been marked by regional wars and civil conflicts that are persisting in some
resource-rich regions. From a global health perspective, the country presents a
challenging situation with political instability and widespread corruption where the
rich resources of the country are mostly controlled by an elite that benefits from
bad governance (Ntembwa and Van Lerberghe, 2014). Nonetheless, this situation
paradoxically provides an interesting opportunity for tracking aid resources and
analysing donors’ capacity to target population needs. Since donors and aid agencies
mostly anticipate misuse of funds in the country, little aid transits through the
government budget (The Global Fund, 2016). Consequently, the majority of external
funding for health care should not be prone to government’s aid diversion.
Chapter 3 uses a spatial regression discontinuity analysis to determine whether
donors are able to target local populations with the greatest needs. The purpose of
this analysis is to go beyond ad hoc assumptions on donor’s information about local
health needs and test its capacity to maximise health gains and inequity reduction
in access to health care. Because DAH is widely controlled by donors and their
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local partners (who are implementing the interventions in the country), there exists
little possibility for the national government to interfere in the allocation of external
funding (MSP, 2017). In this specific context, donors become, to some extent,
recipients of their own aid since they have to use their funds according to their own
preferences. In this case, do we observe that aid is reaching those with the greatest
health needs, as intended by the donors? In other words, are donors able to optimally
allocate their own health resources? If not, the answer would indicate either that
donors are unable to identify those local populations with the greatest health needs
or they are unable to reach them (due to logistical difficulties for example). Using
a rich set of information at the health facility level, I examine whether donors are
locally able to target the population with the greatest health needs. I claim that if
donors have perfect information about local needs, the variations in local aid will
follow the variations in the local burden of diseases. I exploit the locations of mining
activities where the risk of malaria transmission is high and find no evidence to
support the assumption that donors are accurately targeting areas with the greatest
health needs.
Chapter 4 focus on exploring the root causes of inequalities in health facility
performance which may also hamper aid effectiveness. Lack of availability of human
resources in rural areas, demotivated medical staff and low-human capital accumu-
lation are major factors that have been identified in the related literature. Another
strand of research discusses the effects of drug availability and the influence of chal-
lenges related to the provision, storage and supply of health products on service de-
livery at the facility level. I suggest another channel for understanding inequalities
in health facility performance: the historical roots of a health system. In low-income
countries that were historically occupied by colonial regimes, the development path
of their institutions has often been affected by the manner in which Europeans
shaped these institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Nunn,
2014; Jedwab and Moradi, 2016; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2018). Colo-
nial regimes established the primary roots of health systems through investment in
health infrastructure and set the first national health policies. Christian missions
7
were closely tied to the colonial expansion and had an important role in health care
provision among local populations. These combined factors suggest that colonial
legacy could have enduring effects on modern facilities and potentially the observed
disparities in hospital efficiency.
I examine in this chapter the long-term effects of colonial health investments on
input utilisation and service delivery by modern health facilities. Information is col-
lected from archival data from the Belgian Congo between 1926 and 1956 along with
contemporary data on health facilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Starting from a simple theoretical model, I hypothesize that initial investment in
health infrastructure construction was higher during the colonial period than after
independence, and I provide evidence that supports this assumption. The chapter
next introduces several estimation strategies that address potential endogeneity con-
cerns. The results consistently paint a picture where health facilities built during
the colonial period receive significantly more subsidies from the central government
than post-independence facilities, while demand for health care is found to be un-
changed. The findings suggest that colonial hospitals might have established closer
connections with the central government to attract a comparatively higher share of
subsidies in this resource-constrained setting.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the thesis by discussing the results outlined in the
preceding chapters in light of the current DAH practises in Sub-Sahara Africa and
its effect on the financing of health care. The chapter ends with examining the
implications of the results for policy and future research.
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Chapter 2
Aid conditionality in a
decentralised health system
2.1 Introduction
The debate over foreign aid as an instrument to promote economic growth is
controversial. Whilst the foreign aid sector has become larger and more institution-
alised, empirical studies have failed to consistently identify a positive effect of aid
on growth (Boone, 1994; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). In the health sector, although
evidence suggests that Development Assistance for Health (DAH) has substantially
reduced global health burdens (Mishra and Newhouse, 2009, Wilson, 2011), it failed
to achieve the health improvement objectives set by the Millennium Development
Goals.
The causes of aid ineffectiveness have been mostly attributed to the recipient’s
behavioural response. Whether under the form of poor quality of institutions and
governance, lack of political accountability, rent-seeking behaviour or interest group
pressures, the failure of foreign aid is often ascribed to the recipient’s unreliability
to tackle development issues as intended by the donor (Svensson, 2000a; Svensson,
2000b; Burnside and Dollar, 2004). The solution to this moral hazard problem is
to incentivise the recipient to commit to the intended development objectives of the
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donor(Azam and Laffont, 2003).
The underlying assumption of the aid conditionality approach is that the donor
has perfect information (or full observability) about the multiple components of the
needs in the country, which includes the identification of sub-populations with the
highest disease burden, their geographic locations and the severity of the disease.
Yet, in low-income countries where local health information is often incomplete
and fragmented, identifying and targeting the beneficiaries of a disease specific pro-
gramme can be a challenging exercise (Niehaus et al., 2013). Furthermore, targeting
may exhibit different levels of efficiency depending on whether the decisions are taken
by the central government or at the community level (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005,
Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2009).
This chapter intends to address this knowledge gap by exploring the theoretical
implications of an alternative assumption: donor’s imperfect information about local
health needs. In particular, I examine the consequences of this assumption when the
donor chooses whether to impose aid conditionality or not to a recipient country with
a decentralised health care system. When the donor has the choice to administer
health funding at the central or sub-national level while only local governments
have perfect information about the local needs, what are the consequences of aid
conditionality on the allocation of health care resources across local jurisdictions
and the financing of the healthcare system? And how does resource reallocation
affects aid effectiveness and health outcomes?
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to formally examine how DAH affects
the distribution of federal transfers in a decentralised health care system. Drawing
from the fiscal federalism literature, my theoretical approach explores whether aid
diversion is caused by the central government’s decision to reduce intergovernmental
transfers or by sub-national entities changing their public spending for health.
Starting with a standard model of intergovernmental transfer, I explore the impli-
cations of introducing DAH in the model and discuss the effects of aid conditionality
on local health expenditures and intergovernmental grants. I find that when the lo-
cal government is committed to maximise the social welfare of the neediest and the
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donor has imperfect information about which group in the local community has the
highest health need, unconditional aid generates the maximum welfare gain for the
neediest health group. I also find that conditional aid increases local health ex-
penditures more than unconditioned aid. This is because when the donor does not
successfully target the high-need group, the local government attempts to compen-
sate for the misallocation of resources by increasing domestic health expenditures
on the high-need individuals.
I then present a model where the health system is characterised by two levels of
health care provision. The results suggests that when the donor primarily chooses
to finance primary health care, as commonly observed, the optimal decision of the
central government is reallocate health resources to the secondary health care level if
the marginal health benefit of the neediest for this level of care is above a minimum
threshold.
However, the results also indicate that donor mistargeting and aid conditional-
ity may reduce resources allocated to secondary health care, creating an unbalanced
financing in the health system and a possible reduction in social welfare. The exact
implications of under-funding the secondary level on aid effectiveness depend on the
marginal health benefit of the neediest for this level of health services. While the
assumptions of this model purposely excluded the existence of local corruption in
some developing countries (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006), the findings, nonetheless, indicate the poten-
tial hazards of aid conditionality. In particular, conditionality with poor targeting
may undermine the ability of the recipient country to manage health resources at
the different levels of the federal system and exacerbate health inequalities within
the country. Furthermore, even if local corruption does exist, through the elite cap-
ture for example, the use of unconditional funds might still be more efficient than
conditional aid with poor targeting (Basurto et al., 2017).
This work makes several contributions to the literature. First, I introduce a
model with a decentralised economy and discuss how DAH can affect the allocation
of health resources at the different levels of the federal system. The emphasis on
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aid conditionality and its consequences on local expenditures reveal that donor’s
imperfect information can have adverse effects on aid effectiveness. In addition, the
introduction of an incentive compatibility constraint, as found in an aid condition-
ality contract, could divert the recipient’s country from targeting the highest needs
or even lead the donor to select ”bad” government when the needs are not fully
observable.
Second, introducing a decentralised health system reveals that different sub-
national entities in a recipient country may have conflicting targeting decisions when
local information does not circulate perfectly. When both the central government
and the donor mistarget the need, the local government may not have the financial
and structural capacity to reallocate funds to the intended beneficiaries. Further-
more, by adding a second level of health care services, I show that donor’s preferences
to achieve immediate and measurable results through the primary health level may
poorly reflect the need of local communities when their marginal health benefit for
second or tertiary health services is higher.
These findings also provide a new theoretical explanation for the empirical evi-
dence of aid fungibility in the health sector (H. Pack and J. R. Pack, 1990; H. Pack
and J. R. Pack, 1993; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Swaroop et al., 2000; McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2001; Farag et al., 2009; Van de Sijpe, 2013). Whilst aid fungibility is a
factor for reducing aid effectiveness in the traditional approach, my results, on the
contrary, reveal that fungibility could have positive health impact when the different
levels of the federal government commit to maximising the welfare of the neediest
and the donor mistargets its funds. Pettersson (2007) finds no evidence that aid
fungibility is associated with a reduction in economic or health outcomes, suggest-
ing that it might not necessarily be detrimental. My findings also closely relate to
Wagstaff (2011) who estimates the consequences of fungibility on the productivity of
the recipient government’s spending. The author shows that spillovers effects might
not be limited to aid project areas and that government reallocation to non-project
areas might also benefit from productivity gains. My theoretical setting offers an
alternative plausibility for the resource reallocation that relies on marginal health
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gains. In particular, marginal productivity is not a driver of government’s spending
when the latter commits to maximise the welfare of the neediest. Finally, the results
of this model supports the evidence on intrasectoral fungibility (Walle and Mu, 2007,
Wagstaff, 2011): when external funding does not reach the intended beneficiaries,
local governments reallocate their own resources only within the health sector to
achieve higher health impact.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews
the related theoretical and empirical literature. In section 2.3, I formulate the
resource allocation problem in a decentralised economy and introduce the presence
of the donor in primary health care. Section 2.4 contains further theoretical analysis
with the introduction of another level of care. The last section contains concluding
remarks.
2.2 Recipient’s public behaviour and fiscal feder-
alism
The impact of foreign aid on the recipient government’s behaviour has triggered
an intense debate in the related literature. A common theoretical approach relies
on agency theory to analyse the incentive problems that may occur in foreign aid
delivery leading to aid ineffectiveness. The donor (Principal) is assumed to be
fully altruistic: it cares only about the welfare of the poor. On the other hand, the
recipient government is assumed to be only partly altruistic and has other incentives
than meeting the need of the poor. The recipient may then have incentives to attract
a high share of aid disbursement, deviate from the donor decision and follow its own
objectives, creating adverse selection and moral hazard (Svensson, 2000a). From
the donor’s perspective, the solution is therefore to implement an aid contract that
incentivises the recipient to comply with its poverty reduction objectives. When the
donor is only able to observe the outcomes, the optimal aid contract is the payment
conditional on the aid having been spent on the intended outputs, also known as
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ex post conditionality (Martens et al., 2002; Azam and Laffont, 2003). However,
when the donor only observes some inputs, conditionality (on inputs) may distort
project choice (Cordella and Dell’Ariccia, 2007). In the presence of lobby groups in
the recipient country, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004) show that the optimal
strategic behaviour of the donor is to announce its reaction function in order to
eliminate the issue of fungibility while maximising the general welfare at the expense
of the lobbyists. On the other hand, if the donor behaves as a leader, increased
corruption will diminish the amount of aid. In this scenario, conditionality leads
simply to no aid to the recipient. But the opposite can also happen as illustrated by
the ”Samaritan dilemma”: the recipient maximises its own utility at the expense of
the donor who decides to allocate aid on the basis of poverty criteria. The recipient
government has then incentives to exploit the donor’s altruism by maintaining a level
of poverty qualifying for aid. As the donor cannot commit not to help the poor,
aid is counter-productive as long as the recipient can adjust its policy accordingly
(Svensson, 2000b). Arguably, the limit of this approach is that repeat offenders
will likely discourage donors who will be encouraged ultimately to find alternative
solutions. The ”Samaritan dilemma” might then exist only for a limited period of
time. More globally, this criticism can be extended to the agency theory approach.
Repeat offenders tend to reveal their inefficiency in spending aid on the intended
items, inciting the donor to target new beneficiaries. Ultimately, ”bad” recipients
simply drive out of the aid market, removing the moral hazard and adverse selection
issues. The examination of aid fungibility relies entirely on the assumption made in
these studies of a misbehaving recipient. The derived results from their analytical
approaches follow logically the mechanism design of an optimal contract where the
recipient is incentivised to maximise the altruistic objectives of the donor.
One way to circumvent these limits is to relax the ”bad” government assumption
that prevails in this related literature and examine the consequences of asymmetric
information on the optimal resource allocations. The source of aid fungibility is
consequently not limited to the moral hazard problem of the recipient but can also
reflect the lack of adequate information available to the donor who is no longer to
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fully observe the needs. If the recipient has perfect information about the health
needs in its country, diverting aid funds can be optimal. Naturally, the question
raises little interest in this simple case if the local government and the donor have
aligned preferences. The donor should simply transfer its aid funds to the recipient
which uses it to maximise the poverty alleviation objective that it shares with the
donor. However examining this approach is more relevant in a federal structure,
where the central government does not necessarily have perfect information about
the local health needs, contrary to local communities. The latter is supposed to
have better information about local needs. This approach, known as the community-
driven development, is known as a mechanism already largely adopted among policy
makers, which consists of empowering community groups through higher control
over planning decisions and investment resources for local projects. Surprisingly, no
studies attempted to use it in a theoretical model.
A large literature on foreign aid investigates the impact of donors’ funds on
government’s fiscal policy response. This literature is characterized by two different
research approaches: Fiscal Response Models (FRM) and empirical studies on the
fungibility of aid. FRM focuses on the role of aid in government expenditures, tax
revenues and public borrowing. The theoretical framework introduces a government
that maximises its utility by setting the optimal level of these fiscal targets subject
to a budget constraint including foreign aid. FRMs are well suited to study the
broad coverage of foreign aid influence on a recipient (McGillivray and Morrissey,
2004). However, these models lack of information about the purpose of foreign aid,
as they do not offer a comprehensive sectoral disaggregation of foreign aid. Hence
FRMs offer a limited interpretation on the inefficiency of aid, as they are not able
to describe where the extra funds are diverted.
Empirical studies on fungibility of aid have investigated whether funds allocated
to specific projects, services or areas are diverted to other expenditure categories
or spent as intended by the donor (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004)). Empirical
evidence shows mixed results on the fungibility of foreign aid, varying according to
the level of spending analysis (project, within sector and national or regional lev-
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els), the measure of foreign aid (aid disbursement, commitment, on and off-budget)
and the variables considered in the empirical work. Most of empirical studies find
that foreign aid is fungible, in particular in the health sector (H. Pack and J. R.
Pack, 1990; H. Pack and J. R. Pack, 1993; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Swaroop et al.,
2000; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001; Farag et al., 2009; Harper, 2012). However,
Van de Sijpe (2013) points out an important limitation in these studies revolves
around their measure of foreign aid: whether considering solely aid disbursement
by donors or aid reported by a recipient country, the measure does not fully de-
scribe the amount of foreign aid received. In particular, omitting off-budget aid
(expenditures that do not pass through the normal budget procedures of the recip-
ient country) may lead to an overestimated degree of fungibility. This bias is all
the more important if the ratio off-budget to on-budget is large. More importantly,
little information exists to explain how fungibility relates to aid inefficiency. Donors
typically expect the recipient countries to demonstrate that the received funds do
not create any reallocation of resources that would not have occurred in this ab-
sence of aid. Ravallion (2008) argues that the wide implications of this commitment
raise serious challenges to estimate the additionality or fungibility of aid. It also
implies that donors have perfect knowledge of the ”needs” of the recipient or at
least superior to the information held locally.
As long as the preferences of donors and recipients are aligned, the reallocation
of funds should be limited. But what if donors neither set nor fund priorities in a
rational way?
Imperfect information can mislead the donor in determining the recipient’s op-
timal resource allocation. Even if aid is not fungible, the extra funds may yield
limited benefit if complementary services are lacking (such as access to water and
sanitation, roads and transportation services to hospitals) or if some sub-sectors
are favoured by donors at the expenses of others (Wagstaff and Claeson, 2004;
A´lvarez et al., 2016). For instance, donor prioritization could create discrepancies
in the recipient’s health care system if it attracts a disproportionate share of global
health financing on a specific disease program such as HIV/AIDS (Shiffman, 2007).
16
Surprisingly, few papers have attempted to investigate the consequences of aid dis-
placement while relaxing the assumptions of ”bad” recipient government and donor
with perfect information. Using data on 57 countries from 1978 to 2001, Pettersson
(2007) compares the impact of aid when it is fungible and non-fungible. He finds no
evidence that fungibility is associated with a reduction in economic or health out-
comes. More recently, Wagstaff (2011) estimates the consequences of fungibility on
the productivity of the recipient government’s spending. His analysis focuses on two
health projects in Vietnam, and although the author finds evidence of fungibility,
he also finds that the reallocated resources are directed to other projects that have
been positively affected by spillover effects from the aid-funded health projects (i.e.
generating gains in productivity).
In the fiscal federalism literature where the fungibility issue stems from, a number
of studies have documented that grants lead to crowding-in of states own funding,
contradicting the theory. This effect, known as the ”flypaper effect”, captures the
finding that state governments use the grant they receive from the central govern-
ment to increase their local spending from residents’ income taxes. McGillivray
and Morrissey (2000) attribute this effect to the ”aid illusion” of the median voter.
But the crowding-in effect of aid could also happen for other reasons: the external
fund on a specific intervention can increase its productivity, or it can be used by
the recipient as an opportunity to get around the prohibitive set-up costs. The re-
cipient can then shift its domestic resources to the newly funded intervention and
maintain it even when aid stops. Several papers investigate the existence of the
”flypaper effect” with foreign aid and found mixed results (H. Pack and J. R. Pack,
1993; Remmer, 2004; Walle and Mu, 2007). Yet the question of whether external
fund causes crowding-in of local public spending or leads to substitution effects is
primordial, and particularly in the health sector. If external funding to a project or
a subsector is reduced or stopped, the recipient may be financially constrained to
reallocate accordingly its public spending on the project that used to be financed
by aid. If donors’ funds target the primary care sector and the recipient reallocates
its expenditure to higher-level care, the impact of a reduction in foreign aid mostly
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hinges on the ability of the recipient to reallocate effectively its expenditure to the
primary sector. The existence of asymmetries in budget reallocations (what could
be called an ”aid elasticity of health care expenditures”) could further exacerbate
the possible adverse effect of DAH on the recipient’s health care system (Gottret
and Schieber, 2006), particularly when donors’ aid is volatile. When the recipient
government is unable to anticipate the future flow of aid, its optimal response may
also be to smooth foreign aid over time and/or across sectors given its intertemporal
budget constraint (Gottret and Schieber, 2006). In this case, the fungibility of aid is
the optimal solution to maximise social welfare and the effectiveness of aid is directly
related to the ability of recipient countries to transfer resources in response to the
volatility of aid. More generally, a major problem in the donor-recipient relation-
ship stems from donors imposing short term objectives on outcomes for individual
interventions, while recipients have to scale up these projects at the national level
and ensure the performance of the health care system as a whole. The question of
aid fungibility and/or ”flypaper effect” is then not a problem per se, but the inves-
tigation should rather focus on where the resources are reallocated (Swaroop et al.,
2000; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000), and to which extent these reallocations
meet the ”needs” of the targeted population.
Some of the solutions can be found in the literature on fiscal decentralisation.
Decentralised levels of government are arguably in a better position than a central
government to ensure the effective provision of public goods within their jurisdictions
(Oates, 1972; Bardhan, 2002). In most countries, decentralisation also applies to the
health care system on the rationale that as health needs vary within and between
districts, local authorities’ preferences are supposed to have better alignment with
local needs (Faguet, 2004). Therefore, the decentralisation of the health care system
has the potential to increase the quality of health inputs and adjust to the needs
of the local population. In theory, the devolution of public funds and taxation gen-
erates inequalities among sub-national entities (horizontal inequalities). To address
this problem, a welfare maximising government uses fiscal transfers to redistribute
public revenues among levels of government to attain equity and efficiency in the
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provision of local public goods such as health care (Buchanan, 1950; Oates, 1972).
Yet, empirical evidence on decentralisation in developing countries is inconclusive,
particularly because of a wide diversity in the considered outcomes and variations
in the quality of the employed methods (Channa and Faguet, 2016). Foremost con-
cerns are political factors that could jeopardize the benefit of decentralisation as
they are more prone to dictate resource redistribution than economic considera-
tions. Electoral concerns and political influence may be important determinants in
the allocation of grants (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Banful, 2011) or local elites
can simply divert public resources and undermine decentralisation efforts (Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 2006). Notwithstanding this fact, there is also evidence that de-
centralisation can improve health outcomes such as child mortality under specific
conditions (Uchimura and Ju¨tting, 2009; Guanais and Macinko, 2009; Asfaw et al.,
2007). The benefits of fiscal decentralisation on health outcomes could be even more
important for very poor countries and could play a role in reducing corruption by
holding local authorities more accountable (Robalino et al., 2001). However, devolu-
tion of health decisions is also likely to have spillover effects on neighbouring regions
as well as creating a system of dispersed facilities without ensuring coordination of
public goods (Levaggi and P. Smith, 2003). As a consequence, the optimal degree
of decentralisation depends on the intended outcome of the public services. As the
devolution of resource allocation decisions aims to increase the health system’s re-
sponsiveness to the population served, strategic health investments should rely on
the expertise of all tiers of the federal government to maximise the overall social
welfare. Whilst local government should focus on expanding primary health care,
central government may be in a better position to provide high-cost tertiary care and
to address externalities among sub-national entities (Levaggi and P. Smith, 2003;
Mukherjee, 2016). It is therefore up to the central government to achieve equity
and efficiency through appropriate health resource allocation strategies across local
jurisdictions.
The research agenda on health care provision in developing countries has exam-
ined how the devolution of decision-making affects health outcomes. However, these
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studies do not offer insights into how DAH affects health resource allocations in the
federal structure. On the other hand, the agency theory uses a unilateral approach
to explain what triggers health aid fungibility, namely ”the bad behaviour” assump-
tion. Consequently, the latter approach offers only a partial understanding of the
issue of aid diversion, neglecting the effects of aid on health allocation decisions that
exist in a federal structure where health care is decentralised. This work attempts to
fill this gap by exploring how foreign aid affects health allocation resources devoted
by the central government and local health expenditures at subnational level.
2.3 The model with primary health care
This section presents a simple model of optimal health resource allocation be-
tween the donor, the central government and the local authority. It aims at ex-
amining the comparative statics effects of foreign aid and intergovernmental grant
on local health expenditures, either when these funds are transferred through bud-
get support to the local government (unconditional aid), or restricted to a specific
intervention (for example, funds conditioned to be spent on a specific project, or
vertical programmes funded and delivered by international agencies and non-profit
organisations).1 The objective is to shed light on the mechanisms that are driving
the effectiveness of foreign aid to the public health sector behaviour.
A federal economy consists of a single representative community which comprises
two groups: ill (P ) and healthy (R), with a proportion pi and (1−pi) respectively. All
members of the community are characterized by a local health need θk (k ∈ {P,R})
that is either high or low with θP > θR.
All individuals derive utility from the provision of healthcare services. I de-
note gk the amount of health services targeted to the group k in the commu-
nity and individual’s valuation of the good is given by h(θk, gk). The function
1Note that vertical programmes such as immunization are usually financed through funds that
do not go through the government budget. However, since I assume that the local government
allocates the funds in accordance to the donor’s decision, I do not need to distinguish this particular
case. The funds will be similarly spent on the intended targeted areas whether they are transferred
under conditional form to the local government or directly targeted by the donor.
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h(θk, .) is assumed to be increasing, smooth and strictly concave in g (for all θk
and gk, h2(θk, gk) = ∂h(θk, gk)/∂gk > 0 and h22(θk, gk) = ∂
2h(θk, gk)/∂g
2
k < 0).
In addition, the marginal benefit of consumption is increasing in individual’s type:
h12(θk, gk) = ∂
2h(θk, gk)/∂gk∂θk > 0.
Individuals differ also in endowed income yk, with yR > yP . The high-need indi-
viduals (who are poor and sick) are not able to pay the user fees to receive primary
care services. For simplicity, yP is set equal to zero among high-need members.
2
Healthcare provision is decentralised to the local government. The latter is
responsive to the welfare of both subgroups in the community, high-need and low-
need. Within the community, health services are supplied at a unit cost q, such that
q′(.) < 0 and q′′(.) > 0: the cost function to produce health services is decreasing and
concave. I assume that there is no private market for health care. As it happens in
most low-income countries, local governments are not able to collect local taxes but
finance the provision of healthcare through fiscal grants and foreign aid (Bardhan,
2002). To part-fund the provision of health services, the local government imposes
a user fee c per unit of health services. Since yP is set equal to zero, only wealthy
people are charged the user fee (yR > c > yP ). This financing system is non-
coercive and the local government problem of optimal health resource provision has
to respect the voluntary participation constraint of the low-need (wealthy) members,
h(θR, gR) ≥ cgR. Therefore, the local government faces challenges in raising local
revenues to support health expenditures when the share pi of high-need is high.
The central government is responsible for raising revenues and allocating health
resources through a lump-sump grant that pays for a quantity a of health services.
In the presence of the donor, I assume that this grant is restricted to the high-need
subgroup in each community, as is the quantity of health services d targeted by
the donors. Therefore, the central government and the donor have fully aligned
objectives. They both have information about the level of total needs among each
2The assumption that wealthy people are also healthy is employed to focus on the main interest
of the model, foreign aid and the financial constraint of the poor. In as much as wealthy people
can afford the health expenditures to be cured, their health status is only temporary and does not
motivate for donor funding.
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community through information provided by local governments. Therefore, the
central government and the donor determine respectively the optimal fiscal grant
and aid to transfer based on the need within the community, depending on pi and
θP . However, they do not know how needs are distributed within each community,
except with a probability p1 for the central government and p2 for the donor, that
the need in a local group k is θk, with p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, if the central government
(or the donor) decides to identify a subgroup within the community, its probability
of success is p1 (or p2), and with probability 1 − p1 (or 1 − p2), it identifies the
high-need (low-need) subgroup as being the low-need (high-need). Note also that
the donor’s preferences are always to target the poor and ill community P , and
never the wealthy. For this reason, there is no need of a community subscript for d.
In addition, the central government adapts its fiscal grant transfer to the existing
health care resources. The central government transfers a grant a that maximises
the local welfare of each subgroup in the community according to the weights given
by the central government to the high and low-needs.
On the contrary, the local government has perfect information about the dis-
tribution of the needs in the community, but it can have different preferences over
high and low-need members. Specifically, the local government assigns a weight µk
to each group within the community with µk ∈ [0, 1]. If µk = 1, the local government
only cares about its high-need members and its preferences are then fully aligned
with those of the central government and the donor. However, I will not restrict
the following analysis to this specific case and I will rather let µk ∈ [0, 1]. I also
assume that the local government seeks to achieve horizontal and vertical equity.
That is, individuals with the same needs receive equal amount of health care, and
those with higher needs receive higher amount of health care. Therefore, health care
resources distribution are based on need and financed by the nonpoors (Wagstaff
and Van Doorslaer, 2000).
In this analysis, fungibility is examined under the assumption that neither the
local government nor the central government diverts aid for their private benefit.
Likewise, there is no form of capture by local elites or group pressure. These con-
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ditions posit assumptions that lead de facto to fungibility. This study focuses on
assessing the extent of diversion of funds (fungibility of aid) when only the local
government (fund’s recipient) has perfect information about local health needs.
In the following subsection 2.3.1, there is no donor and I examine how conditional
grant affects the optimal allocation decision for local health resources. In subsection
2.3.2, I introduce the donor and analyse the effects of conditional grant and aid local
health expenditures and social welfare.
2.3.1 Determination of local public provision of health care
with domestic resources
Determination of fiscal grant
I start by assuming that in the absence of the donor, both central and local
governments maximize their social welfare function with respect to their own pref-
erences for the sick. However, when the donor will be introduced in the second
part, the central government will only care about the sick to fully align its objective
function with the donor. The fiscal grants are financed by a national income tax
τ . The central government determines the optimal fiscal grant a from the following
objective function
Max
ap,aR
piλph(θp, gp + ap) + (1− pi)[λRh(θR, gR + aR) + y(1− τ)]
where λk is the weight given by the central government for group k. The central
government’s budget constraint is given by
(1− pi)yτ ≥ qa (2.1)
where a = piap + (1− pi)aR.
Since the budget constraint (2.1) must bind, the fiscal grant transferred to the
community is determined by
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h2(θp, gp + ap) =
λR (q
′(G)a+ q(G))
λp
(2.2)
and
h2(θR, gR + aR) = q
′(G)a+ q(G) (2.3)
where the total healthcare expenditures is G = g + a, with g = pigp + (1− pi)gR. In
this setting, the first-order conditions determine the quantity of health care services
provided by the central government. The grant received by the high-need subgroup
is a function of the local price of health services, local health needs, the share of high-
need members, the local health expenditures and the weight assigned by the central
government to the low and high-need group. Hence, it follows that the marginal
rate of substitution between ap and aR is
h2(θp, g + ap)
h2(θR, g + aR)
=
λR
λp
(2.4)
Local provision of health resources
I assume that the local government maximizes its social welfare function with
respect to its own preferences for the sick. The central government has the choice
to transfer the fiscal grant as unrestricted budget support or to impose the grant
to being spent on a specific group within the community. When the fiscal grant is
unconditionally transferred to the local government, the central government has no
role in the local government problem except to increase the financial resources of
the local government. In both cases, the central government allocates resources aq
that pay for the price of health care services to reach a given level of health care per
capita. For simplicity, I assume that the central government only targets the poor
who are also high-need individuals.
Unconditional fiscal grant
If the central government decides to transfer an unconditional (without use re-
strictions) lump sum grant per capita a to the local government, the optimal local
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expenditures for the provision of health services selected by the local government
solve
Max
GcP ,G
c
R
{piµPh(θp, GcP ) + (1− pi)µR[h(θR, GcR)− cgR]}
subject to the budget constraint:
q(Gc)Gc ≤ (1− pi)cgR + aq(Gc)
where the total provision of health services for group k is denoted by Gck = gk+a.
Note that the budget constraint requires gR ≤ a to hold (which correspond to the
case where pi = 0). Then, the total provision of health resources in the community
is
Gc = piGcP + (1− pi)GcR
= g + a
= pigP + (1− pi)gR + a
The social welfare function of the local government is given by the utility function
of the high and low need, as well as the weight that it attributes to each group. The
local government’s budget constraint is obtained from the funds locally raised on
the wealthy and the fiscal grant transfer. Since the budget constraint must bind,
the total public provision of health care services is given by:
h2(θP , G
c
P ) =
µR
µP
(q′(Gc)g + q(Gc)) (2.5)
h2(θR, G
c
R) = q
′(Gc)g + q(Gc) (2.6)
The optimal expenditure quantity depends on the relative weight assigned by the
local government to the sick and the marginal cost for producing the good. As
the preference of the local government for the low-need diminishes in favour of the
high-need, the ratio µR/µP decreases and the provision of the health services for the
sick increases. As expected, health care expenditures depend positively on the local
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needs and negatively on the local price.
The slope of the social welfare contour is given by the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between the public provision of health care to the high and low-need individuals
h2(θP , G
c
p)
h2(θR, GcR)
=
µR
µP
(2.7)
Given the parameters (µk, θk), the optimal public provision of health care to
the high-need members is maximal when the low-need members receive no share of
the fiscal and the local government gives no weight to the welfare of the low-need
members (µR = 0). Consequently, the marginal rate of substitution in (2.7) can
be interpreted as an ”equity weight” related to the two subgroups (P. Dolan and
Tsuchiya, 2009). An increase (decrease) in this ratio would decrease (increase) the
level of healthcare of the high need relative to the low need group. Note that if
the local government has equal preferences between low and high-need members of
its community (utilitarian approach), (2.7) leads to h2(θR, G
c
R) = h2(θP , G
c
P ) which
implies that gP > gR since the marginal benefit of consumption is increasing in
individual’s type: h12(θk, gk) > 0 and θp > θR. The marginal rate of substitution
of the provision of health care between high and low need group is only a function
of their relative local needs. Higher marginal health benefit of individuals results
in a higher allocation of health services under the utilitarian approach. When the
local government only cares about the high-need members (Rawlsian approach) the
latter receives the maximum amount G¯∗P of health care defined by h2(θP , G¯
∗
P ) =
q′(Gc)g + q(Gc).
There exists a threshold θ∗k(q,Gk, µk) that depends on the total provision of
health service, the marginal cost, and the weight on group k such that local govern-
ment is financially constrained when the local need exceeds θ∗k. Assume from now
on that it is the case.
Conditional grant
Suppose now that the central government decides to restrict the grant to the
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poor members in the community. That is, the local government has to allocate the
fiscal grant according to the central government’s decision. This kind of grant is also
known as earmarked grant. The central earmarks the fiscal grant on the high-need
group of the community with probability p1, but can also incorrectly designate the
low-need group as the fiscal grant receiver. As in the previous case, the central
government uses the grant a. Therefore, the maximization’s problem of the local
government becomes:
Max
gP ,gR
{[µPpih(θP , Gcp) + µR(1− pi)h(θR, gR)] p1
+
[
µPpih(θP , gp) + µR(1− pi)h(θR, GcpR)
]
(1− p1)− µR(1− pi)cgR}
subject to the new budget constraint:
q(Gc)g ≤ (1− pi)cgR (2.8)
where GcpR = gR + a and G
c
p = gp + a. The first-order conditions for this problem
yield:
h2(θP , G
c
p)p1 + h2(θP , gP )(1− p1) =
µR
µP
(q′(Gc)g + q(Gc)) (2.9)
h2(θR, gR)p1 + h2(θR, G
c
pR)(1− p1) = q′(Gc)g + q(Gc) (2.10)
The optimal provision of health benefit packages to the high-need subgroup is then to
be compared with the case of the unconditional grant to determine if the conditional
grant can benefit the welfare of the sick. Consider now the difference between (2.5)
and (4.2). The comparison between the two results can only be done when the
local government preferences are aligned with the central government: the local
government would only care about the sick. By letting the ratio µR/µP = 0 in
the two equations, it appears that if q′(.) < 0, the expected health care provision
transferred to high-need individuals under the conditional grant is lower than the
certain provision they receive under the unconditional grant. The conditionality
imposed by the central government affects negatively the amount of health services
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allocated to the high-need subgroup. When the central government does not have
perfect information, it gives some probability weight to allocate health resources out
of high-need individuals to the low-need members in the community.
Combining (2.9) and (2.10) yields the marginal rate of substitution between the
level of health of high and low-need individuals
h2(θP , G
c
p)
h2(θR, gR)
=
µR
µP
− 1− p1
p1
1
h2(θR, gR)
(
h2(θP , gP )− µR
µp
h2(θR, G
c
pR)
)
(2.11)
Assuming that gk ≤ a, if µP > µR, then the second term on the right-hand side
is positive. Comparing (2.11) with the marginal rate of substitution under the
unconditional grant (2.7) (and letting µR/µP = 0), it results that conditional grant
reduces the health resource allocation gap between high and low-need individuals
in the community that was prevailing under unconditional grant. The high-need
members are then worse off and the low-need better off.
Consider now the effects of fiscal grants on local expenditures. Totally differen-
tiating (2.9) gives the marginal propensity to spend on the sick out of conditional
grant
∂g∗P
∂a
= −
1− 1− p1 + µRµP κc(1−pi)−q′(Gc)h22(θP ,gP )
p1
h22(θP ,G
c
P )
h22(θP ,gP )
+ 1− p1 − pi µRµP κch22(θP ,gP )
 (2.12)
where κc = q
′′(Gc)Gc + 2q′(Gc). A straightforward result from (2.12) is that the
highest increase in local health expenditures is reached when p1 = 0 as the local
government seeks to compensate for the excessive grant allocated to the low-need
individuals. On the contrary, an increase in the probability of the central govern-
ment to successfully determine the local need reduces the only positive term of the
equation. As expected, the share of high-need members in the community also neg-
atively affects the propensity of the local government to spend on the ill out of the
conditional grant.
28
2.3.2 Public provision of health care resources with foreign
aid
I introduce in this section the intervention of a donor which cares only about
the high-need members in the community. The donor can decide to give aid as an
unconditional fund transfer to the local government, or finance directly a subgroup
of its choice within the community. If aid is given to the local government, the
latter simply adds the external fund on top of the total amount of public provision.
However, if the donor decides to fund directly a local area of its choice (vertical
programme), it can only identify the high-need group with a probability p2 that
the need θk of the group P is θP . That is, p2 is the probability that foreign aid
reaches the sick. Because the donor cares only about the sick, both the central and
local government align their preferences with the donor to cooperate. Therefore, the
fiscal grant a is restricted to benefit the high-need subgroups in each community.
Notice an important implication of this theoretical setting. The local government
follows the decision of both the donor and the central government when they decide
to transfer conditional funds. That is, there is no distinction between the case
where the local government receives grants to be spent on a specific group in the
community by directly contracting with the donor (this restricted budget support is
also known as earmarked aid) and the case where the donor or the central government
directly finances the intended group. In both cases, the local government has only
a decision-making power over its own resources and funds received as unrestricted
budget support. Similarly, whether the donor transfers funds at the central or local
level makes no difference on the examination of local health resources. This is
because this analysis does not focus on factors related to a misbehaving recipient
that would directly explain aid diversion. I rather assume a collaborative partnership
between the donor and the recipient at the central and local levels and I examine
the implications of imperfectly informed donor and central government and local
health expenditures. Therefore, the factor of interest is only the decision of the
donor to allocate its funds to a specific group within the community or to provide
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an unrestricted budget support to the local government.
I also assume that the central government knows about the donor’s intervention
(whether through unrestricted budget support or conditional aid) and has the pos-
sibility to adapt accordingly the intergovernmental grant a(d). A straightforward
source of aid diversion appears if the central government decides to reduce its fiscal
grant accordingly. In addition to this possibility, I will also examine other conditions
under this theoretical setting that could lead to reallocation of health care resources.
There are four cases to consider in this comparative statics analysis that reflect
the possibility that both aid d and grant a can be transferred directly or indirectly
to the high-need group in the community. In both cases, the donor and the central
government have to include the local price of health care services to reach the sick
with the intended level of health care resources d and a respectively. In all four
cases, the local authority maximises the community aggregate welfare function of
high-need and low-need individuals subject to the total health care amount available
(GP , GR) to each group and the probability that national government and/or the
donor successfully target the high-need group.
Since individuals have the same welfare level within groups, the aggregate welfare
function of each group is defined as
W P (θP , G
P ) = h(θp, G
P )
WR(θR, G
R) = h(θR, G
R)− cGR
In the following four cases, the aggregate welfare functions will differ only with
respect to (GP , GR). The benefit of health resource allocation is measured by the
variation in welfare for each subgroup.
Unconditional grant a and aid d
Consider the case where the local government receives unconditional grant and
aid. It means that it can use grant and aid on top of its own revenue to determine
the per capita level of health care expenditures that it seeks to achieve for the high
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(GdP ) and the low-need individuals (G
d
R). The local government then solves
Max
GdP ,G
d
R
{piµPW P (θP , GdP ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GdR)}
subject to the aggregate budget constraint:
q(Gd)Gd ≤ (1− pi)cgR + (a(d) + d)q(Gd)
where Gd is the total provision of health resources and each subgroup in the
community receives Gdk = gk + a(d) + d with k ∈ {P,R}. Then it follows that
Gd = piGdP + (1− pi)GdR
= g + a(d) + d
= pigP + (1− pi)gR + a(d) + d
Define the price elasticity of health care expenditures is defined as
e(Gd) =
q
Gd
dGd
dq
As in (2.5), if both aid and fiscal grant are transferred to the budget of the local
government, the optimal resource allocation is given by the marginal change in social
welfare of the high-need with respect to total health care expenditures
∂W P (θP , G
d
p)
∂GdP
=
µR
µP
(
q′(Gd)g + q(Gd)
)
=
µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(2.13)
and the second-order condition is
h22(θP , G
d
p)−
µR
µP
κd < 0
where κd = q
′′(Gd)Gd + 2q′(Gd). The first-order condition indicates that welfare
benefits for the high-need individuals depend on the relative preferences of the local
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government between high-need and low-need subgroups and the price elasticity of
health expenditure. The maximum marginal welfare of the high-need is reached
when the local government gives no weight to the welfare of the low-need members
(Rawlsian case) or when the price elasticity of health care expenditures is equal, in
absolute value, to the share of local government health expenditures to the total
health expenditures in the community (
∣∣e(Gd)∣∣ = g/Gd). Because of the limited
financial capacity of the local government revenue in low-income countries, it is
reasonable to assume that the share of local government health expenditures to the
total health expenditures is low as well. Consequently, the marginal welfare of the
sick is maximal only if total health care expenditures are highly price-inelastic.
Recall that the threshold θ∗k(q,Gk, µk) characterises the maximum local need
above which the local government is financially constrained. As this threshold in-
creases with aid and fiscal grant, the local government can reach a larger share of
high-need members in the community when aid or grant increases. The concern
about aid fungibility requires that ∂GdP/∂d ≥ 1. If the local government is finan-
cially constrained, avoiding fungibility of aid requires that neither local government’s
spending nor fiscal grant decreases in the presence of aid. However since this con-
dition is only related to total health expenditures GdP , it is insufficient to inform
us about the impact of foreign aid on local health care expenditures nor about the
critical role of local government in analysing fungibility of aid. Therefore, I analyse
the effects of aid on the optimal local expenditures by totally differentiating (2.13)
to obtain the following:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1− 1− pi −
q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi
)
(2.14)
where pid =
h22(θP ,G
d
p)
κd
µP
µR
and κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd). The optimal local health
expenditures increase with foreign aid, provided that fiscal grant does not decline.
Proposition 2.1. Unconditional foreign aid increases local government spending on
the sick when κd > 0 and sufficiently close to 0 and a
′(d) > −1.
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Proof. Assuming a′(d) ≥ −1, the condition under which ∂g∗P
∂d
> 0 is
1− 1− pi −
q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi < 0
1 <
1− pi − q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi
If κd < 0, the second-order condition implies that
h22(θP , G
d
p)−
µR
µP
κd < 0
pid > 1
This yields to the following
pid − pi < 1− pi − q
′(Gd)
κd
q′(Gd)
κd
< 1− pid < 0
which is in contradiction with q
′(Gd)
κd
> 0 since q′(Gd) < 0 and κd < 0.
Assume now that κd > 0. The second-order condition then leads to
pid < 1
which implies that
pid − pi > 1− pi − q
′(Gd)
κd
if pid < pi. One condition for this last inequality to hold is κd sufficiently close to 0.
Note that
κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
= q′(Gd)
(
q′′(Gd)
q′(Gd)
+ 2
)
The term in the parenthesis refers to the convexity (or curvature) of the inverse
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demand function. Note also that if the need θP of the sick is very high, this last
inequality always holds and the marginal propensity to spend aid received on the
sick can be positive even if the local government has a higher relative preference for
the low-need group.
The optimal allocations of health resources critically depend on the share of the
high-need group in the community: given the preferences of the local government
for each subgroup in the community, µP and µR, high-need members receive a lower
share of health care services as pi increases. Consider the condition under which
∂g∗P/∂d > 0, requiring pi
d < 1. As the share of poor individuals in the community
gets closer to pid, the marginal propensity to spend out of aid increases. Nonetheless,
when the share of the poor gets too high (pi > pid), foreign aid has negative effects.
This is because pid is a function of the relative preferences of high-need and low-need
individuals as well as the local health needs. Therefore, if the local government’s
preferences for low-need increase or if the local health needs decrease, pid will decrease
and the additional external fund of the donor becomes an opportunity to reallocate
the local government’s resources away from the high-need to the low-need group
within the community.
However, these considerations are valid only when the local government at-
tributes the weights µP and µR to the high-need and low-need subgroups respectively.
In other words, the local government’s preferences are misaligned with those of the
donor (and the central government) who cares only about the high-need subgroup.
Hence, special attention should be devoted to analyse the effects of aid on local
health expenditures when the ratio µR/µP tends to zero. Equation (2.14) becomes
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
µP
µR
=0
= −(a′(d) + 1) (2.15)
As a consequence, foreign aid affects negatively local health expenditures unless the
central government reduces its fiscal grant by more than one. When the donor, the
central and local government’s preferences are fully aligned, there is no rationale for
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the local government to increase its health expenditures following foreign aid.
Unconditional Grant a and conditional aid d
Consider the situation where the donor targets its aid to a specific subgroup in
the community while the central government transfers a unconditional grant to the
local government. The local government maximises the following objective function
max
GcP ,G
c
R
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
d
P ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GcR)
]
p2
+
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
c
P ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GdpR)
]
(1− p2)
s.t. q(Gd)Gc ≤ (1− pi)cgR + a(d)q(Gd)
where GdpR = G
d
R + d. The change in the budget constraint reflects the impact
of conditional aid on the local government’s new budget: the local government is
now only able to allocate Gc in the community while the price remains a function
of the total health expenditures Gd. The local government receives its funding from
the user fee collected on the low health-need group as well as from the transfer from
the central government. The total marginal welfare of the high-need individuals is
given by
∂W P (θP , G
d
p)
∂GcP
p2 +
∂W P (θP , G
c
P )
∂GcP
(1− p2) = µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(2.16)
Sufficient conditions for this to be the unique maximum are
h22(θP , G
d
P )p2 + h22(θP , G
c
P )(1− p2)−
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)) < 0 (2.17)
As expected, if the donor has perfect information about local needs in the community
(p2 = 1), the marginal social welfare of the high-need is unchanged whether there
is aid is conditional or not. However, if p2 < 1, since G
d
P > G
c
P the social welfare of
the high-need individuals is lower under conditional aid. Indeed, the total marginal
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welfare (right-hand side of the equation) is similar to subsection 2.3.2, while the
change in social welfare is now split between a ”high” state of welfare where the
high-need individuals receive a quantity of health care services equal to Gdp with a
probability p2 and a ”low” state of welfare where they receive a quantity G
c
P with
probability 1− p2 which corresponds to the level of health expenditures where there
is no donor.
Proposition 2.2. If the donor has imperfect information about the local health need,
conditional aid decreases the social welfare of the high-need individuals.
How does an exogenous increase in conditional aid affect the local government
spending on high-need individuals? Using the Implicit Function Theorem on (2.16),
I obtain:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− pic(1−p2)a′(d)+1 + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
pidp2 + pic(1− p2)− pi
 (2.18)
where pik =
h22(θP ,G
k
p)
κd
µP
µR
and κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd).
Consider now the effects of conditional aid with those arising from the situation
when both aid and grant are unconditional (2.14).
Proposition 2.3. Conditional aid decreases the marginal propensity to spend on the
sick relatively to unconditional aid and increases fungibility when pi < pic, a′(d) > −1
and p2 is close to 1.
When the donor targets its funding to the high-need group in the community
but mistakenly reaches the low-need, high-need individuals get under-allocated com-
pared to the situation where aid is unconditional. As a consequence, the local govern-
ment increases its spending on health services to the high-need group to compensate
for the misallocation of foreign aid.
Proof. Subtracting (2.18) to (2.14) gives
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
unconditional-aid
− ∂g
∗
P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
conditional-aid
=
1− pi − q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi −
pic(1−p2)
a′(d)+1 + 1− pi − q
′(Gd)
κd
pidp2 + pic(1− p2)− pi
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Assume that a′(d) > −1 and κd < 0. Then 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd <
pic(1−p2)
a′(d)+1 − q
′(Gd)
κd
+ 1− pi
under the condition that
pic(1− p2)
a′(d) + 1
> 0
which holds under the present assumptions (a′(d) > −1 and κd < 0).
In addition, since GdP > G
c
p, pi
d > pidp2 + pi
c(1− p2). Now if pi ≤ pic < 1, then
1− pi − q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi −
pic(1−p2)
a′(d)+1 + 1− pi − q
′(Gd)
κd
piddp2 + pi
c(1− p2)− pi < 0
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
unconditional-aid
<
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
conditional-aid
In addition, note under the particular case where the donor targets the high-need
group with perfect information (p2 = 1), (2.18) becomes
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1− 1− pi −
q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi
)
which is lower than the same partial effect in subsection 2.3.2 where aid and grant
are unconditional (2.14). It means that the increase in local government health ex-
penditures on the high-need group is lower when aid is conditional, even if the donor
has perfect information about local health needs. On the opposite, the maximum
increasing effect of foreign aid on local government’s expenditures is reached when
p2 = 0.
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− pica′(d)+1 + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
pic − pi

In this case, the partial effects of aid on local health expenditures on the high-need
group are higher when aid is conditional. This corresponds to the maximum of health
resources the local government can reallocate when the donor targets entirely the
low-need group at the expenses of the high-need group and pi < pic. Consequently,
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the misallocation of the donor’s resources entirely dictates the effects of aid on local
health expenditures on high-need individuals.
The case where the governmental grant is conditional while aid is unconditional
is examined in the Appendix A. The next and final case will then focus on condi-
tional grant and aid.
Conditional grant a and aid d
Consider now the final case where both the donor and the central government
impose a restriction on the funds they transfer to the local government. The donor
decides where aid should be allocated within the community. As the donor does not
know the need of the local community, it can only make a guess with probability p2
that an identified group in the community correspond to a high-need group.
The level of fungibility is then given by dGdP = (a
′(d)p1 + p2)dd. It follows
that dGdP/dd ≥ 1 if a′(d) ≥ (1 − p2)/p1. In this setting, fungibility is avoided if
the central government’s response to foreign aid is higher than the right-hand term
which depends on the probability of successful targeting of both the donor and the
central government. Therefore, imperfect information of the donor and the central
government is likely to increase the level of aid fungibility. The maximization’s
problem of the local government becomes :
max
gP ,gR
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
d
p) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, gR)
]
p1p2
+
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
s
P ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GcpR)
]
(1− p1)p2
+
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
c
P ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GdpR)
]
p1(1− p2)
+
[
piµPW
P (θP , gP ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GdR)
]
(1− p1)(1− p2)
subject to: q(Gd)g ≤ (1− pi)cgR
with GdR = gR + a(d) + d. Note how the change in the budget constraint of the local
government reflects the conditional aid and fiscal grant: the local government is
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left with its own funding raised from the user fee on the low-need group to provide
health services g at the price q(Gd) that is determined by the total provision of
health services, including conditional aid and grant. The derived optimal allocation
to the high-need members is expressed as follows
∂W P (θP , G
d
P )
∂gP
p1p2 +
∂W P (θP , G
s
P )
∂gP
(1− p1)p2 + ∂W
P (θP , G
c
P )
∂gP
p1(1− p2)
+
∂W P (θP , gP )
∂gP
(1− p1)(1− p2)
=
µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(2.19)
Comparing the optimal allocations for high-need individuals with the three other
cases, it is straightforward that combining conditional aid and grant reduces the
amount of health care services to the high-need group if p1 and p2 are lower than
one. The extent of welfare loss is once again related to the welfare difference between
W (θP , G
d
P ) and W (θP , gP ), provided that the last term corresponds to the lowest
social welfare of the high-need. Consequently, the higher the probability weight
attributed to the marginal welfare of the high-need group, the higher is the welfare
loss of conditional grant and aid compared to unrestricted budget support as in
subsection 2.3.2. Whilst the local government cannot prevent the misallocation of
conditional aid and grant, it can mitigate the unintended increase in the welfare of
the low-need relatively to the high-need by reallocating a higher share of its own
health expenditures. However, the local government also faces a higher price (q(Gd))
compared to the absence of conditional grant and aid (q(g)) while remaining with
the same fixed budget. Therefore, the local government’s capacity to divert its local
funds may be insufficient to compensate for the misallocated resources of the central
and the donor.
I now characterize the marginal propensity of local health spending on high-need
out of aid and compare it with the previous cases.
Proposition 2.4. Conditional aid causes the marginal propensity of spending on
the sick out of aid to increase, provided that p2 < 1 and a
′(d) is negative or close to
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0.
The misallocation of the donor’s fund related to its willingness to target the high-
need group forces the local government to increase its own health expenditures to the
high-need individuals, under the condition that the fiscal grant remains unchanged.
Intuitively, an increase in fiscal grant to the local community would attenuate the
increase in local health spending on the sick.
Proof. I use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive the marginal effect of foreign
aid on the optimal local health expenditures.
dg∗P
dd
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
a′(d)
a′(d)+1p2(1−p1)pis+ 1a′(d)+1p1(1−p2)pic+(1−p1)(1−p2)pigP +1−pi−
q′(Gd)
κd
p1p2pid+p2(1−p1)pis+p1(1−p2)pic+(1−p1)(1−p2)pigP−pi
)
(2.20)
where pik =
h22(θp,Gkp)
κd
µp
µR
. I analyse the marginal propensity to spend on high-need
individuals out of foreign aid by comparing the case where aid is conditional (2.20)
with unconditional aid and conditional grant (A.2 in the Appendix A). If p2 = 1,
the effects are similar to the case where only aid is unconditional (A.2, A). However,
if p2 < 1 conditional aid has larger impact on local government expenditures than
unconditional aid. Analysing the difference between (2.20) and (A.2) boils down to
examining the sign of the following
a′(d)
a′(d)+1pi
s(1− p1) + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
pidp1 + pis(1− p1)− pi −
a′(d)
a′(d)+1p2(1− p1)pis + 1a′(d)+1p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP + 1− pi − q
′(Gd)
κd
p1p2pid + p2(1− p1)pis + p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP − pi
Notice that pidp1 + pi
s(1 − p1) − pi > p1p2pid + p2(1 − p1)pis + p1(1 − p2)pic + (1 −
p1)(1− p2)pigP − pi and a′(d)a′(d)+1pis(1− p1) > a
′(d)
a′(d)+1p2(1− p1)pis + 1a′(d)+1p1(1− p2)pic +
(1− p1)(1− p2)pigP , provided that a′(d) is negative or close to 0. As a consequence,
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
case3
− ∂g
∗
P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
case4
< 0
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It should be specified that these results also hold when (µR/µP = 0): the local
government only seeks to maximise the welfare of the high-need subgroup in the
community. This special scenario is an important consideration since the donor
and the central government only cares about the sick. Therefore, even when the
donor, the central and local government have fully aligned objective, conditional aid
increases local health expenditures. These results should be weighed against those
obtained under unconditional aid and grant (subsection 2.3.2). When preferences
are aligned, conditionality increases local health expenditures at the expenses of
the local government’s efforts to compensate for the misallocation of aid and grant.
However, as the probability of rightly targeting the high-need group get close to one,
the increase of local health expenditures to the sick subgroup reduces.
The marginal propensity of health expenditures to sick out of conditional grant
is obtained by totally differentiating (2.19)
∂g∗P
∂a
= −
(
1− pi
s(1− p1)p2 + pigP (1− p1)(1− p2) + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
p1p2pid + p2(1− p1)pis + p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP − pi
)
(2.21)
When the donor does not have perfect information about the distribution of
local health needs, fiscal grants transferred to local communities are reduced. The
fungibility of foreign aid can then be avoided only at the expenses of an increased
burden on local fiscal policy. The examination of (2.21) and (A.6, A) demonstrates
that conditional aid and grant reduce the marginal propensity of spending out of
conditional grant.
Proposition 2.5. Conditional aid increases the marginal propensity of the local
government to spend on the high-need individuals out of the conditional grant when
0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1.
Proposition 2.5 is proven in the Appendix A.
41
The final question of interest concerns the varying of p1 and p2. From (2.19) I
obtain
∂gp
∂p1
= − p2(h′′(gdp)−h′′(Gsp))+(1−p2)(h′′(Gcp)−h′′(gp)
h′′(Gdp)p1p2+h′′(Gcp)p1(1−p2)+h′′(Gsp)(1−p1)p2+h′′(gp)(1−p1)(1−p2)−pi µRµp κd
< 0
∂gP
∂p2
= − p1(h′′(gdP )−h′′(GcP ))+(1−p1)(h′′(GsP )−h′′(gP )
h′′(GdP )p1p2+h′′(G
c
P )p1(1−p2)+h′′(GsP )(1−p1)p2+h′′(gP )(1−p1)(1−p2)−pi
µR
µP
κd
< 0
As the probabilities of successful targeting decrease, the local government has to
increase its health expenditures to avoid a reduction in the welfare of the high-
need relative to the low-need members. Therefore, the local government reallocates
its health resources to target subgroups characterized by higher marginal health
benefits. Nonetheless, the imperfect information setting creates a financial burden
on the budget of the local government whose limited capacity may not permit it to
reach its desired welfare level of the high-need relative to the low-need individuals.
The role of conditionality of health resources and its associated probability of
successful targeting can be described as follows. If either fiscal grant or foreign aid is
conditional, the probability weight of misallocating the health resources reduces the
welfare of the high-need, as illustrated in figure A.1, A. The welfare loss of the sick,
denoted 4W is a decreasing function of the probability of successful target and is
decreasing with h(g), the minimum health benefit obtained by the sick in the absence
of foreign aid and fiscal grant. Notice that when the total health expenditures are
conditioned (Gcondit = pG
d + (1− p)g), the level of welfare derived from this health
care provision is similar to the welfare level obtained from the unconditional health
provision Gd1 which is lower than Gcondit. Consequently, the imperfect information
setting generates a loss in external health resources 4G that corresponds to the
ineffectiveness of grant or foreign aid. In particular, the extent of health expenditure
loss is given by4G = −(p(1−p)/2h′′(Gcondit)/h′(Gcondit). This inefficiency increases
with the concavity of the valuation function h(.) and decreases with the probability
of successful target.
These comparative statics results reveal some specific features about the response
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of the local government expenditures to different modalities of transfer of funds.
When the donor (or the central government) has imperfect information about the
local needs, conditional aid is only benefiting the low-need group. Reducing aid
diversion through targeted programs mostly improves the welfare of high-need indi-
viduals if the donor and the central government have perfect information or if the
donor has perfect information and the central government transfers an unconditional
grant to the local government. Other cases will necessarily lead to higher fungibility
of aid.
2.4 Introducing two levels of health care
The examination of aid diversion and the effects of aid on local health expendi-
tures and intergovernmental transfers was conducted in the last section in a simple
theoretical framework, with only one level of health care services. In this section, I
present the comparative statics effects of foreign aid when the health care sector is
characterized by two levels of health care, the primary and secondary health care.
The motivation behind this introduction is to explore another source of aid fungibil-
ity. Indeed, donors tend to prioritize primary care services to respond to high-need
individuals that do not have the financial capacity to use these services (such as
the poor living in rural areas with limited access to health facilities). But it also
refers to the donor’s imperfect information about the whole health sector, creating
discrepancies between the decision of the donor and the central government to allo-
cate health resources optimally. Consequently, the optimal response of the recipient
government could be to divert health resources to higher level of care leading to
fungibility of aid.
Suppose that the central government is responsible for financing a higher level
of care (e.g. national public hospital). The consumption of this service is valued
v(θk, a
h
k) by individuals of type k, with a
g the fiscal grant dedicated to this higher
level of care. The function v(θk, .) is assumed to be increasing, smooth and strictly
concave in its second argument. Denote m the unit cost of providing secondary
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health care services per capita. I assume that the unit cost of secondary care is
higher than the unit cost of primary care, m > q.
For simplicity, I assume that the primary and secondary health care services are
only used by the poor and ill subgroup in each community3. However, the federal
government uses an income tax τ on the rich to finance its health expenditures.
As before, local health expenditures G (which are now referred to as primary care)
are financed by local governments through user fees, fiscal grant, ag, and possibly
foreign aid, d. Individuals value the two goods differently depending on each level of
consumption. In particular, h′(0) > v′(0) > h′(G¯) where G¯ represents the minimum
amount of primary care services such that v′(θk, ahk) > h
′(θk, G) for all G > G¯. As
before, I assume that d > a.
Unconditional aid
Given its preferences for the ill and healthy individuals, the central government
solves the following problem
max
ag ,ah
piµcp[h(θP , gP + a
g + d) + v(θP , a
h)]
subject to the central government budget constraints
qag +mah ≤ (1− pi)yτ (2.22)
g + d+ ag ≤ G¯ (2.23)
The last constraint denotes the central government’s willingness to invest in the
higher level of care once the primary health care facilities have reached the invest-
ment threshold. Under the assumption that the donor solely focuses on primary
health care, the optimal public provision of the federal government is to allocate the
minimum health resources to reach this threshold. If the donor’s resources, d, do
not exceed G¯ − g − ag, the constraint never binds. Hence, for the sake of interest,
3This assumption only simplifies the calculations but does not affect the overall findings detailed
below insofar as the donor only cares about the poor.
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I assume that g + d = G¯ − . Consequently, the central government only needs to
transfer a minimum health resource ag to reach the primary health care threshold.
At the community level, the optimal provision of health resources between pri-
mary care and higher level of care is determined by the following first-order condi-
tions:
piµcPh2(θP , gP + a
g
p + d)− α1α2 = 0 (2.24)
piµcPv2(θP , a
h
p)− α1m = 0 (2.25)
where
alpha1 and
alpha2 denote the Lagrange multiplier attached to the constraints (2.22) and (2.23)
respectively. Combining (2.24) and (2.25), I obtain the marginal rate of substitution
between the consumption of the primary care good and the secondary health care
good:
MRSa
gah =
h2(θP , gP + a
g
P )
v2(θP , ahP )
=
1
m
(q +
α2
α1
) (2.26)
The absence of the donor (d = 0) implies that the constraint (2.23) is non-binding
and MRSa
gah = q/m < 1. Consequently, the optimal resource transfer from the
central government is such that ag > ah. This inequality reflects the higher invest-
ment of the federal government in primary health care in the absence of foreign
aid. On the other hand, the presence of the donor (d > 0) results in the binding
constraint (2.23) and MRSa
gah > 1, provided that q + α2/α1 > m. The optimal
transfer of health resources from the central government is characterized by a higher
allocation of resources to secondary health care services (ag < ah). Notice that α2
is the marginal utility of total health expenditures when they meet the threshold G¯.
Hence, a surge in foreign aid generates a reallocation of central government resources
from primary to secondary health care if the marginal health benefit of the sick at
G¯ is large enough.
So far, the optimal allocation analysis within the health sector has been treated
only under of the donor’s unrestricted budget support to the local government, and
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I shall now turn to examine the implication of conditional aid.
Conditional aid
As before, the donor targets successfully the high-need subgroup with the com-
munity with a probability p2. Consequently, the donor’s misallocation of funds may
reduce the level of primary care services for the high-need individuals while the over-
all total primary care expenditures in the community are unchanged. The central
government solves the following maximisation problem:
max
ag ,ah
piµcp[h(θP , gP + a
g + d)p2 + h(θP , gP + a
g)(1− p2) + v(θP , ah)]
subject to the same constraints of the unconditional problem, (2.22) and (2.23)
respectively. From the first-order conditions, the derived optimal health resources
are given by:
piµcP (h2(θP , gP + a
g
p + d)p2 + +h2(θP , gP + a
g)(1− p2)− α1q − α2 = 0 (2.27)
piµcPv2(θP , a
h
p)− α1m = 0 (2.28)
This yields to the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of the
primary care and the secondary health care good:
MRSa
gah =
h2(θP , gP + a
g
p + d)p2 + +h2(θP , gP + a
g)(1− p2)
v2(θP , ahP )
=
1
m
(q+
α2
α1
) (2.29)
In the presence of foreign aid, the constraint (2.23) is binding and MRSa
gah > 1.
However, the comparison of (2.29) with (2.26) indicates that the marginal rate of
substitution between the consumption of primary care and secondary care services
is lower in the case of conditional aid (because the marginal utility of health care
services consumption is lower for the low-need group). This result implies that the
conditionality of aid reduces the ability of the central government to transfer health
resources from primary care to secondary care services when the probability of the
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donor to target the low-need group increases.
Proposition 2.6. Conditional aid reduces health resources to secondary health care
services transferred from the central government when the probability of the donor
to target successfully the high-need group is lower than one.
Hence, conditional aid limits the reallocation of the central government’s funding
from primary to secondary health care.
2.5 Conclusion
The issue of fungibility of aid has been widely explored in the related theoretical
literature through the lens of the Principal-Agent model. Within this approach, the
donor can specify a contract where the funds are to be spent based on the observable
consequences of the recipient’s actions (outcomes produced or inputs used). The
objective of the donor is then to restrain the recipient from self-interested efforts.
The use of this setting is justified on the basis that the donor has perfect information
about the needs in the recipient country but is unable to observe the recipient’s
actions. However, I show in this work that these results might be sensitive to the
information structure.
I develop a model that departs from the analytical approach used in the Principal-
Agent setting by assuming (1) that the donor does not have perfect information
about the local needs in the recipient country, and (2) that the recipient country
does not engage in self-interested efforts upon receiving foreign aid. The novelty of
my approach is to examine how foreign aid affects the intergovernmental transfers
of health resources in a federal structure system and to assess its implications on
local health expenditures. Asymmetric information is characterised by the donor
and central government’s imperfect observation of the local needs while the local
government has full observability. In this theoretical setting, the assumptions of the
contract theory no longer hold, and I employ a comparative statics analysis of the
effects of foreign aid on local health expenditures and intergovernmental transfers.
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I distinguish among several cases characterised by the existence of conditionality
of foreign aid and fiscal grants. Intuitively, one might expect that funds transferred
as unrestricted budget support to the local government contribute to the fungibility
issue and the ineffectiveness of aid, compared to the case where aid is conditional
or used to finance directly a specific program. However, when the local government
is committed to maximising the social welfare of the ill (and poor) individuals and
the donor has limited information about which group in the local community has
the highest health need, I find that unconditional aid generates the maximum wel-
fare gain for the high-need group. I also find that conditional aid has more of an
increasing effect on the local health expenditures than unrestricted budget support.
However, this increase in local government spending on the high-need individuals
is the result of the local government’s efforts to compensate for the inappropriate
allocation of the donor’s funding to the low-need group in the community. As the
probability of the donor to successfully target the high-need group raises, the ex-
pansionary effect of foreign aid on the local government expenditures diminishes.
This result suggests that conditionality of aid could have disruptive effects on the
recipient’s health system when the donor has imperfect information and the local
government is committed to reducing the burden of disease of the high-need group.
In this setting, the apparent decrease of aid fungibility associated with conditional
aid is the result of the local government’s attempts to compensate for the donor’s
misallocation.
When there are two levels of health care provision and the donor earmarks aid
to primary care services, the central government is forced to reduce health resources
dedicated to the secondary level in order to increase those of the primary health care
sector. This situation gives rise to suboptimal health outcomes when the secondary
health sector is under-allocated and the marginal health benefit of secondary health
services is higher than that of primary health services. This result highlights the
potentially disruptive effects of conditionality of aid on the recipient health system.
These findings illuminate the need for the donors to engage with all actors of the
decentralised health system in order to make effective health investment decisions
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(Collier, 2007). When local communities have perfect information about the distri-
bution of health need, country ownership of foreign aid increases the effectiveness of
aid. Priorities should therefore be devoted to increase country ownership of health
interventions and collaborative partnership among global health actors. Since health
programmes in low-income countries are often supported by many donors, it would
be interesting to explore in future research how the externalities generated by vari-
ous programme interventions from multiple donors are affecting health outcome and
aid effectiveness. Empirical research could also test the implications of the model
developed in this research by estimating the effects of conditional aid on domestic
health expenditures at sub-national levels.
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Chapter 3
Are donors targeting the greatest
health needs? Evidence from
mining sites in the D.R.Congo
3.1 Introduction
Identifying and reaching the populations who have the most pressing health needs
is essential in countries with high disease burden and limited health care resources.
Donors prioritise health interventions to achieve the highest reduction in disease
burden along with health equity objectives (WHO, 2015a). Targeting the highest
health needs requires donors to have complete and accurate information about the
distribution and intensity of local needs to make optimal resource allocation decisions
in the recipient country. However, barriers to the gathering and sharing of health
information are commonplace in low-income countries and may pose a threat to
narrow aid targeting.
In this chapter, I explore donors’ ability to target the highest health needs at the
community level by examining how local variations in the burden of malaria affect
the amount of aid allocated locally. Some researchers have already emphasised the
importance of aid allocation in maximising donors’ intended outcomes along with
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the challenges related to the identification of the greatest needs.1 In particular,
aid re-allocation to the highest needs could lead to maximum welfare improvements
when donors have full observability of the need in the country.
To assess the efficiency of aid targeting, analyses have been done both across and
within countries (Esser and Bench, 2011; Dieleman, Graves, et al., 2014; Briggs,
2018). Although these studies provide innovative methodologies to track aid re-
sources, few can relate the findings to the efficiency of aid targeting. First, the
efficiency of aid should be determined by analysing how the observed aid alloca-
tion differs from the optimal allocation that maximises the objective function of
the donors (Collier and Dollar, 2002). Second, aid could potentially improve the
welfare of the beneficiaries; simply matching aid resources to the distribution of the
local needs could then lead to misleading findings. Third, needs are often defined in
general terms that could be measured through multiple potential outcomes (Alatas
et al., 2012). Divergences in identifying the key outcomes of interest translate into
unclear objectives of aid: the multifaceted relationship between health, education
and poverty implies that aid resources can serve many purposes and the estimated
outcomes can capture various types of aid (Qian, 2015). Fourth, the existence of
various forms of aid support poses a challenge to the identification of donors’ fund-
ing at the subnational level.2 Especially, it is practically impossible to distinguish
external resources from domestic spending at the local level since a significant part
of aid may transit through the government budget. Altogether, these combined
factors pose a clear threat to the identification and disaggregation of aid effects.
This chapter addresses these identification issues in several ways. First, I focus
the analysis on donor funding for malaria to obtain distinct and measurable out-
comes of donors’ objectives. The high burden of the disease has attracted important
external funding in sub-Saharan Africa and the strategies for malaria elimination are
well-known, encompassing effective actions for the prevention, diagnosis and treat-
1See for example Ravallion and Chao (1989); Besley and Kanbur (1991); Bigman and Fofack
(2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002).
2External funding can transit through the government budget (on-budget) or be directed to
local interventions (off-budget); see Van de Sijpe (2013).
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ment of malaria cases.3 Thereby, I can link directly health needs related to malaria
with aid allocated for the disease. Second, I exploit the presence of multiple mining
areas in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to obtain
spatial variations in the burden of malaria. The dramatic increase in the risk of
malaria transmission within mining areas has been well documented in the tropical
medicine literature (Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Moreno et al., 2007; Vittor et al., 2009;
Knoblauch et al., 2014). The spatial variations in the disease pattern prevailing be-
tween mining and non-mining areas constitute a natural experiment to analyse the
geographical distribution of aid for malaria. The fact that mining sites are charac-
terised by having, locally, the highest risk of malaria transmission essentially means
that they should receive comparatively the highest share of aid for malaria. Third, I
exploit the unique health financing situation of the DRC to estimate aid for malaria
at the community level. The disease is highly endemic in the DRC and several years
of civil wars have extensively weakened the health system of the country. The con-
siderable financial support provided by the international community to tackle the
humanitarian and health crisis created a disproportionately financed health system.
A striking example is found with the National Malaria Control Programme for which
external aid accounts for more than 95% of its overall funding (MSP, 2017). Taking
advantage of a novel dataset with detailed information on key financial and health
indicators at the health facility level, I argue that the stock value of antimalarial
commodities can approximate total aid for malaria at the local community level.
To ensure the validity of this assumption, I select health facilities located in a
similar geographic area in the Eastern DRC and which should bear similar costs.
The varying distances of health facilities to their closest mines form two distinct
groups that correspond to the treatment (mining area) and control (non-mining area)
groups. The presence of mosquito breeding sites within mines leads to geographical
areas with high risk of malaria transmission (Bousema et al., 2012), and the mining
threshold corresponds to the maximum travelling distance of miner patients to health
3The definition of the population with the highest burden of malaria should not be prone
to different interpretations between donors and local governments, as opposed to the concept of
poverty.
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facilities. The discontinuity in the exposure to intense malaria infection at the
mining threshold should translate into a change in the pattern of donor’s behaviour
if the latter is accurately targeting the highest burden of malaria.
The estimation strategy relies on a regression discontinuity (RD) design to com-
pare the allocation of malaria funding for health facilities in the two groups, and
thus, identify the contribution of mining areas on local aid for malaria. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to exploit the stock value of antimalarial com-
modities to obtain direct tracking of donors’ funding for malaria to health facilities.
Importantly, these estimates can document the precision of donors’ targeting of the
disease and consequently, provide information about their ability to identify the
highest health needs at the local community level.
I find no evidence that donors are targeting areas with the greatest burden of
malaria. I first consider whether local aid for malaria increases within mining areas
and find a significant but quantitatively small increase in local aid. To assess the
magnitude of these estimates, I then explore how the increase in local aid for malaria
relates to the associated costs of the additional burden of malaria in mining areas.
The results offer a contrasting picture of the initial finding. From the number of
reported malaria cases at the facility level, the risk of malaria transmission increases,
at least, by 7 percent in mining areas. The estimated costs per capita of providing
prevention, diagnosis and treatment for the additional burden of malaria are then
compared to the increased aid for malaria in mining areas. I find that more than one
third of the costs required to address the additional burden of malaria transmission
are not financed by donors, suggesting that local aid is disproportionately distributed
among health facilities across mining areas and non-mining areas. The estimates are
robust to a number of sensitivity checks, including different RD polynomial orders
and various bandwidth selections. These findings provide evidence consistent with
studies showing the unequal allocation of donors’ funds towards the need at sub-
national levels (Odokonyero et al., 2015; Borghi et al., 2017; Kotsadam et al., 2018;
Briggs, 2018).
Furthermore, the decomposition of aid allocation between curative treatment,
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prevention and diagnosis reveals disproportionate funding patterns. A malaria-
preventive commodity mostly drives the increase in local aid for malaria within
mining areas for pregnant women, whilst aid for other commodities is either small
or unchanged. Overall, these findings provide some suggestive evidence that donors
have limited capacity to target aid to beneficiaries with the highest health needs.
This analysis contributes foremost to the literature on resource allocation and aid
effectiveness. Donors’ imperfect observability of local needs is a well-known problem
for aid targeting (Besley and Kanbur, 1991) that has been addressed either by using
a proxy based on a set of observable household characteristics for the unobservable
outcome (proxy-means testing) or by delegating the identification process directly to
local community leaders when essential information is missing (Coady et al., 2004;
Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Alatas et al., 2012). My work complements these
studies by offering an innovative approach that exploits the geographic location of
mines to determine locally the highest health needs and evaluate the precision of
aid targeting.
My research also provides a novel contribution to the theoretical literature on
aid effectiveness as it offers a unique opportunity to test empirically one of its main
assumptions. Specifically, since aid ineffectiveness is widely seen as the consequence
of agency problems between the donor and the recipient (Azam and Laffont, 2003),
one solution consists of implementing an aid contract that incentivises the recipient
to comply with the donor’s poverty reduction objectives. This theoretical setting
hypothesises that the donor has perfect information about the needs in the country.
My results challenge this assumption by arguing that donors might only have limited
capacity to collect local health information due to factors hampering the circulation
of information from local communities to the central government and donors.4
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides back-
ground on the financial and epidemiological situation in the DRC. Section 3.3 de-
scribes the data and the geographical analysis. Section 3.4 presents the empirical
4These findings are consistent with the recent experimental literature on the imperfect ob-
servability of local needs to donors, which also exploits location-specific data. See BenYishay and
Parks (2019) for an excellent review of these studies.
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analysis related to the impact of mines on aid for malaria to health facilities and
introduces the regression discontinuity setting. Section 3.5 describes the results and
section 3.6 discusses policy implications and concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Malaria situation and artisanal small-scale mining
Malaria Situation - Malaria represents a critical public health challenge in the
DRC. Almost the entire country is under high risk of malaria transmission where
the disease is among the leading cause of mortality and morbidity (WHO, 2015b).
In 2015, the DRC accounts for 7.1% of the global total of estimated malaria deaths,
ranking second in the world (WHO, 2015b). Malaria is mostly caused by Plasmodium
falciparum in the country, a parasite transmitted through the bite of mosquitoes.
National strategies to control and reduce the spread of the disease consists of 1) pre-
vention through the use of insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs), Indoor Residual
Spraying (IRS) and sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP), a chemoprevention adminis-
tered to pregnant women and children less than five years old ; 2) identification
of malaria cases through light microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs)5; 3)
antimalarial treatment with artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT), the rec-
ommended first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria cases.6
Mining Sites - Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) refers to informal min-
ing work involving minimum use of mechanical tools (Hentschel et al., 2002). The
activity is estimated to be responsible for 90 % of the total mineral production in
5The malaria diagnosis relies on two possible tests: a microscopic identification of the malaria
parasite and a Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT). The former test requires extensive expertise and is
usually done in clinical centres and hospitals. On the other hand, RDTs exist in kit forms and do
not require extensive expertise to perform the test and interpret the results. It is therefore mostly
used across health facilities in the DRC.
6In 2005, the DRC adopted artesunate and amodiaquine (ASAQ) as the first line treatment for
uncomplicated malaria cases, and the combination of artemether and lumefantrine as the second
line treatment (MSP, 2011).
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the DRC (C. Andrews et al., 2008). Owing to its informal nature, artisanal mining
poses significant health and safety hazards. The use of mercury for gold extrac-
tion and the presence of dust and fine particles in the air surrounding mines expose
miners to unsafe working conditions. Furthermore, mining activities rely on the use
of abundant water to filter the extracted minerals, leaving multiple open pits with
stagnant water. Consequently, mines provide extensive breeding sites for mosquitoes
which could increase the risk of malaria transmission among populations living and
working in proximity to mines (Staedke et al., 2003). Multiple evidence of an in-
creased malaria prevalence within mining areas and around mosquito breeding sites,
in general, supports this fact (Moreno et al., 2007; Vittor et al., 2009; Knoblauch
et al., 2014).
3.2.2 Health funding landscape in the DRC
Health Sector - The Congolese public health sector is divided in three decen-
tralised levels: a central level for the management of national health programmes
and general hospitals; an intermediate level composed of 26 provincial health di-
visions with provincial level hospitals and laboratories as well as pharmaceutical
warehouses; a health district level divided into 516 health zones across the country,
where each health zone has at least one hospital. Health zones are then further
divided into health areas which include one health centre for about 10,000 inhabi-
tants. Access to health care in the DRC is low in the public health sector, with a
utilisation rate of health services of 30% (World Bank, 2015).
Health Funding Landscape - Several years of civil wars and continuing lack
of government financing have drastically undermined the health system in the DRC.
As a result, the country extensively relies on out-of-pocket expenditures and exter-
nal aid to finance the provision of health care services.7 The presence of multiple
donors affects disproportionately the financing of the health sector, with some dis-
7In the DRC, the major source of health financing comes from household funds (45%) followed
by external donors (40%) and government expenditures (15%) (MSP, 2017).
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ease programmes almost entirely funded by the international community (such as
HIV, Tuberculosis or Malaria). This observation is particularly salient with the Na-
tional Malaria Control Programme where more than 95% of its overall funding comes
from external aid (MSP, 2017). The three major donors for malaria control activi-
ties in the DRC are the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the
United States Government (U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID)
and the United Kingdom Government (Department for International Development,
DFID) which together account for 92% of total aid for the malaria programme in
2017.8
According to national guidelines, prevention, diagnosis and malaria treatment
in public health facilities is free of charge for patients. But due to low salary and
frequent disruptions in salary payments, health workers charge, in practice, small
user fees on malaria patients.9
3.2.3 Evidence of local malaria funding
This section presents the proposed strategy to locally estimate foreign aid allo-
cated to the Malaria Control programme.
Lack of information about donors’ funding at the local level is a major barrier
to quantify the amount of foreign aid that is allocated to each health facility. One
reason behind this data limitation issue is that donors choose either to allocate funds
to national disease programmes that transit through the government budget or to
directly target health interventions at subnational levels (through the support of
local implementing partners). It is, therefore, practically impossible to distinguish
external aid from domestic spending at the health facility level. However, the fi-
nancing of the health system of the DRC offers a unique setting to circumvent this
8Other partners for the malaria control programme include the World Bank, the World Health
Organisation and UNICEF whose funds correspond to more general support for the health system
of the country.
9Consultation fees represent about 30% of out-of-pocket expenditures for Congolese patients,
whilst the average total medical cost for outpatient care is approximately $7 (Laokri et al., 2018).
Patient user fees for diseases funded by external donors (such as malaria) are lowered due to the
reduction in the cost of medicine and drug but still include fees to health workers. These fees also
tend to increase in urban areas and with the size of health facilities (Bertone et al., 2016).
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identification problem. The Malaria Control Programme is almost entirely funded
by donors (Figure B.1, Appendix B) which implies that antimalarial commodities
in public health facilities are almost exclusively provided by external resources.10
The stock value of antimalarial commodities should then be a valid proxy for local
external aid if it represents the major source of variations in local funding (whilst all
other expenditures related to external aid for malaria remain constant). In general,
this assumption would raise concerns as other malaria related costs, namely human
resource costs, transportation and storage, are expected to vary significantly across
the country.11
However, I restrict the data sample to observations that are located within a short
distance of the mining threshold and I argue that apart from the provision cost of
antimalarial commodities, all other malaria-related costs should remain relatively
constant across health facilities in the sample. First, salaries and risk allowances
(governmental payment distributed to all health workers) to health workers are pro-
vided by the government (mostly through donors’ support) based on a salary scale.12
It is then unlikely that two health facilities, located in a common (rural) area, ex-
perience significant disparities in governmental payments for a given qualification
of health workers.13 Second, all health commodities are centrally procured by a
10The low contribution of government spending to the malaria control programme (Figure B.1,
Appendix B) is mostly dedicated to cover the management operations at the central level (MSP,
2017), and so its contribution to the local provision of commodities should be minimal. The
proportionately low government spending also avoids the risk that donors may adapt their aid
allocation to specific areas in response to government health investments or vice versa (O¨hler et
al., 2017). Another concern is that no information is available on patients’ purchase of antimalarial
medicines through retail drug stores. These expenditures may come from antimalarial medicines
bought from the illegal pharmaceutical market (Bjo¨rkman Nyqvist et al., 2012;Cohen et al., 2015).
However, I argue that the access to health products on illegal markets should not systematically
differ in mining and non-mining areas, so its omission should not systematically bias the results.
11According to the 2016 audit report in the DRC, 53% of total malaria funding is for the
procurement of antimalarial commodities, 27% for expenditures related to human resources and
11% is attributed to transport and storage of commodities. A remaining 9% is dedicated to the
management and organisation of the malaria programme (The Global Fund, 2016).
12Note that health workers can also receive top-up payments from donors, and Bertone et al.
(2016) find that they represent a relatively small share of total income of health workers in the
DRC (an increase of $17 which represents about 10% of the total income of nurses who compose
the vast majority of health workers in the sample).
13In the estimation results, I control for the number of health workers and their qualification
(nurses vs. doctors)
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national organisation that manages and coordinates the pool procurement of phar-
maceuticals, their distribution and storage in regional warehouses, and their supply
to health facilities.14 The expenditures related to the transport and storage of health
commodities are therefore closely tied to the geographic location of the health facil-
ity. Since my data sample spans health facilities over a relatively small geographic
area compared to the country size (Figures B.2 and B.3, Appendix B), most health
facilities are supplied by a common regional warehouse, and should, therefore, share
identical costs of storage. Lastly, transportation costs from the regional warehouse
to health facilities are likely to differ, depending on the location and accessibility of
the health facility. Nonetheless, these transportation costs represent only 7 percent
of the overall expenditures related to the malaria programme (The Global Fund,
2016), so these variations should only have a minimal impact on the local allocation
of aid.
3.3 Data
The data used in this research is drawn from two main sources: the District
Health Information System and geographic locations of artisanal mining sites.
District Health Information System. Epidemiological and financial data
on health facilities were extracted from the District Health Information System
(DHIS2), a web-based health information system where health facilities report their
routine administrative and clinical data.15 Reports from health facilities are up-
loaded monthly to the system and include multiple epidemiological measures on
disease burden, consumption and stock level of health commodities as well as fi-
nancial and human resource information. The DHIS2 contains data on all health
14The Congolese organisation that controls the national procurement of drugs (Federation of
Central Procurement in Essential Medicines) works in close collaboration with the Global Fund to
obtain negotiated prices of health commodities with manufacturers (see Annexe B.14).
15The DHIS2 database is used by the Ministry of Health to monitor health service delivery,
measure achievement and track health progress at the difference levels of health care across the
country.
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facilities in the DRC regardless of the type of structures (hospital, health centres
and health posts) and includes both private and public health facilities, as well as
faith-based facilities.16 However, I restrict the data sample to rural health facilities
located in the Eastern DRC, where information on mines is available. In total, there
are 1,511 observations located in six provinces: North and South Kivu, Maniema,
Ituri, Tshopo and Tanganyika (Figure B.5, Appendix B).
Information on the stock level of commodities is reported at the beginning of
each month (and thus before the consumption of commodities) from January to De-
cember 2017.17 Due to inconsistent procurement of commodities to health facilities,
I average monthly the stock level of commodities over the entire year of 2017.
Antimalarial commodities correspond to all malaria-related health products that
are used for diagnosis (RDT), treatment (ACT) and prevention (SP and ITN). The
estimated stock value is then calculated from the stock quantity of each antimalarial
commodity at the facility level and their prices. The latter is obtained from the ref-
erence pricing list of the Pooled Procurement mechanism established by the Global
Fund (see Annexe B.14).18
I provide in annexe B an extensive discussion on the data quality of DHIS2 in
the DRC and provide evidence of its validity for this analysis.
Mining areas. Obtaining precise information on the burden of malaria at the
local level is a challenging exercise. The Malaria Atlas Project provides a measure
of the risk of malaria transmission based on the suitability of air temperature at
national and regional levels (Hay and Snow, 2006). However, this information does
not permit to identify the local needs at more granular levels, such as local commu-
16Uncomplicated malaria cases, diagnosis and prevention services can be provided in health
posts but patients seeking clinical services are referred to health centres or hospitals. At the
community level, unpaid health workers may also carry out health promotion activities but there
is no information available on the service provided.
17The earliest information on health facilities starts in 2015 with the initial implementation of
the DHIS2; however, the complete coverage was only reached by the end of 2016.
18The Pooled Procurement mechanism set by the Global Fund aims to stabilise prices and ensure
market sustainability of health commodities by pooling demand of countries that participate to
the programme (The Global Fund, 2018).
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nities. The finest source of information comes from the 2013 Demographic Health
Survey (DHS) in the DRC, whereas information on local malaria funding is only
available from January 2017. Furthermore, the GPS location provided in the DHS
are randomised within a 5 km area for confidentiality purposes. This randomisation
poses a risk of misidentification of the burden of disease when matched with the
precise GPS position of health facilities. I adopt, therefore, a novel strategy that
identifies the highest burden of malaria based on the presence of mines.
A comprehensive list of artisanal mining locations in the Eastern DRC was com-
piled by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) through multiple data
collection campaigns conducted between 2009 and December 2017.19 The dataset
contains information on the geo-location (longitude and latitude) of 3,687 mining
sites artisanal mining sites in the entire provinces of North and South Kivu, as well
as in the bordering health zones in the provinces of Maniema, Ituri, Tshopo and
Tanganyika (Figure B.5, Appendix B).
Geocoding of health facilities. The geographic locations of health facilities
are only partially provided by the DHIS2. To complete the geocoding of the remain-
ing health facilities in the sample, I triangulate information from the DHIS2 with
two other sources of georeferenced data: ReliefWeb maps provided by the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Open-
StreetMap files. ReliefWeb provides a list of geocoded health facilities in North and
South Kivu related to OCHA’s humanitarian activities and OpenStreetMap is an
open database routinely enriched by field observations, satellite images and inte-
grated datasets. Overall, the data sample comprises 1,511 health facilities (Figure
B.2, Appendix B). Distances between health facilities and their closest mines are
obtained from the use of geostatistical tools available in Geographic Information
19IPIS research teams worked in collaboration with the Congolese Ministry of Mines, the Con-
golese Public Service for Assistance to Artisanal and Small-scale Mining, the Congolese Mining
Register, the Provincial Mining Divisions and representatives from local civil society organisations.
See Weyns et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the data and collection process.
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System (GIS) software.20
Furthermore, data on elevation and terrain features were obtained from NASA’s
Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) satellite images.21 Elevation informa-
tion is provided at a high spatial resolution (3 arc-second resolution or approximately
90 metres) which makes it possible to determine the precise geographical features
of each observation in the sample. In particular, distances from mines to health fa-
cilities are calculated based on the elevation and surface features in order to obtain
more realistic distance measures than the straight line Euclidean distance (Figure
B.4, Appendix B).22
Table B.1, Appendix B, presents summary statistics for key health facility char-
acteristics in mining and non-mining areas and their difference in means with the
full sample. Tables B.2 and B.3, Appendix B, restrict the sample to observations
that fall respectively within a 8 and 3 km window around the threshold. Columns
(1-3) and (4-6) of each table show the number of observations, sample mean and
robust standard deviations for non-mining and mining areas respectively. Columns
(7-9) indicate the difference in means between non-mining and mining areas, the
robust standard errors for the difference and the p-value of the test of equality of
the mean coefficients between the mining and non-mining samples. Whilst the base-
line characteristics present several statistically significant differences using the full
sample of observations, these differences tend to disappear as the sample shrinks
to smaller areas around the mining threshold. In particular, the difference of an-
20ArcGIS 10 and QGIS 2.8 have been used for this exercise.
21Terrain’s elevation data is produced from radar interferometry technique where a satellite
equipped with the instrument collects data to generate a digital elevation map of the Earth (see
https://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/.
22Satellite images of light density from the Suomi-NPP Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer
Suite (VIIRS) provides a useful source of information on local economic activity (Henderson et al.,
2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). The location of economic activity in the vicinity of
mining areas could potentially correlate with lower disruptions in the provision of health commodi-
ties nearby health facilities through better road access or higher consumption of commodities if
patients have higher incomes. However the resolution of the satellite images (approximately 1 km)
provides a noisy estimate of the location of economic activity compared to the precise data-location
of mines and health facilities collected in this study. Furthermore, all mines are located in rural
areas where night light density is low, particularly in this region of Africa. Hence, using night light
density might not bring a useful sense of the local variations in economic activity around mining
sites and health facilities.
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timalarial stock value is highly significant with the largest window selection but it
becomes insignificant as the sample reduces to closer distance from the mining area
threshold. The variations in these differences-in-means with the window selection
underline the importance of identifying a clear strategy to determine the causal
effects of mining areas on local aid for malaria.
3.4 Empirical framework and estimation
3.4.1 Setting the RD design
To test whether local aid received by health facilities reflects the burden of
malaria among the populations in their catchment areas, I rely on the stock value
of antimalarial commodities. However, locally assessing the risk of malaria trans-
mission is a challenging exercise. Despite the fact that health facilities report the
monthly number of malaria cases that could be used to determine the location of
the highest burden of the disease, the identification of malaria cases relies on the
availability of RDTs that are financed by external funding. An increase in the re-
ported number of malaria cases may therefore simply reflect a higher stock of RDTs
in the health facility. Furthermore, there could also exist some inconsistencies in
the reported number of malaria cases across health facilities that would affect the
estimation of the distribution of the burden of malaria. To overcome these issues, I
employ an instrument that correlates with the risk of malaria transmission without
being caused by external funding or data quality reporting. Following the public
health literature on malaria and artisanal scale mining, I propose to use mining
areas as the identification strategy.
Since mining areas are located where the exploitation of natural resources is
feasible, it constitutes a natural random selection framework where other local char-
acteristics between mining and non-mining areas are unlikely to vary discontinuously
at the mining boundary. As a result, the exposure of health facilities to the bur-
den of malaria is a discontinuous function of whether a health facility belongs to a
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mining area. To test whether the donors are targeting the highest needs, I use a
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design that evaluates the effect of mining areas on
aid for malaria to health facilities.
The central idea behind the RD design is to compare the treatment outcome
of units just above and below a threshold, denoted c. This threshold is based on
a running variable (or score), X, which is, in this case, the distance from a health
facility to its closest mine. The treatment group corresponds to health facilities
located within a close distance to mines (below the mining threshold) whilst health
facilities located above the mining threshold form the control group. The observed
outcome is local aid for malaria that is captured by the stock value of antimalarial
commodities, and the border of the mining area constitutes a threshold that gen-
erates a discontinuous probability of getting infected with malaria. I hypothesise
that the mining threshold should also cause a discontinuity in local aid for malaria
if donors are responsive to the local needs related to the disease. In this setting, the
RD framework requires that all other factors influencing the burden of the disease
are smooth across the threshold (Hahn et al., 2001). That is to say, the risk of
malaria transmission and aid for malaria on either side of the threshold should only
differ across health facilities in the probability of being in a mining area.
3.4.2 Estimation framework
The RD design uses the distance from a health facility to its corresponding
mining area threshold as the running variable. Specifically, the causal mining effect
is estimated using the following specification
Yi = α + β1minei + g(X˜i) + β3zi + i (3.1)
where X˜i is the centred variable Xi at the cutoff point (X˜i = Xi − c) and minei
is an indicator for mining area (X˜i ≤ 0). The outcome Yi corresponds to aid for
malaria to health facility i, and g(X˜i) is the RD polynomial which controls for
smooth functions of geographic distance from a mine to its closest health facility
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i.23 The key parameter of interest is β1, which captures the RD treatment effect.
Under the identifying assumption that health facilities in non-mining areas form a
valid counterfactual, β1 identifies the effects of mines on local aid for malaria. The
vector of covariates zi includes geographic characteristics for facility i: elevation,
slope, distance to the closest regional distribution centre of health commodities,
distance to armed conflicts24 and the number of mines in the vicinity of the facility.25
In addition, most health facilities in the data sample are located in a mountainous
region where the average altitude is about 1,300 meters (Table B.1, Appendix B); the
use of chordal or relative Euclidean distances might then lead to misleading results.26
I rely instead on a more realistic distance based on slope and surface elevation using
information collected from NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission.27
The RD approach requires that all relevant factors, besides treatment, vary
smoothly across the mining threshold. The underlying assumption is that health
facilities within a small bandwidth on either side of the threshold should only differ
in their probability of receiving malaria cases for treatment and not in their envi-
ronmental conditions or inherent capacity to treat patients. I assess the validity of
this assumption in section 3.5.
For robustness checks, I also present both parametric and nonparametric esti-
mation of the causal effect of mining area on local aid. The parametric approach
assumes a functional form of the regression function. Define the conditional expec-
tation of the outcome given the distance variable on each side of the threshold as
follows
23The local Linear Regression is used in the baseline results, where g(X˜i) = δ1X˜i + δ2mineiX˜i.
The presence of the interaction terms allows for two different regression functions on each side of
the threshold. To test the stability of the findings, I also report results with a cubic model that
provides a more flexible form of the polynomial.
24I use data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) which reports
georeferenced information on political violences and protests between January and December 2017.
25The purpose of including baseline covariates is only to explore the sensitivity of the results,
as they should not affect the estimated discontinuity in a RD setting (D. Lee and Lemieux (2010);
Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, et al. (2018)).
26The chordal distance is the distance between two points on a curve and accounts for the
spherical shape of the Earth.
27Slope was calculated from this elevation using ArcGIS 10.4.1; the distance based on slope was
calculated from the path distance function in ArcGIS.
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E
[
Yi(0) |Xi = c+
]
= g(Xi) (3.2)
E
[
Yi(1) |Xi = c−
]
= β1 + g(Xi) (3.3)
Under the parametric approach, the functional form of g(.) is assumed to be
known and the estimate of the treatment effect is given by the least-square estimates
of β1. Using the full data sample for the estimation of the RD effect around the
threshold is not well-suited to perform an RD analysis, as its internal validity relies
on the comparability of observations around the boundary: a global polynomial may
produce estimates sensitive to observations far away from the threshold (D. Lee and
Lemieux (2010); Gelman and Imbens (2018)). Hence, I restrict the data sample to
small neighbourhoods around the threshold to ensure the comparability of units on
each side of the threshold.28
Controlling parametrically the function form of the regression function may, how-
ever, produce biased estimates if the approximating function is insufficiently close
to the true function. Thus, most RD studies employ a nonparametric estimation
through local modelling that fits at any given point x0 a parametric function fitted
only to a fraction of observations in a neighbourhood of x0 (Fan and Gijbels, 1996).
The idea behind this approach is to locally approximate the unknown conditional
mean function by a local polynomial function of degree p, using Taylor’s expansion
in the neighbourhood of interest (under the continuity assumption of the function
g(.)).
Polynomial choice and bandwidth selection
The choice of the polynomial order p and the neighbourhood selection (or band-
width h) around the cutoff are critical in determining the treatment effect. High-
order polynomials have the potential to increase the accuracy of the approximated
28In the results section, I show that the estimates of the RD effects are robust to various window
selections.
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function for a given bandwidth, but it comes at the cost of high variability; they
could also lead to approximations errors near the cutoff if they over-fit the data
(Gelman and Imbens, 2018). Similarly, to ensure that the characteristics of the
treatment and the control group are almost identical, the units should be selected
as close to the threshold as possible given the data availability. Whilst smaller
bandwidths reduce the misspecification bias, they also increase the variability of the
estimator. The common practice is then to use a low polynomial order and control
the accuracy of the approximation by the bandwidth (Gelman and Imbens, 2018).
In particular, Hahn et al. (2001) recommend using local linear regression due to
its better boundary bias properties. In the following section, I report the baseline
results with the local linear model and test their robustness with a cubic polynomial.
The local linear regression procedure consists of estimating two weighted least
squares regressions on each side of the cutoff. To obtain the weights, I use a tri-
angular kernel where weights decay with the distance from the cutoff point.29 In
addition, I follow Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) who propose a method-
ology to obtain robust confidence intervals by correcting for the bias introduced by
the approximation of the RD local polynomial estimator. The procedure consists of
augmenting the confidence intervals centred around the bias-corrected RD estima-
tor and using a standard error that reflects the uncertainty introduced in the biased
estimation. In the following section, I report the results of the RD treatment effect
using this data-driven methodology, referred to as ”CCT”.
3.4.3 Mining threshold and fuzzy RD design
As described earlier in the text, I cannot rely on the number of reported malaria
cases to estimate locally the risk of malaria transmission due to donors’ financing of
RDTs.
Since mining areas create a conducive environment for malaria proliferation, the
risk of malaria transmission in the catchment area of a health facility should be a
29Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the estimation results should be less sensitive to the
choice of the kernel function than to the bandwidth selection.
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function of the distance between the facility and its nearest mine. I define a mining
area as the maximum distance from a mining site that miners are travelling to seek
malaria treatment. This distance is crucial in my empirical strategy as it will be used
to determine the mining threshold separating the control and treatment groups.
I first exploit the findings from the literature on patients’ utilisation of health
services in rural areas. Stock (1983) shows that in Nigeria 89% of patients in rural
health centres are coming from a distance that is less than 10 km. In the malaria
context, Noor et al. (2003) explore the patient’s travelling distance to health facilities
in Kenya and find that the median distance is 8 km for patients in rural areas.
Likewise, the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) conducted in 2007 and 2013 in the
DRC reveals that the patient’s travelling to a health facility is less than 2 hours for
75% of the rural population - which would represent a distance ranging from 6 to 8
km at the average human walking speed ranging from 3 to 4 km per hour.30
Second, I examine the distance that separates mining sites from the living place
of miners to account for the possibility that a health facility and a mining site are sit-
uated in opposite directions from the location of a miner’s household. Dibwe (2008)
examines working conditions in artisanal mining sites in the Katanga province of the
DRC and finds that more than 97% of miners are living within 7 km from the mines.
More recently, Faber et al. (2017) exploit data on miners from a random sample of
150 mining areas in the DRC and show that that the average traveling distance of
miners from their household is 7 km.31 Based on these findings, I hypothesise that
the maximum distance separating a mine to a health facility with a significant share
of miner patients should range between 13 and 15 km.
Next, I analyse how this range of mining thresholds fits my data sample. Specifi-
cally, the threshold should indicate a discontinuity in the burden of malaria. I define
malaria prevalence as the mean share of malaria cases reported by a health facility
30Note that the limited paved road network in eastern DRC may further reduce the ability to
travel large distances.
31Faber et al. (2017) also find that the median travelling distance of miners is 3 km, which
suggests the presence of outliers with potentially far greater distances. However, the quasi absence
of road network in the Eastern DRC, where my data sample is, should reduce the risk of having
large travelling distance among miners.
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out of the total population of its catchment area. Figure B.6, Appendix B, presents
the malaria prevalence as a function of the distance from a health facility to its clos-
est mining site. Each point plots an average value within a bin that represents a 1 km
interval. Figure B.7, Appendix B, shows the non-parametric estimations of malaria
prevalence conditional on the distance to the closest mine, using a kernel-weighted
local polynomial regression of order 1. In both figures, the malaria prevalence is
found to fluctuate within a constant interval that ranges from approximately 12%
to 18% with the first ten kilometres from the mining sites. A sharp decrease in the
burden of malaria occurs at a distance lying between 14 and 15 km from mines,
where the malaria prevalence falls by more than 5%. The fluctuations in the disease
prevalence are not recovering from the decrease beyond this point where the 95%
confidence interval ranges from about 7% to 14%, which suggests a reduced burden
of malaria for all health facilities located beyond 15 km. This visual evidence is
remarkably consistent with the findings from the literature.32 I, therefore, select
the midpoint distance between the two sides of the jump as the mining threshold,
corresponding to 14.5 km. The selected threshold should ensure that patients are
not seeking health services above or below this boundary. In the next section, I also
assess the robustness of the results when varying the mining threshold.
An additional concern relates to the potential smooth geographic variations in
aid for malaria. As argued above, the discontinuity in the burden of malaria at the
boundary of mining areas should induce a change in donors’ behaviour if they are
accurately targeting the highest needs related to malaria. However, donors might
also smoothly respond to the discontinuity in the risk of malaria if the density of
health facilities is high at the boundary of mining areas. One explanation is that
other factors besides the distance of a health facility from a mine might play a
role in the decision making of malaria patients when they select a facility (such as
quality of health services). To explore this possibility, I examine the geographic
32Although this distance falls within a similar range to the findings from the literature, the
concern related to the potential endogeneity issue caused by the use of RDTs remains. In the result
section, I further discuss about this concern when presenting the results of the decomposition of
the RD effects by commodity.
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distribution of health facilities around the mining threshold. Figure B.9, Appendix
B, depicts the cumulative distribution function of health facilities conditional on
the distance to the nearest facility. The data sample is restricted on health facilities
that are located within 4 km from a mining threshold(blue dashed line) and within
10 km from the threshold (red line). The graph reveals the scattered distribution
of health facilities in the Eastern DRC. The minimum distance between two health
facilities is higher than 5 km for more than 70% of health facilities located within
10 km from the threshold, and almost 50% of health facilities within 4 km from
the threshold have the closest facility located beyond 10 km. Only 10% of facilities
are separated by less than 3 km. Under such conditions, malaria patients may have
very limited possibility to select a health facility on other criteria than distance.
Similarly, the probability of occurrence that two health facilities are separated by
only a small distance across the mining threshold is very low. This evidence suggests
that donors should simply not have the opportunity to smooth aid allocation within
small distances across the threshold.
In a sharp RD design, the exposure to the risk of malaria transmission in health
facilities should fall abruptly from 1 to 0 at the mining threshold, an assumption
that is unlikely to hold since other external factors affecting the risk of malaria
transmission also exist in non-mining areas and not everyone is at risk of getting
infected with the disease within mining areas (for example, some individuals may
naturally acquire immunity to malaria due to long exposure to infectious mosquito
bites). Yet, the disproportionate burden of malaria induced by mining areas creates a
discontinuity in the share of malaria cases around the threshold, as shown previously.
To be more precise, I redefine the problem as follows: let p be the share of malaria
cases out the total population in the catchment area of the health facility, and pm
the minimum share of malaria cases that characterises a health facility located in
an area with high burden of malaria. I further assume that the probability that a
facility receives a minimum share pm of malaria cases out of the total population that
it serves is uniformly distributed within a mining area. The uniform distribution
can be a good approximation of the true probability distribution if the latter does
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not decrease significantly between a mining site and its corresponding threshold.
This assumption is supported by the fact that the risk of malaria transmission by
mosquito bites is significantly higher in the presence of mosquito breeding sites such
as mines, leading to ”hotspot” areas where the disease is endemic (Carter et al.,
2000).33 As a result, all neighbouring populations of mining sites that fall under
mosquito flight range distances are intensively exposed to mosquito bites; within
small geographic distances from the breeding spots, the risk of malaria transmission
should be high and spatially homogeneous.
It follows that
Pr(p ≥ pm |Mine = 1) > Pr(p ≥ pm |Mine = 0)
where Mine is an indicator for mining area. This setting forms a fuzzy RD
design where the jump in the probability p of high exposure to malaria is less than 1
at the mining threshold, but a change in the risk of transmission exists. The mining
area is used as an instrument for the risk of malaria transmission to estimate the
impact of the latter on local aid for malaria (D. Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Define Di a binary variable which equals 1 if a health facility i is exposed to
high risk of malaria transmission and 0 otherwise. The estimation of the model for
malaria burden on local aid is expressed as
Yi = α0 + β0Di + f(X˜i) + γzi + ζi (3.4)
and the probability of malaria transmission is given by
Pr(Di = 1 |Xi) = α1 + τminei + h(X˜i) + γ1zi + υi (3.5)
where f(X˜i) and h(X˜i) are the RD polynomials which control for smooth functions
of geographic distance from a mine to its closest health facility i. In this setting, the
33To be precise, (Carter et al., 2000) show that the distance from the breeding sites where the
risk of malaria transmission is the greatest ranges from 2 to 3 km.
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discontinuity in local aid (equation 3.1) is simply the reduced-form estimate obtained
from the substitution of the two above equations, the discontinuity in the risk of
malaria transmission being the first-stage estimate (equation 3.5). In the reduced-
form (equation 3.1), β1 captures the intent-to-treat effect (β1 = β0τ), which is the
average effect of assignment to treatment. In other words, β1 captures the effect
on local aid from being exposed to a high risk of malaria, as a consequence of the
health facility being located in a mining area, as opposed to not being exposed to a
high malaria risk.
The instrumental variable approach relies on two important conditions: 1) that
the mining area is a good predictor for the risk of malaria transmission and 2) that
mining areas only affect local aid through the increased risk of malaria transmission
(exclusion restriction). I provide some supportive evidence for the first condition
in the results section, which is in line with the findings from the public health lit-
erature. The exclusion restriction is more difficult to demonstrate as unobservable
characteristics determining the allocation decisions of donors might exist. However,
health donors have clear objectives of reaching the vulnerable populations, irrespec-
tive of their locations, and ensure the equality of healthcare access (WHO, 2015a).
A preference for targeting mining areas, which tend to be wealthier, would clearly
violate the equity objective. Another concern is if mining areas tend to have, in gen-
eral, better transport conditions, health products may reached the health facilities
located in mining areas more easily. In turn, this would translate into a higher stock
of health products in mining areas and therefore higher aid for malaria. However, I
show in the results section that there does not exist a systematic difference between
the transport conditions within mining and non mining areas, as captured by the
proximity to conflict events and the distance to the regional centres for the distri-
bution of health products. Based on this evidence and on the theoretical objective
of donors, the risk that the exclusion restriction does not hold appears limited.
Finally, I remove hospitals from the sample selection as patients tend to travel
more distance to hospitals than to smaller health centres (Stock, 1983). The risk
is that they may invalidate the choice of the threshold if patients from mining sites
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seek treatment in non-mining areas. In addition, the National Malaria Programme
indicates that malaria curative treatments in hospitals should primarily relate to
severe malaria cases whereas health centres should offer treatment for simple malaria
cases (MSP, 2011). This corroborates the fact that all health facilities in the sample
have stocks of antimalarial commodities to diagnose and treat simple malaria cases.
As a result, I hypothesise that patients should not seek treatment in a hospital when
they have symptoms related to simple malaria case.34
Lastly, the malaria literature has documented that children are at a higher risk
of malaria transmission than adults (D. Smith et al., 2007). This fact could pose a
threat to the comparability of the treatment and control groups if mining areas are
mostly deprived of children. Although there is imprecise information on child labour
in mines, recent evidence suggests that children in the DRC may often engage in
mining activities, regardless of international labour standards on child labour (Faber
et al., 2017).35
3.5 Results
Before presenting the estimation results for the effects of mines on local malaria
funding, I start by providing evidence of the plausibility of the two main identi-
fication assumptions of a valid RD design: continuity around the threshold (no
self-selection) and random assignment.
3.5.1 Validity
The assumption of the RD design would be violated if health facilities can ma-
nipulate the running variable, the geographic distance from the health facility to
34A caveat is that the existence of user fees could also play a role in the decision of patients to
seek treatment to a health facility. Unfortunately, no information on setting user fees in health
facilities in these regions was found; I can, thereby, only assume that user fees should not vary
significantly among public health facilities within small geographic distances.
35The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted in the DRC in 2010 reveals that
more than 60% of children in Eastern DRC are engaged in labour activities including mining. More
recently, Faber et al. (2017) use a survey from a random sample of 150 mining areas in the DRC
and find that about 13% of miners were aged below 18.
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its closest mine. However, this assignment does not leave much room for strategic
behaviour as most of artisanal mining activities should be more recent than the
presence of health facilities.36 To investigate the possibility of manipulation of the
running variable, McCrary (2008) suggests to examine the distribution of units on
both side of the threshold: a systematic manipulating behaviour would be revealed
by a peak in the distribution of units on one side of the threshold as health facilities
select their preferred group. The objective of the test consists of identifying a dis-
continuity in the density of health facilities around the threshold that would indicate
that units are altering their assignment. Figure B.8, Appendix B, presents a visuali-
sation of the density function of the running variable, which does not reveal obvious
discontinuity around the threshold. Note that the running variable is centred at the
threshold point, so negative and positive distance correspond respectively to mining
and non-mining areas. The smoothness of the density suggests there is little scope
for selective sorting of health facilities across the RD threshold.
To formally assess the validity of the continuity assumption, I also perform sev-
eral density continuity tests of the running variable based on a data-driven procedure
proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2017) to explore the possibility of self-selection of units
around the threshold. Table B.4, Appendix B, presents the results of the density
test, where the null hypothesis corresponds to equal density functions of the treat-
ment and the control group. The first two columns correspond to the choice of the
bandwidth (in metres) on each side of the threshold, columns (3) and (4) indicate
the number of observations used and the last column gives the p-value of the test.
I perform the test using two different MSE optimal bandwidth on each side of the
threshold (Cattaneo et al., 2017) for which the results are reported in the first row.
The second row corresponds to the density test which determines the possibility of
equality of the two cumulative distribution functions of the running variable on each
side of the threshold. In both cases, the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of
continuity.
36Revamping health infrastructures in the DRC is a well-recongized priority, so it is unlikely
that the construction of health facilities preceded recent mining exploitations (MSP, 2017).
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The falsification (or placebo) test provides further evidence about the plausi-
bility of the identification strategy. Placebo covariates are the pre-intervention (or
predetermined) covariates that should not be affected by the mining area under a
valid RD design. For each of these covariates, I perform a local polynomial regres-
sion where the predetermined covariate is the outcome variable, in order to test the
existence of an RD treatment effect. Figure C.13, Appendix B, provides a visual
effect of the mining area on the predetermined covariates, where the running vari-
able is the distance to mines centred around the threshold (mining and non-mining
areas corresponds respectively to the right and left hand side of the threshold). Im-
portantly, these graphs do not present visual evidence of a discontinuity between
mining and non-mining areas for each of the predetermined covariates.
3.5.2 Mining effect on local malaria funding
Table B.5, Appendix B, reports the parametric estimates of the effect of mining
on the outcome of interest and the placebo outcomes from equation (3.1). Columns
(1) and (2) report the OLS estimates of the RD treatment effect on local aid
for malaria using a linear model in distance. The corresponding window selec-
tion restricts health facilities to be located within 3 km from the mining threshold.
Columns (3) and (4) present the OLS estimates when health facilities fall within 8
km from the threshold, and I use a cubic polynomial model to give more flexibility in
the approximation of the regression function as the latter spans more observations.
For each window selection, I explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of
baseline covariates.
As expected in a valid RD design, the coefficient estimates are not affected by the
covariates whilst the precision slightly improves. The RD estimates on local aid for
malaria indicate a significant positive effect of mining areas that is stable across the
window selections. Specifically, the presence of mines induces an increase in local aid
per capita between $0.06 and $0.07 at the health facility level either when facilities
are restricted to be near the threshold (less than 3 km) or further away (within 8
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km); these effects are statistically significant, even with the largest window. With an
average local population of 10,000 in their catchment areas, health facilities within
mining areas receive an additional aid for malaria that ranges between $600 and
$700 per month.
The bottom part of the table provides the results of placebo tests which in-
vestigate the presence of a mining effect on the outcomes of four pre-determined
covariates: total expenditures, total revenue, number of health workers and number
of births per health facility. Selecting these covariates enables to test the existence of
significant discontinuity across the mining threshold in some of the leading features
of health facilities’ performance that could relate to local aid absorption capacity.
Expenditures and revenue capture the financial dynamic of health facilities whilst
the number of births and the number of health workers can capture the ability of
health facilities to attract and treat patients respectively. Importantly, these indi-
cators could be causal factors for local aid targeting if donors are able to identify
health facilities’ characteristics. A systematic difference in these placebo covariates
between mining and non-mining areas would then invalidate the RD design. How-
ever, the reported p-values indicate that mining areas have statistically insignificant
effects on these placebo outcomes.
Table B.6, Appendix B, documents the non-parametric estimates. The RD treat-
ment effect corresponds to the difference of the estimates of two locally weighted
regressions on each side of the cutoff using a triangular kernel function. Following
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), the reported results are based on robust
confidence intervals and MSE-optimal bandwidth.37 Column (1) estimates the base-
line regression on the sample defined by the MSE-optimal bandwidth and using a
local linear polynomial in distance to the threshold. Column (2) adds baseline co-
variates corresponding to geographic characteristics (elevation and slope) and the
number of mines in the surrounding area of the health facility. Columns (3) and (4)
replicate the first two columns using a local polynomial of order 3.
37The MSE-optimal bandwidth selection and point estimators are specifically chosen to include
covariates (see Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, et al. (2018) who propose efficient driven methods to
incorporate covariates in the RD design).
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The estimates of the contribution of mines on local aid for malaria are all statis-
tically significant and consistent with the parametric results, ranging from $0.06 to
$0.07 per capita. Once again, the bottom part of the table documents the results
of the placebo tests on the predetermined covariates and provide evidence of the
validity of the RD design.
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Choice of neighbourhood. Although the estimates of mining areas on lo-
cal aid for malaria are consistent across both parametric and non-parametric ap-
proaches, they might be sensitive to the choice of neighbourhood. In particular,
choosing smaller bandwidths has the advantage of reducing the misspecification er-
ror related to the approximation of the true function around the threshold, but it
comes at the price of greater variability of the RD estimate. The first two graphs in
figure B.12, Appendix B, present the sensitivity of the coefficient of aid for malaria to
the bandwidth selection and the polynomial order in the non-parametric approach.38
The bandwidth selection following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) is re-
ferred to as ”CCT” on the x-axis of the first graph, and is also used to obtain the RD
estimates for varying polynomial orders in the second graph. These graphs reveal
that the estimates are remarkably constant across varying neighbourhoods around
the threshold and specification models.
Mining threshold. The third graph in figure B.12, Appendix B, presents the
sensitivity of the RD estimate to the choice of the threshold. This exercise allows to
test the validity of the 14.5 km mining threshold described in section 3.4 and enables
to estimate an upper bound on the discontinuity effect on antimalarial stock value by
varying the threshold distance between mining and non-mining area. As expected,
the RD coefficient estimate is sensitive to the location of the threshold as the latter
38The sensitivity analysis leads to similar results with the parametric approach.
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is a critical element of the RD design. The variations of the coefficient estimate pro-
vide suggestive evidence for the validity of the 14.5 km threshold selection. The RD
estimates are alternately positive and negative but centred around zero when the
threshold is below 14.5 km, that is, supposedly located within the mining area. This
finding is consistent with the assumption that the mining border is at least located
at a 14.5 km distance from the mine: given the uniform distribution of the burden
of malaria within the ”true” mining area, there should be little variations in aid for
malaria between the health facilities of these areas. Thus, the average difference
of aid for malaria between the treatment and the control group conditional on the
distance from the mine should not be systematically positive or negative when the
threshold of the RD design is located within the ”true” mining area. Similarly, for
every threshold located beyond the ”true” threshold of the mining area, the burden
of malaria should decay gradually with distance as the mining effects shade off. The
RD estimates should once again be centred around zero, assuming no other external
factors would cause a systematic difference in aid for malaria between the treatment
and control group. The point estimator of interest is then located at the ”true” min-
ing area threshold, for which the RD estimate should reach its maximum value: if
the treatment and the control group are correctly identified, the RD strategy based
on the ”true” threshold is cleared from any unit that would incorrectly be assigned to
the treatment or control group, causing a downward bias estimation of the RD effect.
The bottom graph in figure B.12, Appendix B, indicates that the upper bound of
the RD estimate is obtained with the 14.5 km threshold which has the highest point
estimator and is the only estimate whose 95% confidence interval is entirely positive.
Another concern is that some patients might decide to seek healthcare in another
health facility for various reasons that constitute the unobserved characteristics of
patients. As an additional robustness check, tables B.7 and B.8 present the para-
metric and non-parametric estimations respectively when I restrict the data sample
to health facilities that are separated by at least 3 km. The coefficient estimates are
comparable to the main results, providing additional support for the RD strategy.
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Aid targeting within mining areas. Donors could also perfectly observe the
distribution of the needs within a mining area and decide to restrict the allocation
of malaria resources to the closest health facilities from mining sites.39 This donor’s
strategic decision could have detrimental implication on the availability of care in
health facilities away from the mining site, but it could arguably ease the targeting
approach if mining sites have better road access within mining areas or if donors
choose to strictly targeting miners. Importantly, this assumption would explain the
relative small difference that is observed in aid for malaria between health facilities
around the mining threshold. I explore this hypothesis in figure B.13, Appendix
B, by analysing how aid for malaria at the facility level relates to the distance
to its closest mine. The figure shows the non-parametric estimations of local aid
conditional on the distance from a health facility, using a kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression of order 1. The kernel function is epanechnikov and the the
bandwidth corresponds to 700 metres. The y-axis represents local aid for malaria
per capita at the health facility level and the x-axis corresponds to the distance from
the health facility to its closest mine in metres. The shaded area denotes the 95%
confidence interval of the coefficients. The plot shows a relative constant share of
aid for malaria in health facilities located within mining areas, independent of the
distance from the mine. This graph, therefore, suggests that there is no evidence
that donors choose to target the closest health facilities around mining sites.
3.5.4 Decomposition by commodity and additional tests
I now turn to the decomposition of the mining effects by aid allocated to each
antimalarial commodity. The baseline results, presented above, focus on all com-
modities to locally capture the amount of aid for malaria. However, each commodity
has a specific role in tackling the disease burden, which can be decomposed in three
sub-categories: prevention, identification and curative treatment. The aid decom-
39As discussed above, the burden of malaria should be equally distributed within a mining area
so this donor’s approach would entail inequalities in treatment access among patients within the
area.
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position enables to examine how the burden of malaria affects the allocation of aid
resource to each of these sub-categories.
Figure B.10, Appendix B, provides a visual discontinuity on the stock value
of ACT and SP against the distance to the mining threshold in panel A and B
respectively. Both plots fit a local cubic polynomial in distance; the jump in outcome
at the threshold appears much larger for the stock value of SP than ACT, although
in both cases, the effects fade away with distance.
Table B.9, Appendix B, reproduces the table with the parametric regressions
presented for the effects on local aid for malaria. Column(1) corresponds to the
OLS estimates of the mining area effects on each antimalarial commodity using a
3 km window around the threshold and a linear model in distance. The second
column reports the OLS estimates for observations falling in a 8 km window from
the threshold and using a cubic model in distance. The mining effect is statistically
significant for the stock value of all antimalarial commodities for both window se-
lection except for ITN. The highest mining effects are found to be on aid for SP and
ACT for which the stock value increase by $0.04 and $0.02 per capita respectively,
whilst the effect on the stock value of RDT is marginal (less than $0.01 per capita).
Table B.10, Appendix B, shows the results with the non-parametric approach,
where column (1) and (2) estimate respectively a local linear polynomial and a local
cubic polynomial in distance. Compared to the parametric approach, the estimate
of aid for ACT and SP are lowered by approximately $0.005 per capita when using a
local linear model; the estimate for RDT remains unchanged. When the specification
involves a local cubic model in distance, only the stock value of SP and RDT are
statistically significant, and aid to SP reaches almost $0.05 per capita.
Together, the outcomes from parametric and non-parametric estimations illus-
trate important findings. First, the effects of mining areas on aid allocated to each
antimalarial commodity are relatively constant with respect to the distance from
the mining threshold, which attests to the robustness of the results. Second, the
mining effect on aid for malaria is largely driven by the effect on aid for SP which
accounts for 65% (0.046/0.072 = 0.64) of the overall mining effect on local aid for
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malaria. The remaining part of additional aid in mining areas is mostly devoted to
ACTs (about 22 %) and RDTs (11 %).
Disentangling the mining effects on antimalarial commodities. A po-
tential concern with the increase in aid for SP commodity relative to ACT is that
health facilities within mining areas might be subject to systematically more fre-
quent disruptions in the provision of a specific commodity for reasons inherent to
the presence of mines. To assess this eventuality, table B.11, Appendix B, documents
the mining effects on the monthly number of stock-out days, consumption and the
share of consumption in the stock level for each antimalarial commodity. Column
(1) reports the estimates for SP and columns (2)-(5) decompose the mining effects
for each age category of ACT treatment that corresponds to age-specific dosage.
The last two columns present the estimates of ITN and RDT respectively. The RD
estimates of the monthly number of stock-out days are statistically insignificant for
all commodities, indicating that mining areas do not disrupt the provision of a spe-
cific commodity. Monthly consumption is statistically significant for all commodities
except for ACT to children between 6 and 13 and RDT. This result confirms the
predominance of the burden of malaria within mining areas through increased de-
mand in antimalarial medicines, in particular among children between 1 and 5 for
whom the ACT consumption rose by 4%. The bottom part of the table reveals
that the share of consumption in the stock level of each commodity has a negative
coefficient estimate which is explained by the higher stock level of antimalarial in
mining areas. The estimates are only statistically significant and negative for SP
and RDT, indicating that the increase in demand (monthly consumption) within
mining areas for these two commodities is lower than their increase in supply. This
last result corroborates the previous finding of SP receiving the highest share of aid
for malaria.
As a final test, I explore the existence of systematic differences between mining
and non-mining areas in the sub-populations targeted by donors. As previously de-
scribed, ACT treatments are characterised by specific dosages which relate to four
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different age categories (below 1, between 1 and 5, between 6 and 13 and above 13)
whilst SP is a preventive treatment specific to pregnancy. Unfortunately, data lim-
itation prevents from exploring the distribution of age population between mining
and non-mining areas. I can therefore only assume that this distribution is similar
in the two areas and I rely on the additional burden of malaria caused by the mines
as the unique driver for the provision of ACT drugs.40 Regarding SP preventive
treatment, the commodity is given to pregnant women during routine antenatal
care (ANC) visits (WHO, 2018a). I examine the presence of a discontinuity in the
population of pregnant women by using the reported number of ANC visits.41 Table
B.12, Appendix B, documents the effect of mining areas on the share of ANC visits
per capita and malaria prevalence using non-parametric estimations. Columns (1)
and (2) denote respectively the local linear and cubic models. Malaria prevalence
is defined as the share of malaria cases received in health facility per local popula-
tion. The RD estimate for the share of ANC visits is statistically insignificant which
could reasonably be interpreted as an equal distribution of pregnant women between
mining and non-mining areas. This last result, combined with the findings on the
similarities in the number of stock-out days for all commodities between the two
areas, provides suggestive evidence that malaria prevalence should be the primary
causal factor for the determination of local aid for malaria.
Equity of local aid. Whilst local aid for malaria increases by $0.06 per capita
in mining areas, the decomposition of the mining effects reveals an unequal distri-
bution of resources allocated to antimalarial commodities. I further document how
the distribution of local aid for malaria is matching the needs by examining the vari-
40One concern with this assumption is that mining areas could be characterised with lower rate
of children due to the health and safety hazards of mines. However, as described in section 3.4,
recent studies on child labour suggests that the presence of children should not be significantly
lower within mining areas.
41For the validity of the test, I hypothesise that antenatal care attendance among pregnant
women do not systematically differ in mining areas, an assumption that is not directly testable.
Although pregnant women are banned from mining activities, mining work is also more lucrative
for them than any other activities surrounding mining areas (Buss et al., 2017). Hence, I suspect
that pregnant women in mining areas should have little incentives to move home during their
pregnancy and attend a different health facility for antenatal care.
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ations in the stock of commodities with respect to the change in burden of malaria
between mining and non-mining areas. The bottom part of table B.12, Appendix
B, corresponds to the RD estimation of mining effects on malaria prevalence using
a local linear polynomial. In mining areas, the number of malaria cases increases
between 7 and 8 percent when the nonparametric estimation employs a local linear
and a cubic model respectively; both results are statistically significant.42 In base-
line results presented earlier, mining areas were found to have a small but significant
effect on aid for malaria. The rise in local aid could underestimate the coefficient
of the mining effect on malaria prevalence if aid for malaria contributes (through
preventive treatment) to reduce the burden of the disease. The obtained result on
malaria prevalence should therefore represents a lower bound estimate.
Next, I quantify the results on local aid for malaria by estimating the theoretical
costs that should be borne at the health facility level for the prevention, diagnosis
and treatment for an additional unit of risk of malaria transmission. Using the prices
of antimalarial commodities from the Pooled Procurement mechanism of the Global
Fund (Figure B.14, Appendix B), the total monthly estimated cost for providing
malaria treatment and prevention per capita is $1.25.43 This result is in line with
the finding from WHO (2015a) who estimates that the cost of curative treatment is
approximately $1 in Sub-Saharan African countries. The total cost is decomposed
as follows: ACT $0.7, SP $0.09, RDT $0.25 and ITN $0.21.
The amount of aid required for financing diagnosis, prevention and treatment of
malaria relates to the disease burden within a given area. Figure B.15, Appendix
B, plots the evolution of malaria-related costs with the additional risk of malaria
transmission. The horizontal red dashed line shows the additional aid for malaria
42Malaria cases are usually detected at the facility level by RDTs, the latter being provided
mostly by donors. This could pose a threat of endogeneity bias but table B.11, Appendix B,
reports insignificant effects on the number of stock-out days of RDTs between mining and non-
mining areas. This means that the number of detected cases should not be more constrained by
the availability of RDT in health facilities located in non-mining area.
43To calculate the overall monthly financial costs per capita, I rely on the decomposition of
the Congolese population that was taken from the United Nations World Population Prospects:
57 percent of adults (above 14), 25% of children between 6 and 14 and 16% that are less than 5.
The share of pregnant women and children who are receiving SP medicines is assumed to be 25%
following the estimations in the National Health Accounts in the DRC (MSP, 2017).
83
that is received in high burden areas according to the nonparametric RD estimation
(Table B.6, Appendix B) of the mining effect. The graph indicates that local aid
can potentially cover the costs associated to the burden of malaria when the addi-
tional risk of malaria transmission does not exceed 4.4%. Beyond this point, health
facilities within mining areas do not get their share of aid.
What is the actual risk of malaria transmission? As discussed above, I find that
malaria prevalence increases by at least 7 percent in mining areas. At this rate, local
aid should increase by a minimum of $0.09 per capita to fully meet the needs related
to malaria. On the other hand, the results of both parametric and nonparametric
RD estimations of the mining effects on local aid indicate that the increase in aid
for malaria ranges between $0.05 and $0.06. Presumably, this result implies that at
least more than one third of the additional malaria needs in areas with high burden
of the disease is not financed by aid.
Altogether, these results suggest two main conclusions on the patterns of aid
targeting. First, the additional risk of malaria transmission is not followed by a
proportional increase in local funding for malaria curative treatments. Given the
cost of malaria prevention and treatment approximately equals to $1.25 per patient,
a minimum 7 % increase in malaria prevalence would require an additional $0.09 of
aid per capita whilst health facilities are found to receive less than $0.06 per capita.
Second, aid for preventive commodities for pregnant women (SP) are more re-
sponsive to the change in the risk of malaria transmission, although this dispropor-
tionate response raises concerns about the effectiveness of aid for this commodity.
Whilst the estimated cost of SP represents approximately 7% of the overall costs
of providing antimalarial commodities, SP accounts for more than 65% of the addi-
tional aid allocated to high risk areas. On the other hand, the share of ACT is 56%
in the overall antimalarial cost whilst only 22% of aid is targeting it. There is no
evidence that external funding for insecticide-treated bed nets (ITN) is higher for
mining areas.
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion
Targeting of health needs is central in low-income countries with high disease
burden and limited resources (Dupas and Miguel, 2017). Important health gains
could be achieved through more precise allocation of resources to areas with the
greatest health risk.44 In this study, I exploit the variations in the burden of malaria
between mining and non-mining areas to estimate the response of donors to local
needs. Aid targeting of population’s needs can be assessed through analysing the
quantities of health products delivered in existing health facilities, which has been
shown to be the most cost-effective distribution method (De Allegri et al., 2009).
Using a novel data source to track aid for malaria at the health facility level, I find no
evidence to support the assumption that donors are accurately targeting areas with
the greatest burden of malaria. Although I document a significant effect of local
variations in the burden of malaria on local aid for the disease, the evidence also
suggests that local populations with the highest burden of malaria do not receive
the highest share of aid for malaria comparatively to those living in neighbouring
areas with reduced exposure to malaria infection.
First, the small increase in local aid for malaria does not match the costs incurred
for the extra burden of malaria in mining areas. In particular, my findings suggest
that local aid is covering at maximum 60 percent of the additional costs induced
by the additional risk of malaria transmission. Second, the decomposition of aid by
targeted population reveals that resources are unequally distributed with respect to
local health needs; this inequality is in turn exacerbated by the overall mistargeting
of aid for malaria.
These results pinpoint some limitations in the actual aid allocation and suggests
that aid could be more closely tailored to local health needs. Better allocation of aid
could generate health efficiency gains and reduce inequities in treatment access for
patients across areas with different burdens of malaria (difference in allocated aid)
44As a recent example in the DRC, C. Dolan et al. (2019) show that national insecticide-treated
bed net campaigns against malaria between 2009 and 2013 achieve significant mortality reduction
among children under 5 only in areas with the highest risk of malaria transmission.
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and within areas (across population sub-groups). In cases where health information
is fragmented and difficult to collect, donors could seek the engagement of local
community leaders in aid targeting decisions (Alatas et al., 2012).
My findings resonate with the literature on geographical targeting of aid at sub-
national levels. O¨hler et al. (2017) find no evidence that funding from World Bank
to anti-poverty projects is allocated to the poorest areas within countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Briggs (2018) shows that aid from World Bank and African Devel-
opment Bank targets comparatively richer geographic areas across African countries.
In the health sector, Kotsadam et al. (2018) show that external funding is allocated
to subnational areas of Nigeria with lower infant mortality.
More broadly, my findings question the effectiveness of aid in settings with lim-
ited information about local needs, and challenge the view that donors possess suf-
ficient knowledge to make optimal decisions of resource allocations (Easterly, 2006).
The results best support the assumption that aid mistargeting reflects donors’ inac-
curate information about local population needs. The fact that the distribution of
local funding per commodity does not match the needs of each targeted population
could be explained by two factors: the incomplete information of donors about local
health needs or ineffective supply chains of health products leading to poor availabil-
ity of medicines in health facilities (Yadav, 2015). However, the evidence does not
support the latter: the number of stock-out days for each antimalarial commodity
does not systematically differ among areas with varying risk of malaria transmission.
This finding partially rules out the role of the supply chain of health products to
explain the difference in the stock of antimalarial commodities between local areas
with different burden of malaria.45 Hence, the results suggest that mistargeting is
primarily caused by the decisions of donors.
The results of this research only apply to the malaria programme in Eastern
45I cannot completely exclude the possibility that the supply chain of medicines locally affect
their provision level to health facilities located in areas with high disease burden without causing
systematic stock-outs. However, this eventuality is highly improbable: the quantity of health
commodities provided to the facility could hardly remain systematically low without experiencing
more frequent stock-outs.
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DRC, and it would be speculative to draw general policy implications. Rather,
the findings in this chapter underscore important research questions. First, I have
shown the critical importance of focusing on a disease-specific programme when doc-
umenting the distribution of health resource allocation. Further research on other
highly financed diseases (such as HIV/AIDS) could help to uncover the root causes
of targeting deficiencies. Second, the fact that funding for some health commodities
(ACT, SP) is more sensitive to local variations in the burden of malaria than others
(RDT, ITN) suggests that donors have imprecise information about the local varia-
tions in disease burden. An alternative explanation is that health workers might be
more successful in signalling the need for being provided some specific health com-
modities than for other health commodities. The signalling efforts of health workers
would then induce a partial adjustment in donors’ targeting decisions, improving
thereby the aid allocation for the specific commodities. Future research on these
questions is important to improve health aid targeting.
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Chapter 4
Colonial origins and hospital
performance in the D.R.Congo
4.1 Introduction
Persistent inequalities in development and investment in health infrastructures
are hampering health system performance in sub-Saharan Africa (Hsia et al., 2011).
As health facilities absorb more than half of total health domestic expenditures
(WHO, 2014), exploring the root causes of inequalities in hospital performance is
crucial to improve the allocation of health resources and achieve their highest impact.
This chapter attempts to bring a new perspective on this issue by investigating
the historical legacy of a colonial regime on modern disparities in health system
performance. Specifically, the objective is to explore to what extent colonial health
investments have a causal effect on contemporary hospital input utilisation and
output production.
Previous research on African development has pointed out the role of colonial
legacy in shaping institutions and its enduring effects on contemporary economic
outcomes (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Nunn, 2014). They
highlight the importance of initial conditions and factor endowments on modern
institutional and economic development. In the health sector, colonial powers had
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a prominent role in the establishment of the health system: they built, financed
and organised the structure for the delivery of healthcare in the colonies, set up the
earliest national-wide public health policies and provided medical staff and health
equipment to the newly created facilities (Schwetz, 1946). One could, therefore,
expect that colonial health investment may have had long-lasting effects on health
care delivery through better provision of health commodities, financial stability,
current investment level, or structural capacity.
On the other hand, the shaping of these institutions could also have been extrac-
tive if driven by the economic objective of resource exploitation, producing economic
and health inequalities with negative effects on development paths. The Belgian
Congo is an illustrative example where labour coercion and constant use of violence
for resource extraction disrupted both local communities and the Congolese society
(Kivilu, 1984; Lyons, 2002). At the individual level, colonial extractive practices
may have had a negative impact on health services demand through mistrust in
medicine (Lowes and Montero, 2018). The colonial enterprise also instituted a two-
tiered health care system segregating white Europeans, entitled to a high quality
of health care, and Congolese black populations for whom health financing mostly
served to maintain labour productivity at its desired level (Kivilu, 1984). Alto-
gether, these two opposite approaches point to the same direction: the colonial
origin of health facilities may be an important causal factor to explain the large
variations in modern health facility indicators (E. Lee et al., 2016). Likewise, the
heritage of colonial presence may continue to strongly determine health care de-
mand and utilisation through its intermediate effects on population health (Cage
and Rueda, 2017; Lowes and Montero, 2018) or ethnic partitioning (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2016).
I examine the long-term effects of colonial health investments on modern hospital
performance by using archival data on the Belgian Congo between 1926 and 1956
along with contemporary data on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Focus-
ing the analysis on the DRC brings two benefits. First, I obtain refined data from
colonial archives on population health, public investments and disease prevalence in
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this second largest African country. The collected information offers the possibility
to accurately estimate the effects of colonial health investments at the subnational
level and has the advantage of precisely identifying sources of variation in factors
pertaining to colonial settlement decisions. Furthermore, the troubled recent history
of the DRC provides a unique setting for examining the persistence of the colonial
legacy. From independence in 1960, followed by the Mobutu authoritative regime,
to the collapse of the state and the outbreak of civil and regional wars three decades
later (Nest et al., 2006), the presence of causal effects on modern facilities would be
remarkable. It would suggest a high degree of persistence of initial health invest-
ments and the crucial role played by colonial medical missions in determining the
performance of modern African hospitals.
Starting from a simple theoretical model, I hypothesize that initial investment in
health infrastructure construction was higher during the colonial period than after
independence of the Congo, and I document evidence that supports this assumption.
I use a simple model of hospital production to derive the effects of a change in initial
investment on modern health facility indicators. The model suggests that colonial
health settlements may have contributed to building a network of health facilities
with comparatively higher physical and human capital than health facilities built at
later stages.
To test this model, I construct a dataset of colonial and post-independence health
facilities from multiple information sources. First, I exploit historical maps from the
Ministry of Colonies of the Belgian Congo that document the location of health
infrastructures supported by religious, private and colonial government funds be-
tween 1926 and 1956 to build a geocoded dataset of colonial health facilities.1 I
determine their exact location by matching them with the list of modern health
facilities obtained from the Ministry of Health of the DRC. In total, the country
has about 1,100 hospitals, among which 208 are identified with colonial origins. I
1While many recent studies on legacies of religious missions in the past have exploited data
from historical atlases, I find that historical archives from the Belgian Congo provide a more
accurate and complete source of information. Jedwab, Selhausen, et al. (2018) similarly document
that atlases have limited capacity to report mission activities.
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augment these data with detailed information extracted from colonial archives on
public health data in the Belgian Congo on the geographic distribution of the sleep-
ing sickness, number of health facilities, medical staff and health expenditures at
the district level. Second, I use a unique database on epidemiological and financial
information on modern health facilities between January 2017 and December 2018
that were collected from the Health Information Management System of the Min-
istry of Health of the Democratic Republic of Congo. From this database, I examine
health facility performance in three areas: financial capacity, input utilisation, and
output production.
Next, I identify modern health facilities that originated from colonial settlements
and those that were built during the post-independence period. The two samples are
subsequently used to estimate the causal effect of colonial investments on modern
health facility performance using different strategies. I start with estimating an OLS
model that controls for a large set of geographical, epidemiological and demograph-
ical covariates at the local level. Drawing upon multiple colonial archival data, I
further examine the heterogeneity of effects by hospital ownership, source of colonial
funding, targeted population (White or Black) and duration of colonial settlement.
I also use the georeferenced locations of colonial missions and health facilities to
conduct a matching estimation based on geographic proximity, population covered
and health facility ownership. I argue that modern health facilities located within
a short distance from a settlement constitute credible counterfactuals to facilities
created during the colonisation era. Finally, I address the potential endogeneity
of mission settlements (Jedwab, Selhausen, et al., 2018) by using the prevalence
of sleeping sickness during the colonial era as an instrument for the settlements of
colonial medical missions.
I find that health facilities built during the colonial period receive significantly
more subsidies from the central government than post-independence facilities while
demand for health care and health service production are similar. This suggests
that health facilities originating from colonial settlements established closer ties
with the central government than post-independence facilities. The lack of effects
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of colonial settlements on health demand is in direct opposition to Lowes and Mon-
tero (2018) findings of individuals’ mistrust in medicine. These contrasting results
might be explained by the fact that only specific colonial practises would deterio-
rate individual trust in medicine. I also find that colonial hospitals are using more
capital and labour inputs than hospitals built during the post-independence period.
I provide suggestive evidence that differences in initial structural investments are
mostly responsible for the contemporaneous disparities in input levels between the
two groups. These results are robust across a range of estimation methods, as well
as to different assumptions about the spatial clustering structure. Altogether, these
findings highlight the importance of examining the historical roots of health facilities
to assess their performance. It could help to understand the observed differences
in the efficiency of health resources in improving population health at subnational
levels.
This research contributes to the literature on the historical roots of economic de-
velopment.2 A growing number of studies single out the extractive nature of colonial
missions in durably affecting health behaviour and mistrust in medicine. Cage and
Rueda (2017) document that Christian missions increase HIV prevalence when they
are not combined with health investments. Lowes and Montero (2018) show that
colonial medical missions in French Central Africa reduce trust in modern medicine.
However, this chapter demonstrates that the presence of colonial settlements could
also positively affect the provision of health care through the increased infrastruc-
ture capacity of health facilities. The ability of colonial regimes to mobilise large
health investments and skilled resources, although driven by resource exploitation,
appears to be a strong channel of persistence of the colonial effects. This finding is
consistent with Huillery (2009) who documents a positive effect of colonial invest-
ments in health, education and infrastructure on the current performance of each
of these public goods. It also resonates with Dell and Olken (2019) who show that
extractive institutions could result in comparatively higher economic and social out-
comes in the long-run. More broadly, the findings in this chapter also add to the
2For a thorough review of this literature, see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2018).
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literature on the persistent effect of investments in infrastructure (Huillery, 2009;
Jedwab and Moradi, 2016; Jedwab, Kerby, et al., 2017). The importance of initial
factor endowments echoes the results in Jedwab, Kerby, et al. (2017) on the role of
colonial sunk investments as a channel of persistence.
However, my analysis differs from these studies in several ways. Previous work
has used district-level data to study French and British colonies, which may have
specific colonial regime patterns. The focus on Belgian Congo offers an opportunity
to examine the effect of a different colonial regime covering a large spatial territory.
Furthermore, no studies have, to my knowledge, explored the effects of colonialism
on modern hospital performance. With this aim, I construct and analyse a dataset
at the health facility level, which allows me to estimate directly the persistence of
colonial effects at the granular level and avoid thereby losing information through
data aggregation.
The roadmap of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides an historical
background on the DRC and its health system. Section 4.3 describes the data
and the geographical analysis. Section 4.4 introduces the conceptual framework.
Section 4.5 to 4.7 present the empirical analysis through different identification
strategies. Section 4.8 explores some alternative channels for the results and section
4.9 discusses policy implications and concludes.
4.2 Historical background
4.2.1 Colonial legacy of public health
The colonisation of Congo began in 1885 with the infamous Congo Free State gov-
erned by the King Leopold II of Belgium, before becoming the Belgian Congo in 1908
when the Belgian State took over the private colony. The colonial regime primarily
aimed at extracting rubber, copal and ivory resources through human exploitation
and shaped the Congolese institutions to serve an export-oriented economy (Nest et
al., 2006). Private companies that were given large territorial concessions during the
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Congo Free State period were the primary beneficiaries of the country’s resources
exploitation. Using coercive control to mobilise cheap labour force, they grew as
important actors of the colonial regime and were at the forefront of an important
infrastructure development that took place during the inter-war period. An inte-
grated transport network of railways, roads and waterways served both agricultural
and mineral exports.
The first medical campaigns in Congo appeared in the early twentieth century
with the outbreak of sleeping sickness, or human trypanosomiasis, a disease trans-
mitted through the bite of a tsetse fly. The initial health policies consisted in the
creation of a cordon sanitaire, a quarantine aiming to restrict movements of infected
people (Schwetz, 1946). However, the Belgian Congo had to wait until the early
1920s for the inception of a health system and the development of medical missions
for the Congolese population that were supported by the colonial administration
(Lyons, 2002). As colonial powers looked to expand their influence through religion,
industry and commerce, the provision of health care was consequently administered
by three coexisting actors: the State, Christian missions and private firms. Some
independent health organisations partly funded by the Belgian government or pri-
vate companies also played an important role in the provision of health care.3 The
different and sometimes opposite objectives of the three actors resulted in geograph-
ical disparities in the allocation of health resources (Lyons, 2002). All medical care
was free of charge. However, priorities of health interventions were given to the
European population with the objective of reproducing similar standards of health
quality services to what existed in Europe (Figure C.1, Appendix C). On the other
hand, the provision of free health care for the Congolese population was primarily
geared towards a healthy and productive labour force to support exploitation of
natural resources (Hunt, 1999).
After World War II, the colony witnessed rapid economic growth and used its
budget surplus and international borrowing to finance the development of the health
3Examples of such health organisations are the Fondation Me´dicale de l’Universite´ de Louvain
au Congo (FORMULAC), the Fondation Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance Me´dicale aux Indige`nes
(Foreami) or the Croix-Rouge du Congo.
94
care system. This resulted, in 1949, with a massive ten-year health investment plan
of 3 billion Belgian Congo francs (known as the Van Hood Duren Plan) aimed to
equip all provinces of the Belgian Congo with Medico-Surgical centres (rural hospi-
tals) (Duren, 1953).4 The total number of health facilities (hospital, dispensaries,
maternities, health centres and posts) rose from 568 in 1949 to 2,815 ten years later,
and comprised 293 General Referral Hospitals, more than 85,000 hospital beds and
703 physicians (Ministery of the Colonies, 1958). In 1958, two years before indepen-
dence, the country benefited from one of the most developed medical infrastructure
in Africa (Pepin, 2011).
4.2.2 Health system and the State
By the time of independence, most of the Congolese population experienced
better health and improved socio-economic conditions compared to the previous
generations who witnessed the beginning of the colonial enterprise (Kivilu, 1984;
Lyons, 2002). The medical workforce entirely relied on white foreign physicians and
nurses, while the Congoleses were restricted to medical assistant positions (Kivilu,
1984).
The flourishing economy of European settlers remained until the Congo gained its
independence in July 1960. At that time, lack of trained African administrative and
technical managers combined with ethnic isolation considerably hampered the social
and political development path of the Congolese society (Vanthemsche, 2012). The
newly created State immediately entered a period of internal disorders and civilian
conflicts until Joseph Mobutu took power in 1965 to begin an authoritarian rule of
the Congo (renamed Zaire in 1971) that lasted for the next three decades. While
most European skilled workers fled the country following independence and all public
services deteriorated, the copper industry resisted the troubling series of events and
provided up to 80 percent of Congolese foreign revenue in the 1970s (IBRD, 1973).
In the meantime, the quality of the health system sharply declined due to low
4These health centres were the focal point of on an integrated network of satellite dispensaries
that provided health services to rural peripheries.
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investments (Lyons, 2002). The fall in copper prices combined with hyperinflation
and a heavy debt burden eventually drove the country to the economic collapse in
the early 1990s (Hesselbein, 2007). This disintegration reduced the fiscal space for
the public financing of health care and ultimately dragged down government health
expenditures (Gardner, 2013). Since then, hospitals have suffered a long decline in
their capacity to deliver health services with frequent disruptions in drug supply
and health equipment (MSP, 2011).
As the Mobutu regime ended in the late 1990s, wars with Uganda and Rwanda
and the fragmentation of Congo into four autonomous regions precipitated the coun-
try to a general state-implosion (Nest et al., 2006). The official ceasefire in 2003
and the reunification of the country left a fragile state in economic and political
crisis, characterised by inadequate provision of public services, rampant corruption
and a dearth of investment. Most of modern health facilities are in dire need of
rehabilitation (MSP, 2011).
In this setting, Development Assistance for Health (DAH) grew as a vital source
of funding for the current health system. The financing of the health system al-
most entirely relies on DAH and private out-of-pocket expenditures, which accounts
respectively for nearly 40% and 55% of total health financing (MSP, 2017). The
evolution of DAH between 1990 and 2017 in the DRC (Figure C.2, Appendix C)
reveals the growing share of DAH in the financing of the Congolese health system.
The recent surge in Chinese aid and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has brought
large infrastructure projects to the DRC to modernise the country, including the
health sector.5 Yet, the effects of these projects on health system performance re-
main relatively unknown due to data limitations about Chinese aid.6
The modern health system of the DRC has three levels of organisation. At the
central level, the Ministry of Health set the national health strategies for each of the
5Political considerations may play an important role in the allocation of Chinese’s aid to health
(Dreher and Fuchs, 2015).
6Gre´pin et al. (2014) find that Chinese health resources in Africa mainly finance health infras-
tructure and medical staff. Bluhm et al. (2018) show that Chinese investments in transportation
infrastructure tend to reduce spatial economic inequalities, but do not find a significant effect on
local health projects.
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26 provinces of the country, and directly manage all General Referral Hospitals. The
provincial health departments are responsible for technical and logistical support
of the health system at the intermediate level and the management of provincial
hospitals. The third level is composed of 516 health zones, or districts, where each
district covers a population of 100,000 to 200,000. The three main types of health
facilities at the district level are health posts, health centres and district hospitals
(and private clinics). Figure C.3, Appendix C, tracks the evolution of administrative
boundaries in Congo from the inception of the colonial period to the most recent
change in 2015.
This brief historical overview of events that have shaped the DRC, from inde-
pendence in 1960 to the present day, highlights the frequent political instability
along with economic crises that had far-reaching implications for the performance
of the Congolese health system. Exploring the persistence of colonial effects on
hospital performance after such a large series of disruptive events could highlight
the importance of initial investment in conditioning the development path of health
institutions.
4.3 Data
Colonial settlements - I use two primary data sources. First, I exploit mul-
tiple colonial maps on health infrastructures between 1936 and 1953 to georeference
the establishment of colonial health investments. These maps, produced by the Bel-
gian Ministry of Colonies, provide information on the geographic distribution of all
hospitals and dispensaries that reported health activities to the colonial government.
Each map informs about the type of health infrastructure (hospital or dispensary),
the population served (Europeans or Congolese) and the ownership (government,
religious or private). Figure C.4, Appendix C, provides an example of these maps,
which shows the location of all medical infrastructures in 1953. I also use two ad-
ditional maps that report the health activities of a governmental health organism
(the Fondation Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance Me´dicale aux Indige`nes, Foreami)
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in the western provinces of Kwango and Bas Congo in 1935. Lastly, a detailed map
of all existing Christian missions in 1929 provides additional historical evidence on
the colonial presence (Figure C.5, Appendix C). The latter does not allow me to
determine whether a Christian mission provided health services or solely focused on
religious activities. However, Christian missionaries considered health activities as
an important vector for spreading their faith; their presence could then potentially
imply the provision of health services during the colonial time.
Equipped with this information, I georeference and geolocalise all historical data:
I first construct a geocoded dataset of all colonial medical missions between 1929
and 1953. I then compute the exact location of modern health facilities with colo-
nial origins by matching the colonial health settlements with the list of modern
health facilities in the DRC.7 The geo-location analysis was finally augmented with
archival public health data from the Belgian Ministry of Colonies between 1926 and
1955. The archival data offers information on the provision of health services at the
provincial level, the number of patients treated, the number of medical staff and the
estimated number of beds.
Modern health facilities - The list of modern health facilities was obtained
from the District Health Information System (DHIS2), a routine web platform man-
aged by the Congolese Ministry of Health that provides financial and epidemiological
information on modern health facilities in the DRC. Monthly data was extracted
between January 2017 and December 2018. A challenge was that the database pro-
vides incomplete information about the geographic coordinates of health facilities.
To solve this issue, I triangulate the geographic information of facilities from sev-
eral sources: ReliefWeb maps for each of the 26 provinces in the DRC; the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) database,
OpenStreetMap files and a Red Cross health map.8 ReliefWeb provides a list of
7This step was a challenge as most hospital names with Belgian references changed after In-
dependence, so I had to rely on additional archival documents of the post-Independence period to
match all colonial with modern names.
8These maps are obtained from the following websites: (ReliefWeb) https://reliefweb.
int/; (OCHA) https://data.humdata.org/organization/ocha-dr-congo); (Red Cross)
https://www.croixrouge-rdc.org/organisations/ and OpenStreet map (https://www.
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geocoded health facilities in the DRC related to OCHA’s humanitarian activities
and OpenStreetMap is an open database routinely enriched by field observations,
satellite images and integrated datasets. The Red Cross health map supplements
these data with the location of health facilities supported by the Red Cross in 2018.
The total sample data comprises 17,000 health facilities of which 4,449 have been
geolocalised. The sub-sample of geolocalised facilities contains 351 health facilities
that were built during the colonial period. Since there exists high heterogeneity
among health facilities in terms of size and capacity to deliver health services, I
decide to focus the subsequent analysis on hospitals. Restricting the sub-sample of
facilities on hospitals leads to 1,099 observations among which 208 have colonial ori-
gins. Figure C.6, Appendix C, shows the locations of colonial and post-independence
hospitals that are used in the final sample. The share of hospitals that could not be
geocoded is 30 percent and only includes post-independence hospitals. To a large
extent, these hospitals are located in rural areas where little information exists.9
This sample selection raises potential concerns: it could lead to underestimation
of the colonial effects on health facility performance if the hospitals with unknown
locations also have lower performance. However, the sample of geocoded hospi-
tals remarkably contains 98 percent of the 488 General Referral Hospitals (Hoˆpital
Ge´ne´ral de Re´fe´rence, HGR) in the country.10 In the results section, I discuss the
implications of the colonial effects on urban and rural hospitals.
Data description - Figure C.7, Appendix C, plots the distribution of hospitals
by ownership (faith-based, private and public) in the full data sample (dotted bars)
and within the facilities with colonial origins (red dashed). The share of colonial
hospitals with private ownership out of the total number of private hospitals is
very small, which suggests that health facilities have been growing much faster
in the private sector since independence than in public or faith-based sectors. The
bottom graph of figure C.7, Appendix C, restricts the illustration to public hospitals
openstreetmap.org/).
9Although I could not geolocalise all hospitals, I have information on the district they belong
to. I, therefore, include all hospitals in the district level analysis.
10General referral hospitals (HGRs) are provincial hospitals that provide tertiary care.
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(HGR and medium size hospitals composed by district and provincial hospitals) and
indicates that public hospitals are essentially HGRs in the data sample.
Table C.1, Appendix C, reports the covariate balance between health facilities
built before and after independence of the Congo for financial and structural char-
acteristics, inputs used and output produced. The table shows that a range of these
covariates have means that are substantially higher for the hospitals that have colo-
nial origins: monthly days with electricity, beds, medical staff, malaria cases, inpa-
tients and emergency cases. Nonetheless, these discrepancies could be independent
of colonial effects: colonial facilities could be located in areas closer to transportation
modes for the supply of health products or with better patient access. On the other
hand, they could also be exposed to higher burden of disease (such as malaria) than
post-independence hospitals if they are systematically located in endemic areas. I
develop several empirical strategies to address these concerns.
4.4 Conceptual framework
This section provides a simple theoretical model to help shed light on the mecha-
nisms through which colonial health investments may interplay with modern health
facility performance. The central objective of the model is to show how the level of
initial investment could relate to the optimal choice of input and output involved
in the production function of a health facility. One of the fundamental differences
in health financing between pre and post Independence is in the fiscal state capac-
ity to raise revenue and finance social services (Gardner, 2013). There is ample
historical evidence that under the colonial regime, the Belgian Congo had higher
levels of public financing, skilled workers, quality of institutions, transportation and
communication network than after independence (Vanthemsche, 2012). Figure C.8,
Appendix C, illustrates the evolution of the share of domestic health expenditures
in the total budget between 1927 to 2016. While about 11% of total expenditures
were devoted for health during the colonial era, this share significantly declined to
5% during the first decade of Mobutu’s regime (in the 1970s), became almost in-
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significant in the 1990s with the economic collapse of the State, and has fluctuated
between 3 and 4% since 2000. Furthermore, the change in the government’s partic-
ipation in health care expenditure cannot not be solely attributed to a fall in public
revenue as suggested in figure C.9, Appendix C: the increase in Gross National In-
come (GNI) in the late seventies and since 2000 has not induced a similar increase
in the share of domestic health spending.
How do initial investment decisions differ between facilities created be-
fore and after independence? - Although extractive, European colonialism also
massively invested in infrastructure, roads and mechanised transport. The establish-
ment of a tax system based on custom tariffs, tax on profits and revenues provided
important revenues to the colony (Gardner, 2013). After World War II, health care
expenditures increased in most African colonies. Colonial regimes were more suscep-
tible to allocate higher resources to public hospitals than after independence: the
simultaneous collapse of the state and the economy in Congo after independence
and in the early 1970s significantly reduced the government’s capacity to finance to
health care (Frankema and Buelens, 2013). In addition, the majority of (European)
skilled workers fled the Congo following independence to escape the rising political
instability, leaving behind indigenous Congoleses with no formal training in busi-
ness, administration or medicine (Vanthemsche, 2012). The emerging nation also
lost its financial and technical support from Belgium. Altogether, independence can
be interpreted as a negative external shock on the structural capacity of public in-
vestment in all sectors of the economy which should have affected all newly created
(post-independence) health facilities.11 These facts can be modelled as a shift in the
efficiency of structural investment from θC to θP in the post-independence period,
with θC >> θP .
12
11Similar investment patterns occurred across Africa following the fall of colonial regimes (Bar-
num, Kutzin, et al., 1993).
12Note that the significant increase in DAH in the DRC since 2008 (Figure C.2, Appendix C)
could affect this assumption: the share of government health expenditure represents approximately
10% of the total budget that includes DAH, which is similar to what is observed during the colonial
period. However, only 4 post-independence hospitals in the sample were constructed after 2008,
so the recent surge in DAH should not invalidate the assumption.
101
Hospital production function - Hospital, physicians and patients interact to
determine the ultimate levels of input used and output produced by health facilities
(Hodgkin and McGuire, 1994). For simplicity, I only consider the public hospi-
tal decision while keeping the choice of treatment constant among physicians and
patients.13
Consider three different inputs used in the production function of a hospital:
human and physical capital, denoted L and K, and infrastructure capital X. The
latter, also defined as ”structural capital”, is a long-term determinant of the maxi-
mum capacity of output production of a hospital (such as health unit building, power
plant, transport access). It differs from physical capital which corresponds to ”main-
tenance capital” and incorporates assets that directly contribute to the delivery of
health services; it is characterised by short-term durability (such as drugs, health
equipment, beds). The effective stock of public infrastructure capital is therefore
defined as A = θX.
The production function is modelled by a Cobb-Douglas function with constant
return to scale (CRTS), and the output is given by the following equation:14
yi = Aik
α
i (4.1)
where i indicates the type of hospital (Colonial C, or post-independence P ) and
k refers to the capital to labour ratio K/L. The stock of physical capital equals
investment (I = K).
The government’s maximisation problem - Hospitals are financed by the
central government which allocates health resources between colonial and post-
independence hospitals to maximise the overall output production of health ser-
vices.15 The government raises revenue from a tax τ on hospital’s profit to finance
13In the empirical analysis section, I control for several factors that could affect patients’ decision
to seek treatment in a hospital, such as geographical characteristics, access to health facilities and
population served by hospitals.
14Time subscripts are omitted for simplicity
15Hospitals can also be seen as profit maximisers or cost minimisers in competitive environments.
For simplicity, I only consider public hospitals where the facilities are provided with publicly funded
health care (see Street et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion).
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the health grant transferred to colonial and post-independence hospitals. Hospitals
use governmental grants to invest in physical capital. The government maximisation
problem is
Max
kC ,kP
ACk
α
C + APk
α
P
subject to the budget constraint
τ(yC + yP ) ≥ kC + kP (4.2)
where the subscripts C and P denote the indicators respectively belonging to
colonial and post-independence hospitals.
Since the budget constraint (4.2) must bind, the fiscal grants transferred to
colonial and post-independence hospitals are determined by
AC(
1
kC
)1−α = AP (
1
kP
)1−α (4.3)
The difference in structural investment between colonial and post-independence
periods discussed above implies that infrastructure capital is such that AC > AP .
If the effective stock of public infrastructure capital of colonial hospital is at least
equal to the efficiency of post-independence infrastructure, then the governmental
health grant is the highest for colonial hospitals to maintain equality of equation
(4.3). However, the efficiency index θt decreases with time: in modern days, colonial
hospitals could then have a significantly reduced efficiency index. Indeed, anecdotal
evidence on the advanced deterioration of colonial hospitals tends to indicate that
the modern efficiency index might be lower for colonial infrastructures. The long
period separating the colonial period from the modern days combined with lack of
infrastructure investments in the DRC (Ntembwa and Van Lerberghe, 2014; Brun-
ner et al., 2019) suggest that the infrastructure of colonial hospitals might be more
deteriorated than post-independence infrastructures. The effective stock of infras-
tructure capital might then be more important for post-independence hospitals if
the efficiency index of their structure is sufficiently larger than the one of colonial
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infrastructures to compensate for the difference in initial structural investment. In
this case, AC is lower than AP to restore equality of equation (4.2) and the opti-
mal response of the government is to allocate a higher grant to post-independence
hospitals.
Proposition 4.1. Optimal allocation of health resources implies that the central
government transfers a higher health grant to colonial hospitals only when their
effective stock of infrastructure capital is the highest.
See section C.2 in the appendix C for a detailed proof.
The empirical examination of health facility performance should, therefore, con-
sider the initial structural investment of a facility and the efficiency index of the
infrastructure. While information on initial structural investment is not available,
historical evidence shows that colonial infrastructures should have benefited from a
significantly higher initial investment. In section 4.9, I discuss how the efficiency
index of modern infrastructures can relate to the results obtained from the empirical
analysis and its implications on the persistence of colonial effects.
4.5 OLS estimation
I start by estimating the effects of colonial health investments between 1929
and 1956 on contemporary health facility performance using Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) estimation. The cross-sectional analysis relies on the following linear regres-
sion function
Yf = αf + τColf + δAccessf + γXf + f (4.4)
where Yf is a vector of health facility indicators, Colf is a dummy variable equals
to 1 if the facility was created by a colonial settlement, Accessf is the accessibility
of health facility f captured by the distance in km to the nearest transportation
mode (railway, road or waterways). The coefficient of interest is τ which captures
the effect of historical colonial settlements on current health facility performance.
The term αf captures all administrative and ecclesiastical provincial-specific factors
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affecting health facility performance. This is important since some provinces might
receive more subsidies from the central government or be prone to more specific
disease burden than others (such as Ebola).
The vector of controls Xf includes a set of geographic and demographic base-
line characteristics at the facility level. The geographic controls are the elevation
and slope, obtained from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), as well
as distance to coast, distance to the main provincial city, distance to the nearest
Regional Distribution Centre of pharmaceutical products, distance to the nearest
hospital and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the facility is located in an urban area.16
I also control for the presence of armed conflicts that have frequently erupted across
the country. The data is obtained from the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED) that reports georeferenced information on political violence
and protests between January 2017 and December 2018. All non-dummy variables
are taken in the natural log to remove the skewness of their distribution.
I supplement this set of controls with the distance to the nearest historical trans-
portation mode. To obtain this information, I digitised a 1928 detailed map from
the Ministry of Colonies on the communication channels in Belgian Congo (Figure
C.10, Appendix C) which comprises railways (black), waterways (blue) and roads
(red). Additional information on transport connections from the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development IBRD (1957) supplements the mapping before
independence in 1960. Lastly, health facility performance can vary with respect to
the geographic distribution of the risk of malaria transmission in the country. I use
an indicator of the malaria parasite transmission intensity in 2017 obtained from
the Malaria Atlas Project to account for this spatial heterogeneity.17 I exclude from
the data sample Kinshasa General Referral Hospital whose financial and structural
16These distance measures are important to control in the DRC since they can be strong deter-
minants of the availability of health care products (MSP, 2011).
17The Plasmodium falciparum parasite rate (PfPR) is an index of malaria transmission intensity
which estimates the proportion of children aged 2 to 10 who carries the parasite (Hay and Snow,
2006). Annual medians of PfPR in 2017 was obtained at approximately 5 km resolution from the
Malaria Atlas Project (https://map.ox.ac.uk).
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capacities outperform the rest of the sample.18
In the decentralised Congolese economy, each province is ruled by a local gov-
ernment with its own budget.19 Provincial public spending might then influence
hospital performance. To account for the heterogeneity across provincial budget
and the correlation of hospital performance within provinces, standard errors are
clustered at this unit level (Abadie, Athey, et al., 2017).
One limitation is that I could not obtain information on the exhaustive list of
public investments during the colonial period. Although controlling for the proxim-
ity to transportation mode should capture a substantial partial of public investment,
colonial investments in education could arguably also be determinant of modern hos-
pital performances. However, Huillery (2009) does not find evidence that, in French
West Africa, colonial investments in education impact current health performances,
as proxied by the number of medical staff. I hypothesise that similar results should
apply to the Belgian Congo.
4.5.1 Health facility performance data
The evaluation of hospital performance involves a set of inputs used as a cost
minimisation exercise or a set of outputs produced reflecting the maximisation of the
health production function (Street et al., 2010).20 Regardless of the measurement
approach, the identification of the set of inputs and outputs involved in the produc-
tion function is critical to determine hospital performance and, in turn, establish a
benchmark comparison between colonial and post-independence hospitals. Follow-
ing the theoretical model introduced in section 4.4, I use the number of medical
staff (nurses) and beds respectively as proxies for human and (short-term) physical
capital. Other indicators on medical equipment and machines would have been a
18All results are robust to the inclusion of Kinshasa General Hospital.
19Note, however, that only 8 % of public domestic health spending is coming from provincial
governments, while 80% is from the central government, the remaining share being attributable to
other administrative services and mutual funds (MSP, 2017).
20The issue of the most appropriate method for modelling hospital costs is subject to debate
depending on whether hospitals should be analysed under the perspective of a firm or a non-profit
organisation (see Pauly (1987)).
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better proxy for physical capital as they can more closely reflect the current level of
factors of production of health services than beds. Unfortunately, data on material
equipment is incomplete in the DHIS2 and cannot be used for this exercise.
Health production is captured by the number of severe malaria cases treated.
Malaria is endemic in the DRC: it is the leading cause of mortality among children
below five, and one of the highest disease burdens in the country.21 Health national
policy guidance stipulates that simple malaria cases should be treated exclusively
in small health facilities (health posts or health centres) while severe malaria cases
should be oriented to clinics and hospitals (MSP, 2011). Consequently, the number
of patients treated for severe malaria should be an important indicator of the capac-
ity of a hospital to deliver health services. I will control for the local risk of malaria
transmission to ensure that the number of malaria patients reflect the supply of
health care. Similarly, the volume of patients seeking care in a hospital can also af-
fect its performance. I use the number of deliveries, outpatient visits and emergency
to capture local demand for health care and supply. These indicators could equally
reflect both demand and supply and will be interpreted with respect to the number
of malaria treated, which should clearly reflects the supply when controlling for the
risk of malaria transmission.
Indicators relating to the financial performance of a facility are also considered
and include investment and government funding. The former variable is a standard
indicator for measuring strategic financial decisions, while the amount of government
funding received by a health facility informs about its connection to the central gov-
ernment. However, it is important to distinguish current investment from the initial
structural investment presented in the theoretical model. Hospital investment may
have strong fluctuations from one year to the other, since the hospital stock produced
by the investment can remain for several decades with little depreciation (Barnum,
Kutzin, et al., 1993). I, therefore, explore whether the cumulative hospital capi-
tal stock produced in the colonial period leads to differences in modern investment
21The global health data from IHME provides a detailed ranking of the disease burden in the
DRC: http://www.healthdata.org/democratic-republic-congo.
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decisions with post-independence hospitals.
Finally, I exploit the average reported number of days per month without elec-
tricity to capture the modern efficiency of the infrastructure.22
4.5.2 Results
The results of the OLS estimation of equation (4.4) are reported in table C.2,
Appendix C. The outcome variables are divided into three panels: financial char-
acteristics in panel A with government funding and investment; inputs variables in
panel B with the number of beds and nurses; and hospital output in panel C which
includes the number of severe malaria cases treated and bed occupancy, defined as
the ratio of inpatients by bed. Columns (1) report the effects of colonial settlement
without any geographic control; columns (2) control for the access to the facility
and columns (3) add all other geographic covariates described above. All regres-
sions include provincial fixed effects. The table reports significant effects of colonial
settlements on government support and input utilisation: from the regression that
include all control variables, government funding increases by approximately 40%
while medical staff and beds raise by 20% and 12% respectively.
Investment and output production are similar between colonial and post-independence
hospitals when controlling for the number of inputs used, suggesting that both
groups exhibit equal efficiency of resource utilisation. Likewise, health care demand
and supply, captured by the number of malaria cases treated, emergency visits,
outpatient visits and deliveries, do not significantly differ between the two groups.
Next, I explore whether colonial investments improve the contemporaneous ef-
ficiency of input utilisation. To measure efficiency, table C.3, Appendix C, reports
the OLS estimates of equation (4.4) when the dependent variables are length of stay
and bed occupancy, the latter being defined as the ratio of beds to inpatients and
length of stay. A systematic difference in bed occupancy between colonial and post-
22Electricity is supplied by a national company in the DRC but with frequent outages. Some
hospitals may rely on other sources of electricity (generator, solar, etc.) to maintain the standard
functioning of the facility.
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independence hospitals would be unanticipated and would suggest possible misuse
of resources as health care demand is not significantly affected by colonial health set-
tlements. On the other hand, length of stay can capture the efficiency of treatment
provision. The results from table C.3, Appendix C, indicate that bed occupancy
and length of stay are not found to differ significantly between colonial and post-
independence hospitals, suggesting that the two groups present some comparable
efficiency of input utilisation and treatment provision. It also indicates that the
increased allocation of health funding to colonial hospitals does not seem to affect
their production function when controlling for human and physical capitals.
4.5.3 Robustness
Regressions using geographic information can be prone to misleading results
when spatial autocorrelation in residuals is not carefully accounted for (Colella et
al., 2018; Kelly, 2019). In table C.4, Appendix C, I examine the robustness of the
results by varying the cutoff radius for spatial clustering. The standard errors are
adjusted following the method of Conley (1999), by clustering observations within
circles of varying distances. The covariance matrix in Conley’s method is a weighted
average of spatial auto-covariances that are equal within some radius distance of
observations and with zero covariance beyond the cutoff. The first row reports the
coefficient of the colonial settlement from equation (4.4) and the following rows
report the standard errors when changing the variance-covariance matrix through
a change in the distance cutoff of the spatial clusters. The results are remarkably
robust to the radius of Conley correction: the most demanding specification has a
300 km radius of allowed spatial dependence and the standard errors remain very
stable for each outcome of interest.
4.5.4 Intensity of colonial health investment
The heterogeneity of health investment during the colonial period (Figure C.1,
Appendix C) could imply the existence of various and potentially diverging effects
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on modern hospital performance. I examine the decomposition of colonial health
investments effects into several categories: hospital ownership, type of colonial fa-
cility and colonial funding source.23 Regarding the first category, I anticipate that
public hospitals should receive more subsidies from the central government, while
private hospitals might operate at lower costs (Street et al., 2010). Hospital own-
ership might also affect the efficiency of input utilisation: length of stay and bed
occupancy rate could differ between private and public hospitals due to diverging
incentives. I also anticipate some differences across the type of colonial facility (Eu-
ropean or Congolese ”indigenous”): the initial differences in the quality of health
care provision could have persistent effects on modern hospital performance. Lastly,
the source of colonial funding may capture varying levels of investment intensities
since the State, Christian missions and private firms had their own health budget.
Table C.5, Appendix C, replicates the baseline estimates of table C.2, using ad-
ditional controls for hospital ownership and two interaction terms: an interaction
between colonial settlement and colonial facility, and another interaction between
colonial settlement and source of funding. For each of these categories, the colonial
effects on government funding remain significant. As expected, private hospitals
receive less public health funding than their counterparts, while General Referral
hospitals and facilities that served the Congoleses during the colonial period are
found to have higher investments. Bed capacity is higher among colonial faith-
based hospitals while the number of nurses surprisingly decreases for the same cat-
egory. Furthermore, hospitals that originated from European health facilities have
the number of nurses that increases by almost 20 percentage points but are, nonethe-
less, treating fewer patients when controlling for medical staff, as indicated by the
negative coefficients of malaria patients and emergency cases.
Lastly, the number of nurses increases by almost 30 percentage points in hospi-
tals that were initially funded by the colonial government, while the bed capacity is
lower in those same hospitals. This last result could suggest that the colonial gov-
23The teaching status of a hospital would have been another important characteristic to explore,
but I do not have information on this level.
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ernment allocated less funding per health facility for building infrastructure than
Christian or private settlers; indeed, historical evidence suggests that the colonial
regime primarily aimed to expand the construction of health facilities across the
colony (Duren, 1953) while Christian missions and private firms might have been
more devoted to local roles around their respective areas of activities (Lyons, 2002).
The increase in the number of medical staff is however intriguing and could high-
light either some inefficiencies in utilisation of human capital among hospitals with
colonial government funding origins or underinvestment in physical capital.24 In
panel D, outpatient visit increases in HGRs which might simply reflect the higher
number of referred patients to this category. Lastly, panel E presents the results for
input efficiency: bed occupancy is not significantly affected by hospital ownership
or the funding source of hospitals with colonial origins; on the other hand, both
bed occupancy and length of stay strongly decrease among hospitals which served
Europeans during the colonial period. Yet, there are reasons to be cautious with
this last result as only 40 hospitals in the data sample were initially constructed
for Europeans. This coefficient might, then, capture other underlying effects: for
example all hospitals with ”European” colonial origins in the sample are located in
rural areas and are mostly General Referral Hospitals.25 Length of stay increases
among HGRs and faith-based hospitals; the coefficient is negative but not significant
in the private sector.
Next, I examine whether these results hold when restricting the sample to HGRs.
Since they are supposed to be entirely subsidised by the central government, we
could anticipate the absence of significant difference between the colonial and post-
independence HGRs after controlling for all the observable factors that can affect the
allocation of health resources. Table C.6, Appendix C, reports the baseline estimates
of table C.2 while restricting the sample to HGRs in columns 1, and adding a control
for health care demand, captured by the number of outpatient visits. The persistent
24Evidence suggests that physician and nurses tend to prefer hospitals in urban areas while
deserting rural areas where the need for medical staff is higher (Bertone et al., 2016).
25To check this last result, I add an additional control for urban and rural areas and find that
length of stay is shorter by 17 percentage points in rural areas.
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effects of colonial settlements on government funding, nurses and, to a smaller extent,
bed capacity remain significant when the sample is restricted on HGRs. Columns
2 document whether colonial health investments are driven by the surge in health
investment during the decade preceding independence. The colonial effects appear
to be largely attributed to colonial hospitals built before 1936, which emphasises
the importance of initial investments as a channel of persistence.
While these results paint a consistent picture of the effects of colonial health
settlements, there are reasons to be cautious in interpreting them. Historical and
geographical characteristics might have determined the mission locations of the colo-
nial enterprise in ways that are not accounted for by province fixed effects (Good,
1991; Jedwab, Selhausen, et al., 2018). Likewise, the geographical location might
have been an important determinant of the intensity of colonial investment: as an ex-
ample, private firms operating in mining concessions could have been more inclined
to spend comparatively higher on health care services to preserve the health status
of their local labour force. These possibilities highlight the concern of endogenous
location of medical missions that I shall now address.
4.6 Matching estimation
In this section, I explore the effects of colonial health settlements with an al-
ternative estimation strategy: matching on covariates. The rationale for using the
matching procedure is to attempt to identify the true causal effect without spec-
ifying a functional form for the outcome equation: it only uses colonial hospitals
and their nearest post-independence neighbours from a predefined set of matching
covariates. The resulted matched sample is then used to obtain the colonial effects
by estimating the differences in the outcome of interest between colonial and post-
independence hospitals. Importantly, the underlying assumption of this strategy is
the comparability of colonial and post-independence hospitals in the matched sam-
ple: the outcome of a post-independence hospital is assumed to be as good as the
counterfactual colonial outcome - i.e. the outcome of a ”colonial” hospital if it would
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not have been funded during the colonial period but after independence.
To implement the procedure, I start with spatial matching and reinforce it with
additional matching covariates. Spatial matching should ensure that matched hos-
pitals share similar geographic characteristics and, consequently, addresses the con-
cern that colonial settlements are located in areas with better geographical access or
better climatological and epidemiological conditions (or conversely, some hospitals
could operate under more adverse environmental factors). The matching procedure
offers the possibility to ensure that hospitals in both colonial and post-independence
groups operate under similar constraining factors.
Specifically, define a neighbourhood N(Yi) of colonial hospital i with observable
characteristics Yi and P the set of all neighbour hospitals of i. The set of matched
sample Mi of colonial hospital i, where post-independence hospitals j fall into, is
such that
Mi = {j ∈ P |Yj ∈ N(Yi)}
The overall matching sample only keeps observations for which the observable
characteristics are the closest to colonial hospitals.
Neighbourhood and matching estimator - Once the sample is obtained, the
matching procedure consists of minimising the distance between covariate values of
colonial and post-independence hospitals. I use a Mahalanobis distance metric,
which is appropriate for multivariate matching and robust to skewed variables. Dis-
tance between colonial (i) and post-independence (j) hospitals is formally defined
as
(Yi, Yj) =
√
(Yi − Yj)′S−1(Yi − Yj)
where S is the sample covariance matrix of the covariates Y in the Mahalanobis
metric.
Following Abadie and Imbens (2006), I conduct a one-to-one nearest neighbour
matching estimator. The estimator relies on an algorithm which consists in selecting
one treated unit and matching it based on covariate values with its nearest control,
the ”nearest” term being defined as the smallest distance metric. The matching
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estimator uses average outcomes for matched units of the opposite group as an
estimate of the unobserved potential outcome. Suppose a hospital i has a colonial
origin (Coli = 1). Then its potential outcomes are defined as
Yˆi(1) = Yi
Yˆi(0) = Yj ,∀j such that Colj = 0
where hospital j is the nearest hospital to i, Yi and Yj are the outcomes of the
colonial and matched post-independence hospitals respectively, while Yˆi(1) and Yˆi(0)
are the potential outcomes of a hospital when funded by colonial investment or not.
I choose to match with replacement, meaning that a matched unit from the set of
controls can be used multiple times.26 I use the biased-corrected matching estimator
proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2011) that adjusts for the differences in covariates
values within the matched sample when there is more than one continuous matching
covariate. The estimation leads to the Sample Average Treatment Effect (SATE),
which underlies the fact that the matched sample results from non-random attrition
(only matched hospitals are used in the estimation).
The identification and consistency of the estimate rely on two assumptions: i)
Unconfoundedness or random assignment of the treatment (meaning that exposure
to the treatment is independent of the outcome variable conditional on all relevant
characteristics to the probability of treatment being observed) and ii) common sup-
port (or overlap) assumption, (defined as 0 < P (Col = 1|X) < 1) which stipulates
that there is a positive probability of being both a colonial or a post-independence
hospital given a set of observable covariates X.
I argue that both assumptions should be valid in this exercise. Although the
location of colonial settlements might be motivated by several factors that include
geographic characteristics, the exact location of a medical mission at a sufficiently
26Matching with replacement increases the quality of matching and reduces the bias, but it
increases the variance of the estimator. I address this issue in the results section.
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low level should also bear a randomised component. The favourable conditions that
could motivate a settlement decision such as the proximity to a transportation mode,
the economic activity of the area or the burden of disease among the local popula-
tion could be found in various location points within a pre-defined geographic area of
interest. The optimal location site for the construction of a hospital is then unlikely
to be unique but should rather be delimited within a small distance of points of
interest during the colonial time (such as European or Congolese residential areas,
proximity to transportation mode, access to water, etc.). Within this geographic
area of optimal conditions, the choice of the construction site is likely to have an
important random component: at the beginning of the colonial period, few public
infrastructures already existed (such as roads, railways, schools) which would have
otherwise limited the list of potential places to construct a facility with the desired
proximity to public infrastructure or ease of access. On the contrary, the small exist-
ing number of public infrastructures during the colonial period might have opened up
various possibilities of location for the construction site of a hospital and increased,
thereby, the area of its potential construction. The colonial settlement should also
not preclude the construction of hospitals in its vicinity if the geographical area of
optimal conditions is sufficiently large, or the population density is high enough.
In other words, the overlap assumption may become invalid in the case where a
colonial hospital is located in an area that presents few geographic comparabilities
with bordering areas and its population is sufficiently low to deter the construction
of new health facilities. Although these conditions are unlikely to hold in the highly
populated DRC, I check this possibility in the following subsection by restricting
the data sample to small geographic areas around colonial hospitals.
4.6.1 Variables for balancing
Bias-variance trade-off : Successful matching requires achieving low imbalance
between colonial and post-independence hospitals in order to reduce the estimation
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bias, while a sufficiently large matched sample size should reduce the variance.
The primary covariates used for the spatial matching are the longitude and
latitude of health facilities. Second, I explore which additional covariates to include
in the matching procedure that should affect health facility performance. Since
there is no pre-treatment controls per se (it is not possible to find controls shared
by colonial and post-independence hospitals before their creation), the choice of
these additional matching covariates is sensitive: they should affect health facility
performance without being determined by the colonial presence. Specifically, the
empirical distribution of the covariates should be similar between matched colonial
and post-independence hospitals. I use three baseline covariates that are likely to be
correlated with the outcome of interest: geographic location (longitude and latitude)
and the size of population served.27
Figure C.11, Appendix C, assesses distributional balancing in the baseline covari-
ates between treated and untreated units in the matched sample. For each matching
covariate, the graphs plot the average distance between the empirical quantile distri-
butions of the colonial and post-independence groups calculated over the full sample
(left) and the matched sample (right); in the latter, unmatched units are pruned
to improve balance. The quantile-quantile (QQ) plots provide suggestive evidence
of balance in the covariates for the matched sample, with values of each covariate
being almost identical at every quantile.
Figure C.12, Appendix C, explores the validity of the common support assump-
tion by comparing kernel densities of the selected matching covariates over the colo-
nial (dashed blue) and post-independence (red) groups of hospitals. The plots pro-
vide visual evidence of the common support assumption for all matching covariates.
4.6.2 Results
Table C.7, Appendix C, reports the results of the matching estimations for the
three sets of dependent variables: financial characteristics (government funding and
27The population served corresponds to the number of inhabitants in the area covered by the
hospital. Additional information on the demographic profile was unfortunately not available.
116
financing), ii) input used (bed occupancy and number of nurses) and iii) output
produced (severe malaria cases treated and emergency cases). The latter two de-
pendent variables are divided by the number of medical staff. Columns (1) report the
matching estimates when using only longitude and latitude as matching covariates,
columns (2) add the matching on population served. The table indicates a signifi-
cant effect of colonial health settlements on government funding and the number of
beds, confirming the OLS results in the previous section. However, there is no more
evidence of colonial effects on the number of nurses under the matching method.
This difference with the OLS results might come from the sample restriction around
matched observations. For government funding and bed capacity, the coefficients
on colonial settlements are similar to the OLS estimates when all control variables
are included. The increased bed capacity among colonial hospitals supports the
proposition made in the theoretical model (section 4.4) that higher initial structural
investment has a long-lasting impact on the physical capital of hospitals. The large
effects of colonial investments on modern government funding are more puzzling.
Why would modern hospitals with colonial origins receive a higher governmental
grant than other hospitals?
Table C.8, Appendix C, attempts to elucidate this question by decomposing
the colonial effects by hospital ownership: public, private, faith-based and General
Referral Hospital (Hoˆpital Ge´ne´ral de Re´fe´rence, HGR). To do this, I perform a
similar matching estimation as described in the baseline results, while adding an
exact matching on hospital ownership. This procedure reduces heterogeneity and
provides information about potential variations in the causal effects by ownership.
The colonial effects on government funding are insignificant on all types of hospital
ownership except for HGRs.28 This result is surprising since all HGRs are supposed
to be fully subsidised by the central government, according to the national health
policies (MSP, 2011). Yet, many observers note that the limited budget allocated
to health in the DRC adversely affects the subsidies transferred to hospitals, with
28Government funding is divided by the number of medical staff as it is primarily used to finance
salaries.
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infrequent and low disbursements (Ntembwa and Van Lerberghe, 2014; Bertone et
al., 2016). The observed colonial effects on governmental grants could therefore
underline the long-run relationship that some HGRs maintained with the central
government to secure minimal funding. Because of their establishment during the
colonial period, they might have been more successful in signalling their financial
needs than newly created hospitals after independence. Unfortunately, the validity
of this interpretation is limited by the lack of studies on this particular topic of
health financing in the DRC.
Colonial hospitals have higher bed capacity for all types of ownership, with the
exception of faith-based hospitals. Among private and faith-based colonial hospitals,
the number of nurses per bed increases as well, which could be interpreted as an
indicator of higher quality of health services. On the other hand, there is no colonial
effect on medical staff among public hospitals.
4.6.3 Sensitivity analysis
I test the robustness of the results by restricting the matching sample to post-
independence facilities that are located within a maximum geographic distance from
colonial hospitals. Figure C.13, Appendix C, reports the sensitivity of the match-
ing estimate to bandwidth selection for each of the outcome of interest introduced
earlier. The graphs use bandwidths ranging from 5 to 100 km which correspond
to the distance to the nearest hospital and the coefficients are obtained from the
biased-corrected matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). The
regressions include all matching covariates presented above and use robust standard
errors. Unsurprisingly, the variability in the coefficient estimates within the first 5
km is high in all cases due to the small size of the matched sample. The estimates
are relatively constant as the distance to the nearest hospital increases for all cases.
When the dependent variable is government funding or bed capacity, the match-
ing estimates are consistently significant and positive. These findings confirm the
robustness of the results described earlier. The small variations in the coefficient
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estimates with respect to bandwidth selection also suggest that proximity to colonial
hospitals might have little effect on the outcomes of modern hospitals.
4.7 Instrumental variables estimation
4.7.1 Sleeping sickness
I explore an additional identification strategy that addresses the potential endo-
geneity of the colonial presence through an instrumental variable approach to esti-
mate equation 4.4. I instrument colonial settlements by the historical geographic
distribution of the sleeping sickness at the district level as reported in the public
health archival data of the ministry of colonies.29 The argument is that medical mis-
sions were mostly dedicated to contain and reduce the burden of sleeping sickness
(Lyons, 2002). The exposure of districts where the burden of the disease is high
should then be a good predictor for the presence of medical campaigns (Lowes and
Montero, 2018).30 Figure C.14, Appendix C, depicts the kernel density of colonial
health settlements and the health zones (district level) where the presence of the
sleeping sickness was reported between 1910 and 1933. The figure illustrates that the
prevalence of sleeping sickness is a good predictor of the colonial presence: it docu-
ments a strong spatial correlation between colonial settlements and the prevalence
of the sleeping sickness.
Does the instrument satisfy the exclusion restriction? The spread of the dis-
ease was primarily caused by movements of local populations and the ecological
conditions that prevail during the colonial period (Lyons, 2002). The various socio-
economic transformations that took place during the twentieth century in Congo
29Specifically, I exploit the reporting of sleeping sickness where the infection rate is at least
equal to 1%. This arbitrary threshold aims to consider only geographic areas where the burden of
sleeping sickness became significant. The archival maps also report the areas where the infection
rate is less than 1%, but without further information about the number of identified cases, I cannot
claim that they significantly impacted the location of colonial settlements.
30The tsetse fly suitability index (TSI) developed by Alsan (2015) is a useful indicator for
the risk of sleeping sickness transmission at the African regional level. However, the data that I
collected from the colonial public health archives provide refined information at the district level
that is more suitable for this analysis
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are likely to have deeply transformed these factors and changed the geographical
distribution of the disease (Figure C.15, Appendix C). More importantly, although
the sleeping sickness epidemic has had devastating effects among the population
of Eastern Africa in the early 20th century (Scott, 1942; Lyons, 2002), its modern
burden became negligible compared to other endemic diseases in the region, such as
malaria or HIV (Fe`vre et al., 2008). In 2017, WHO (2017) indicates that there were
1,000 new sleeping cases in the DRC, while 34,000 HIV positive were reported to
be on treatment and 25 million were estimated to be malaria-infected. Unsurpris-
ingly, these latter two diseases have attracted much more economic support from
the international community during the last three decades. The implication at the
health facility level is that the modern distribution of the sleeping sickness should
not significantly affect health facility performance. In turn, the geographic distribu-
tion of the disease during the colonial presence should be even less correlated with
contemporaneous hospital performance.
I formally examine the presence of colonial health settlements in the following
first-stage equation:
Colf = αf + βSleepingf + γXf + νf (4.6)
where Sleepingf is a dummy variable equal to one if sleeping sickness was present
among the Congolese population during the colonial period where hospital f is
located. Turning to the structural equation, the effects of colonial settlements on
hospital performance can be estimated as
Yf = αf + τ ˆColf + δAccessf + γXf + f (4.7)
As before, αf captures the administrative provincial fixed effects and Xf is the
set of control covariates described in section 4.5 at the facility level f .
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4.7.2 Effects on hospital indicators
Table C.9, Appendix C, presents the first stage estimates for four dependent
variables: government funding, investment, bed capacity and medical staff. The
table shows that the presence of sleeping sickness strongly affects the geographical
distribution of colonial settlements: the presence of medical missions increases by
nearly 50 percentage points within sleeping sickness areas.
Table C.10, Appendix C, presents the local average treatment effect (LATE)
estimates using the sleeping sickness instrument. As a comparison, the table also
reports the coefficients of the OLS estimation (equation 4.4). Following I. Andrews
et al. (2019) recommendations on potentially weak instruments, each IV column
also reports the 95% Anderson-Rubin (AR) confidence interval of the coefficient on
colonial settlements. The coefficient estimates are remarkably similar to the OLS
estimates, except for bed capacity which is found higher with the IV estimates.
Notice that because the IV strategy identifies areas with sleeping sickness disease
during the colonial period, all hospitals that are located in those areas are treated
as colonial. Yet, nothing prevented new hospitals to be constructed in those areas
after independence, although, they might have little incentives to be close to existing
facilities. Consequently, the instrument may treat some post-independence hospitals
as colonials. The high standard errors of the IV estimates reflect this variability,
which reduces, in turn, their statistical significance. Nonetheless, they offer further
evidence of the robustness of the results.
4.8 Additional channel: Does DAH systematically
support colonial hospitals
The conceptual framework introduced in section 4.4 gives insights on possible
mechanisms through which colonial health investments could have enduring effects
on modern health facilities. As such, I claim that it could be a causal nexus for the
contemporaneous hospital performance if the difference between colonial and post-
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independence investment is high enough. I explore in this section an alternative
channel of persistence of colonial effects.
The three diseases that attract the highest share of Development Assistance
for Health in the DRC are HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria (MSP, 2017). Since
domestic public health expenditures are extremely low in the DRC and insufficient to
cover the population health needs, donors finance almost entirely these three disease
programmes and are intensively involved in the provision, storage, and distribution
of the related health products (MSP, 2011). At the health facility level, donor’s
support can be directly observable by the availability of health products related
to the three diseases. I can, therefore, explore whether donors support differently
colonial and post-independence hospitals. Because malaria is endemic in the DRC,
almost all health facilities are being provided with antimalarial medicines by donors
(Chapter 3); I then exclude antimalarial medicines and focus solely on HIV and
Tuberculosis treatment.31 Using the presence of HIV or tuberculosis treatment in a
facility as a proxy for international aid support, I estimate the following specification
Aidf = αf + τColf + δPhysicianf + f (4.8)
where the dependent variable Aidf is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the facility
receives aid support and 0 otherwise. The variable Physican controls for the num-
ber of physicians in health facility f that could positively affect the probability of
aid support. Table C.12, Appendix C, reports the estimates of the regression (4.8)
using a linear probability model. The first column reports the estimate without
any control and the next three columns add physician, geographic characteristics
and population served as controls. The results are similar with a logit model and
reveal that donors’ support increases by approximately 6 percentage points in hos-
pitals with colonial origins. This quantitatively small effect becomes nonetheless
statistically insignificant when the control variables are included. It is therefore not
31The treatment cost for an HIV infected person represents a huge financial burden, and in a
country with one the highest poverty rate of Africa, the absence of donors’ financial support would
substantially reduce the possibility to tackle the disease burden.
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possible to conclude that donors support could be a major channel of persistence of
the observed colonial effects.
4.9 Discussion and conclusion
This study documents that colonial health settlements in the Belgian Congo
established a network of health infrastructures with high structural capacity that
persistently affected the contemporaneous performance of health facilities. I show
that public hospitals with colonial origins receive higher funding from the central
government than their counterparts which were created after independence. The
effect persists even when the number of medical staff is controlled for. I further
demonstrate that the persistence of colonial effects depends both on the type of
the colonial funding source (State, religious and private firms) that established the
health infrastructure and the targeted population during the colonial period (White
European or Black Congolese). The long-run impacts of medical missions and their
magnitude are remarkable in a country like DRC which suffered from decades of
political and economic instability, civil wars and the complete collapse of the health
system.
A plausible channel that can account for this persistence is the difference in
initial infrastructure investments between colonial and post-independence hospitals.
The theoretical model introduced in section 4.4 suggests that higher governmental
funding to colonial hospitals is the optimal solution to the central government’s
problem that maximises the production of health services if the effective stock of
infrastructure capital is the highest in colonial hospitals. I have explored whether
donors could be a potential channel for the colonial effect without finding any evi-
dence to support it. The results therefore suggest that colonial investment could be
a causal nexus for the contemporaneous allocation of public resources.
Furthermore, colonial hospitals might not only have a better structural capac-
ity in the short-term, they might also have established closer connections with the
central government in the long-run. The limited budget of the government and
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the rampant corruption in the country might participate in building a network of
favoured facilities lobbying for government participation. The historical connec-
tion of colonial hospitals with the central government might play a substantial role
in attracting more attention from the political leaders. On the other hand, post-
independence facilities, which tend to have lower structural capacity, might be less
able to leverage government funding. Colonial investments would, therefore, pro-
vide a comparative advantage to colonial hospitals in competing with other health
facilities to lay claim to limited public resources. This argument echoes Banerjee,
Iyer, and Somanathan (2007) who demonstrate that political considerations can be
closely tied to the provision of public goods in resource-constrained settings. The
2015 National Health Accounts of the DRC (MSP, 2017) indicate that more than
80% of the relatively small public health investments are devoted to the construc-
tion of health infrastructures. This suggests that recently created health facilities
might receive little financial support to invest in medical equipment, information
and communications technology, or to expand health services. In the short-term,
this may reduce their capacity to treat patients, deliver quality health care and even
pay their staff (Fox et al., 2013; Bertone et al., 2016).
The findings also suggest that the funding source of colonial settlements that
can be an important vector of persistence of colonial effects on modern hospital
performance. Hospitals initially funded by the colonial State tend to have lower bed
capacity compared to hospitals funded by private capital or religious organisations
during the colonial period. Historical evidence indicates that the primary health
policy objective of the State was to expand the coverage of health care services across
the country, contrary to Christian missions that aimed to reach local populations
and privately funded settlements that focused on their working force (Duren, 1953;
Lyons, 2002). Private and faith-based colonial settlements might then have had the
opportunity to invest more resources in their own infrastructures, increasing thereby
their structural capacity and producing persistent effects on modern facilities.
The results are consistent with previous literature on colonial public investments:
Huillery (2009) finds suggestive evidence that modern public investments tend to be
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located in places historically funded by the colonial regime. Jedwab, Kerby, et al.
(2017) investigate the root causes for the persistence of colonial investments in public
goods in Kenya and find sunk investments and spatial coordination failures to be
the most important channels. My findings resonate with these results: I show that
the colonial regime had comparatively higher financial capacity and made higher
structural investments in health facilities than the post-independence Congo State.
The findings from this research come from a specific country setting and should
be carefully interpreted with regard to their external validity. Nonetheless, the
structural investment mechanism emphasised in this chapter underlines the impor-
tance of examining the colonial roots of African health systems to understand the
disparities in modern health care financing. Although health investments tended to
be higher during the colonial period than after independence, colonial regimes may
also have favoured unequal distribution of health care services through segregation
between European and ”Indigenous” populations. They could also have allocated
more health resources near their economic interests. As colonial regimes are often
at the origin of modern health systems in countries with colonial roots, the initial
distribution of health care resources in those countries might have enduring effects
on the contemporaneous provision of health care. This present study suggests that
a thorough identification of health facilities built during the colonial era, the role
they played and their connection with the central government should receive full
consideration to understand contemporaneous inequalities in hospital performance.
In particular, the observed pattern of persistence of colonial effects on the develop-
ment of health institutions could offer valuable information to guide the reallocation
of health resources in order to reduce inequalities in health care delivery and access
to treatment. The current situation may exacerbate inequalities in access to health
care if the public domestic resources are unequally distributed among public health
facilities. They may give rise to a parallel two tier health system where the quality
of health care is conditioned upon political considerations. Donors could play an
important role in supporting strategies that address these disparities and set the
right financial incentives to health care providers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Health resource allocation decisions have tremendous consequences on popula-
tion health. In Low-Income Countries, global health donors play a crucial role in
the financing of health systems, but their presence can also turn to be pervasive
and harmful when information about population health needs is opaque and leaves
unmet needs (Sridhar and Batniji, 2008). As outlined in the introduction, a range
of factors have been identified in the literature affecting the effectiveness of health
resources and their optimal allocation. Each chapter of this dissertation attempted
to explore some of the major root causes of ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the fi-
nancing of health systems in poor-resource countries. This section now summarises
the findings of each chapter, lays out the contributions they bring to the related
literature and discusses their overall implications.
5.1 Optimal allocation of health resources
Most low-income countries have now embarked on a decentralisation process of
their economy. In the health sector, reforms have been adopted in the past decades
to decentralise health systems with the objective of empowering local communi-
ties and better responding to local needs (Oates, 1972). If local governments have
access to better information about local needs than the central government and
donors, they may also have an advantage in selecting projects where Development
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Assistance for Health (DAH) is the most effective. Within a decentralised economy,
the appropriateness of aid conditionality raises concerns and its validity should be
questioned.
The analyses in Chapter 2 indicate that a close collaboration between donors
and all tiers of government is required to allocate health resources optimally. In set-
tings where information is fragmented and incomplete while institutions are poorly
performing, donors face an increased risk of obtaining and basing resource allocation
decisions on misleading information. The chapter demonstrates that aid condition-
ality can drive resources away from their optimal allocations; conditionality might
also increase the financial burden of the local government when it is committed
to reducing the burden of disease within its communities. In that case, the local
government’s efforts to compensate for the misallocation of foreign aid reduce both
fungibility and aid effectiveness. The model illustrates the potentially misleading
effects on health outcomes of policies that would strictly focus on eliminating any
possibility of reorienting aid through conditionality.
On the other hand, if aid is fungible within the health sector but unconditional,
additional funding for health projects to improve outcomes in a specific area may end
up financing health activities elsewhere. If the local government commits to poverty
and ill-health reduction, unconditional aid increases both fungibility and aid effec-
tiveness. An alternative situation where fungibility could increase aid effectiveness
is when the donor precisely identifies the local needs and local government spend-
ing exhibits diminishing returns. In this scenario, the total benefits from DAH will
depend on factors such as the initial allocation of domestic health resources among
areas, the extent of diminishing returns to government spending, and DAH impacts
on the productivity of government spending across areas (Wagstaff, 2011).
A natural way to empirically assess the predictions of chapter 2 would be to
exploit observed data on allocations of health resources within the government,
through grant transfers and local public spending, and donors’ funding. However,
the scarcity of data on fiscal transfers within African countries limits the possibility
to examine this question. Nonetheless, existing data on local spending and disease
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burden can still provide information about the geographical distribution of health
resources, understand how flows of global funds are determined, and identify over-
funded geographic areas. This exercise is carried out in chapter 3 which points to
the limitations of geographical aid targeting. The findings suggest that neither aid
agencies nor local partners are able to identify or reach populations with the great-
est needs. The results also highlight that local aid is disproportionately distributed
among populations with respect to their burden of disease. The excess of health aid
in some geographic areas could flag concerns about the cost-effectiveness of aid.
What factors could explain these results? At the local level, collecting accu-
rate information in poor resource settings can be challenging when routine data is
poorly and infrequently reported, and local institutions lack resources to circulate
information to decision-makers. For donors, this poses a clear difficulty to track
the dynamics of disease patterns among local populations, particularly in contexts
of rapidly evolving burdens of diseases. Donor’s mistargeting has two direct conse-
quences: an allocative inefficiency if populations with the worst health outcomes are
not receiving their share of health funds, and a technical inefficiency if some geo-
graphic areas with low health needs receive aid in excess. At the health facility level,
the latter point typically materialises in overstocks of disease-specific medicines with
respect to the population needs in the catchment area of the facility. Excess drug
stocks increase, in turn, the risk of product expiry, the associated costs of storage,
and the irrational use of medicines. The World Health Organization (WHO) es-
timates that more than half of all medicines consumed in the world were wrongly
prescribed or dispensed (WHO, 2004). Regarding malaria treatment, Cohen et al.
(2015) demonstrate that large subsidies for health products might favour inappro-
priate consumption of medicines with respect to patients’ symptoms. Altogether,
these findings highlight that allocative inefficiency may have far-reaching implica-
tions on the overall effectiveness of health resources in achieving significant health
gains and minimising the overall intervention costs.
Allocation inefficiency can also stem from the complex supply system of medicines
that prevail in most Sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries. Challenges in coordinating
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the storage and supply management of drugs due to multiple actors involved (such
as district and regional warehouses, private wholesalers and distributors), numerous
channels of medicine procurements working in parallel (private, public and inter-
national procurement agencies) and decoupled from patients’ needs, could seriously
exacerbate the risk of misallocating health resources (Yadav, 2015). The lack of a
coordinated national procurement and distribution framework is a clear impediment
to a well-functioning health system.
An additional barrier to improving the efficiency of the supply chain resides in
the extent of necessary infrastructure investments in the country. In most of Sub-
Saharan Africa, public infrastructure inherited from the colonial period is in dire
need of investment. Still, donors often appear reluctant to heavily invest in projects
not directly related to health or poverty in general, and the limited public budget
of the country obstructs the path for making the required investments in public
infrastructure.1 In many countries, a poor transportation network considerably
limits the capacity of improvements in the supply chain structure.
5.2 Health facility performance
In 2014, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa tested local health systems and re-
vealed their weakness. In Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, health systems showed
low reactivity to the disease outbreak due to limited capacity for public health
surveillance, lack of qualified human resources, medical equipment, health products
and slow coordination of donors to respond in a timely manner (Chan, 2017). The
tragic episode revealed the importance of strengthening health systems and global
health security infrastructure to respond to future crises. As health system per-
formance is determined by its responsiveness to changes in population health and
its fair distribution of health financing (Murray et al., 1999), disparities in hospital
1Some exceptions exist, such as the public-private partnership the Project Last Mile, which
was launched in 2010 between The Coca-Cola Company, The Coca-Cola Africa Foundation, The
Global Fund, United States Agency for International Development and the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation. In 2019, they operate in 8 African countries.
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efficiency and public funding can contribute to hamper health systems.
Chapter 4 aimed to increase our understanding of inequalities in health facil-
ity performance through a historical lens and explored how colonial settlements
continue to affect contemporaneous health facilities. The findings highlight that
historical factors can be strong determinants of both health facility performance
and government financial support. I find evidence of disparities in the allocation of
public health resources between colonial and post-independence hospitals which are
likely to contribute to regional inequalities in access to health care. Additionally,
they could, effectively, create a two-tier provision of a health care system with dif-
ferent quality of health care delivery. Since government funding is primarily used
to pay staff, salary payments may be more regular among colonial hospitals and,
therefore, attract more qualified health workers. Even though the chapter does not
find evidence of significant differences in length of stay or bed occupancy between
colonial and post-independence hospitals, further research on this subject should
explore how colonial legacy affects the modern quality of health care delivery. More
generally, additional evidence across Sub-Saharan Africa is necessary to understand
how the colonial heritage influences modern health systems and how heterogeneity
in colonial ruling affected the channel of persistence.
5.3 Policy implications and future work
One of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is for health systems of
low-income countries to move away from excessive reliance on out-of-pocket expen-
ditures and reduce, thereby, the proportion of households that incur catastrophic
spending on health services. The challenge lies in finding and applying solutions
to the sustainable financing of the healthcare system while making progress to-
wards Universal Health Coverage (UHC).2 These solutions entail greater capacity
2WHO (2010) defines UHC as the concept of ”providing financial protection from the costs
of using health services for all people of a country as well as enabling them to obtain the health
services that they need, where these services should be of sufficient quality to be effective”.
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and willingness of governments to mobilise public revenues,3 increased public do-
mestic spending on health and better allocation of funds (WHO, 2010).
In this regard, donors’ involvement with recipient governments is essential. First,
aid coordination should be prioritised between donors. Although the presence of
multiple donors, with sometimes conflicting objectives, has long been recognised as
a threat to aid effectiveness,4 donors continue to operate with little coordination
efforts. Some of the risks they pose are the duplication of projects or the absence
of aid funds in hard-to-reach areas, increasing thereby the costs of delivering aid
and impairing the targeting of the vulnerable populations (bourguignon2015).
The State in the recipient country may have neither the capacity nor the necessary
information to stimulate aid coordination. Second, donors should provide support
in designing fiscal policies that foster a better provision of health services in terms
of quality and coverage, and guarantee the smooth transition of the financing of
health programmes as governments reallocate resources to health priorities (Resch
and Hecht, 2018). In decentralised countries, the reduced role of the central gov-
ernment in local health spending should ignite a change in the relationship between
global health donors and recipient countries. Local governments should have better
information about local health needs and be more accountable to their local rep-
resentatives (Oates, 1972). This paradigm shift in donors’ approach would induce
greater involvement of subnational governments in aid allocation decision-making
processes in order to ensure greater accountability.
Additionally, both donors and recipient countries should devote a particular at-
tention to augment the availability of local information. Data on basic indicators
such as local disease burdens, the number of patients treated or under treatment and
local (and regional) government health spending are often inaccurate or missing. In-
vestment efforts should, therefore, also focus on collecting reliable local information
to improve decision-making processes. More extensive use of precise and reliable
3In 2001, African leaders met in Abuja and pledged to reach 15% of government expenditure
allocated to health sector.
4The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 recognised aid coordination (or harmoni-
sation) as a core objective for making aid more effective.
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information on health needs at the community level is crucial to maximise the im-
pact of health interventions. Once again, health-decision makers should engage with
local community representatives to identify the gap in existing information in order
to better assess epidemiological and demographic profiles.
Collecting regional and local data on the procurement and supply of medicines is
also needed to improve the efficiency of health spending. In some countries, routine
measurement of stock availability in health facilities already exists and is essential
to capture the regional disparities in the supply of drugs. Furthermore, data on the
stock of medicines can be useful indicators of local health resources when reliable
health spending data is missing. The empirical studies presented in chapters 3 and
4 rely on this innovative approach. I provided suggestive evidence that stocks of
antimalarial medicines in health facilities can be good indicators for the aid funding
allocated to the disease when government health spending is minimal. The robust-
ness of this approach could be tested with different context-specific diseases; for
instance, the stock of Antiretroviral (ARV) medicines could be a promising can-
didate to capture HIV related funding at the local level. Another line for future
research would be to exploit routine data on the stocks of medicines in central and
regional distribution centres. Gathering evidence at these different points of the
medicine distribution would offer the possibility to track resources from the entry
points of the medicine in the country to its consumption by patients. They would
also provide invaluable insight to better understand the source of inefficiencies in the
distribution of health products, as well as the overall geographical allocation of re-
sources. Anecdotal evidence from the DRC or Liberia suggests that this type of data
already exists within the medicine distribution system, but it is often fragmented
and incomplete due to the presence of the numerous actors that poorly exchange
their information. Better coordination between donors and central, regional and
local medicine suppliers is therefore crucial to meet local health needs.
This dissertation explored several methods to scrutinise the allocation of health
care resources in the DRC. Similar research in other national settings is necessary
to examine the external validity of my results. Furthermore, I have previously
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discussed the complexity of the environment in which most African health systems
operate. Whilst the analysis in chapter 3 includes a thorough estimation of the
costs associated with the procurement, storage and distribution of medicines, as
well as the estimated costs involved with human resources, the scarcity of data
limits the possibility to expand the analysis to wider areas. Indeed, an analysis
based on a large geographic coverage would entail important heterogeneity in the
transportation costs of drugs, specially if the area contains far, isolated and hard to
reach locations. More research on the ”last mile” costs (the costs associated with the
final point of delivery) in isolated areas is important to understand the geographical
distribution of transportation costs within countries and ultimately, how resources
should be allocated to meet the desired health outcomes. Further empirical evidence
on geographic aid targeting in different settings should also assist in determining
how donors’ capacity to reach the greatest needs is affected by accessibility. Do
donors allocate more health resources in easy-to-reach areas for a given burden of
disease within the local population? How do resource allocation decisions respond
to a change in the burden of disease? These questions are important to tackle in
order to better understand the capacity of donors to target health needs in a timely
manner and strengthen health systems.
Nonetheless, future research would probably be also limited by the availability of
data, particularly to capture the dynamics of diseases among the local population.
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are useful to obtain epidemiological infor-
mation, but their infrequency offers limited possibilities to precisely estimate the
evolution of diseases among local populations. Alternative techniques that rely on
Geographic Information System (GIS) data, such as the one introduced in chapter
3, can provide valuable information to estimate the local burden of diseases. When
combined with colonial data, GIS techniques could also prove to be useful to push
further the examination of colonial legacy and understand the path dependence of
financing of modern health systems.
This dissertation has emphasised policy alternatives to increase health funds’
effectiveness and strengthen health systems in poor-resources countries. In this re-
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gard, its overall message is hopeful. Reforms in the global health landscape that
integrate closer collaboration between donors and recipient countries to increase
government and local communities ownership, capacity for financial management
and predictability of donors’ funding have the potential to increase the overall ef-
fectiveness of aid.
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Figure A.1: Health benefits based on conditional and unconditional health resources
g
h(g)
Gd
h(Gd)
GconditGd1
ph(Gd) + (1− p)h(g)
∆
W
∆G>0
A.1 Local public provision of health care with do-
mestic resources
Proofs for the determination of fiscal grant The central government deter-
mines the optimal fiscal grant a from the following objective function
Max
ap,aR
piλph(θp, gp + ap) + (1− pi)[λRh(θR, gR + aR) + y(1− τ)]
where λk is the weight given by the central government for group k. The central
government’s budget constraint is given by
(1− pi)yτ ≥ qa
where a = piap + (1− pi)aR.
The budget constraint binds and I insert it into the objective function of the
central government
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Max
ap,aR
piλph(θp, gp + ap) + (1− pi)[λRh(θR, gR + aR) + y − q(piap + (1− pi)aR)]
FOC with respect to ap
piλph2(θp, gp + ap)− piλR (q′(G)a+ q(G)) = 0
FOC with respect to aR
(1− pi)λR (h2(θR, gR + aR)− (q′(G)a+ q(G))) = 0
The FOC with respect to ap and aR can then be simplified as
h2(θp, g + ap) =
λR (q
′(G)a+ q(G))
λp
and
h2(θR, g + aR) = q
′(G)a+ q(G)
Proofs of Unconditional fiscal grant
If the central government decides to transfer an unconditional (without use re-
strictions) lump sum grant per capita a to the community, the optimal local expen-
ditures for the provision of health services selected by the local government solves
Max
GcP ,G
c
R
{piµPh(θP , GcP ) + (1− pi)µR[h(θR, GcR)− cgR]}
subject to the budget constraint:
q(Gc)Gc ≤ (1− pi)cgR + aq(Gc)
where the total provision of the private good for group k is denoted by Gck = gk+a
with g = pigp + (1− pi)gR.
Note that Gc = piGcP + (1 − pi)GcR. Inserting the budget constraint into the
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objective function of the local government gives:
piµPh2(θP , G
c
P )− µRpi[q′(Gc)Gc + q(Gc)] + µRpiaq′(Gc) = 0
h2(θP , G
c
P ) =
µR
µP
q′(Gc)(Gc − a) + q(Gc)
=
µR
µP
q′(Gc)g + q(Gc)
since Gc = g + a. Likewise, the FOC with respect to the second argument lead to:
(1− pi)µRh2(θP , GcR)− µR(1− pi)[q′(Gc)Gc + q(Gc)] + µR(1− pi)aq′(Gc) = 0
Hence,
h2(θP , G
c
R) = q
′(Gc)(Gc − a) + q(Gc)
= q′(Gc)g + q(Gc)
Proofs of Conditional fiscal grant
The marginal propensity to spend on the sick out of conditional grant is obtained
by applying the implicit function theorem on the first order-condition (4.2) gives:
∂g∗P
∂ag
= − h22(θP , gP )p1 −
µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + q′(Gc)
h22(θP , GcP )p1 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)− pi µRµP (q′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc))
= −
(
1− h22(θP , gP )(1− p1) +
µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + q′(Gc)− pi µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc)
h22(θP , GcP )p1 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)− pi µRµP (q′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc))
)
= −
1− 1− p1 + µRµP q′′(Gc)g+2q′(Gc)(1−pi)−q′(Gc)h22(θP ,gP )
p1
h22(θP ,G
c
P )
h22(θP ,gP )
+ 1− p1 − pi µRµP
q′′(Gc)g+2q′(Gc)
h22(θP ,gP )

= −
1− 1− p1 + µRµP κc(1−pi)−q′(Gc)h22(θP ,gP )
p1
h22(θP ,G
c
P )
h22(θP ,gP )
+ 1− p1 − pi µRµP κch22(θP ,gP )

with κc = q
′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc).
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A.2 Public provision of health care resources with
foreign aid
Proof of case 1: Grant a and aid d unconditional
Totally differentiating (2.13) yields the following marginal propensity to spend
out of aid:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1) h22(θP , G
d
P )− µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )− pi µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)− pi µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )− pi µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
µR
µP
(1− pi)κd − µRµP q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )− pi µRµP κd
)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1− 1− pi −
q′(Gd)
κd
pid − pi
)
with pid =
h22(θP ,G
d
p)
κd
µP
µR
and κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd).
Conditional grant a and unconditional aid d
In this situation, the local government allocates its local resources g and the
external funding that it receives from the donor to maximise its objective function.
However, it has no control over the allocation of the federal grant a. The optimal
resource allocations solve the problem:
max
GgdP ,G
gd
R
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
d
P ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, gR)
]
p1
+
[
piµPW
P (θP , G
s
P ) + (1− pi)µRWR(θR, GcpR)
]
(1− p1)
s.t. q(Gd)Gs ≤ (1− pi)cgR + dq(Gd)
where GsP = gP +d and G
s = g+d. The local government’s first-order conditions
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yield to:
∂W P (θP , G
d
p)
∂GsP
p1 +
∂W P (θP , G
s
P )
∂GsP
(1− p1) = µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(A.1)
Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique maximum are
h22(θP , G
d
P )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)−
µR
θPµP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)) < 0
Unconditional aid transfer to the local government coupled with a conditional grant
leads to similar results to the previous case. The welfare loss of conditional grant is
given by the probability of the central government to misallocate its funds (targeting
the low-need) and the social welfare difference between W (GdP ) and W (G
s
P ). In
particular, if the share of foreign aid on total health expenditures is high and close to
unity, the welfare loss of conditional grant becomes marginal. Totally differentiating
(A.1), the effects of aid on local health expenditures are given by:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a
′(d) + 1)h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− (a′(d) + 1)µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− pi µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd))
(A.2)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− 1a′(d)+1)(1− p1) + µRµP (κd − q′(Gd)− piκd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− pi µRµP κd
)
(A.3)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
h22(θP , G
s
P )
a′(d)
a′(d)+1(1− p1) + µRµP
(
κd(1− pi)− q′(Gd)
)
θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− pi µRµP κd
)
(A.4)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− a′(d)a′(d)+1pis(1− p1)− q′(Gd)κd + 1− pi
pidp1 + pis(1− p1)− pi
 (A.5)
where
pik =
h22(θP , G
k
p)
κd
µP
µR
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The effects of foreign aid on local health expenditures critically depend on the
sign of a′(d). If the central government decides to tie its fiscal grant to the presence
of foreign aid (a′(d) > 0), then local expenditures increase.
Comparing (A.2) with the case of unconditional aid and grant (2.14), the impact
of an conditional grant on the partial effect of aid on local government spending
depends on the sign of a′(d)/(a′(d) + 1)pis(1 − p1) − q′(Gd)/κd 1. When this term
is positive, a conditional grant increases the effects of aid on local health expendi-
tures to the high-need. However, the positivity condition cannot hold if the central
government has almost perfect information about local health needs (p1 close to 1)
or if the effect of aid on the fiscal grant is insignificant (a′(d) close to 0). In such
cases, conditional grant reduces the effect of aid on the local health expenditures to
the high-need group.
In addition, since conditional grant funding increases with foreign aid, the local
government can reduce its own health expenditures. Nonetheless, this effect is mit-
igated by the probability that the central government incorrectly assesses the local
needs of each subgroup. Consequently, the maximum effect of external aid on local
expenditures is reached when p1 = 0 and decreases with p1 increasing.
The comparison of case 2 (2.18) and case 3 (A.2) leads to more ambiguous
results and depends on the probabilities of the donor and the central government to
successfully target the high-need group, as well as the central government’s response
to foreign aid. When both the central government and the donor have perfect
information (p1 = p2 = 1), the case where fiscal grant is conditional (case 2) has
lower increasing effect on the local health expenditures propensity to spend out
of aid than the case where aid is conditional (case 3), provided that d > a. The
logic behind this mimics the proof in case 2 (conditional aid and unconditional
grant): since the local government increases its health care spending to compensate
the misallocation of resources from either the donor or the central government, the
1The case where a′(d) < 0 is omitted as it constitutes a straightforward source of fungibility
of aid. However, this case can be easily included in the reasoning below, and will be mostly the
opposite of the results obtained when the marginal effect of aid on fiscal grant is positive.
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marginal propensity to spend out of aid depends directly on probability that local
needs are correctly assessed and on the quantity of health resources transferred.
The effects of a conditional grant on local government spending in the presence of
unconditional aid are obtained from totally differentiating the first-order condition:
∂g∗P
∂a
= − h22(θP , G
d
P )p1 − µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− pi µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
(A.6)
= −
(
1− h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1) + µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)− pi
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− pi µRµP (q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
)
(A.7)
= −
1− (1− p1) + µRµP κd(1−pi)−q′(Gd)h22(θP ,GsP )
h22(θP ,G
d
P )
h22(θP ,G
s
P )
p1 + 1− p1 − pi µRµP
κd
h22(θP ,G
s
P )
 (A.8)
= −
(
1− (1− p1)pi
s + 1− pi − q′(Gd)
κd
p1pid + (1− p1)pis − pi
)
(A.9)
with pis =
h22(θP ,G
s
p)
κd
µP
µR
.
Comparing the case where the donor is absent (2.12) with (A.6) reveals ambigu-
ous effects. Assuming κj < 0, the comparative effects of a conditional grant in the
presence and the absence of foreign aid depend on the difference in the marginal rate
of substitution between conditional grant with unconditional aid and conditional aid
alone. It means that the level of local health expenditures critically depends on the
effects of aid on the marginal health benefit of high-need individuals.
Proposition A.1. If the donor’s intervention has a significantly large effect on the
marginal health benefit of the high-need members or when p1 is large enough, the
local government’s marginal propensity to spend out of conditional grant is higher
with foreign aid than without it.
Proof. Compare the effects of conditional grant with (A.6) and without (2.12) for-
eign aid. The condition under which foreign aid negatively affects the marginal
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propensity to spend out of conditional grant is
h22(θP , G
d
P )
h22(θP , GsP )
p1 + 1− p1 − piµR
µP
κd
h22(θP , GsP )
>
h22(θP , G
c
P )
h22(θP , gP )
p1 + 1− p1 − piµR
µP
κc
h22(θP , gP )
p1(
h22(θP , G
c
P )
h22(θP , gP )
− h22(θP , G
d
P )
h22(θP , GsP )
) < pi
µR
µP
(
κc
h22(θp, gp)
− κd
h22(θp, Gsp)
)
In addition, κc > κd (if κj < 0) and gP < G
s
P = gP + d. Hence one of the condition
under which this last inequality is satisfied is when p1 is close enough to 0.
The other condition comes from the comparison of the numerators between (A.6)
and (2.12). In particular, foreign aid deteriorates the marginal propensity to spend
out of conditional grant if
κc(1− pi)− q′(Gc)
h22(θP , gP )
>
κd(1− pi)− q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GsP )
This last inequality is ambiguous as κc > κd and h22(θP , gP ) < h22(θP , G
s
P ). There-
fore, this inequality holds if the effect of foreign aid on the marginal health benefit
of the high-need groups is small enough.
Provided that foreign aid has a significant impact on the marginal health benefit
of the high-need, local government expenditures rise with external funding. How-
ever, when the probability of the central government to rightly target the high-need
group is low or when the amount of foreign aid d is small enough, this result does
not hold and the donor funds exacerbate the reduction in local expenditures. This
result holds even if the local government cares only about high-need individuals
(µR = 0). On the other hand, if the local government only maximizes the welfare
of the low-need group, then the presence of foreign aid increases the local govern-
ment’s expenditures for health care services toward the sick when the fiscal grant is
conditional.
Proofs of Case 4. Conditional grant a and aid d
162
I use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive the marginal effect of foreign aid
on the optimal local health expenditures.
dg∗P
dd
=
− (a
′(d) + 1)h22(θP , GdP )p1p2 + a
′(d)h22(θP , GcP )p1(1− p2)
h22(θP , G
d
P
)p1p2 + h22(θP , G
c
P
)p1(1− p2) + h22(θP , GsP )(1− p1)p2 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)(1− p2)− pi
µR
µP
κd
−
h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)p2 − (a′(d) + 1)
µR
µP
(κd − q′(Gd)
h22(θP , G
d
P
)p1p2 + h22(θP , G
c
P
)p1(1− p2) + h22(θP , GsP )(1− p1)p2 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)(1− p2)− pi
µR
µP
κd
Define pik =
h22(θp,Gkp)
κd
µP
µR
. Then,
dg∗P
dd
= −
(a′(d) + 1)p˜idp1p2 + a′(d)p˜icp1(1− p2) + p˜is(1− p1)p2 − (a′(d) + 1)(1− q
′(Gd)
κd
)
p˜idp1p2 + p˜icp1(1− p2) + p˜is(1− p1)p2 + p˜igP (1− p1)(1− p2)− pi
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1−
a′(d)
a′(d)+1 p2(1− p1)p˜i
s + 1
a′(d)+1 p1(1− p2)p˜i
c + (1− p1)(1− p2)p˜igP + 1− pi − q
′(Gd)
κd
p1p2p˜id + p2(1− p1)p˜is + p1(1− p2)p˜ic + (1− p1)(1− p2)p˜igP − pi

I should then examine the special case when the local government only cares
about the sick (µR/µP = 0). In this scenario, equation (2.20) becomes
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣
µP
µR
=0
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
a′(d)
a′(d)+1p2(1−p1)h22(θP ,GsP )+ 1a′(d)+1p1(1−p2)h22(θP ,GcP )+(1−p1)(1−p2)h22(θP ,gP )
p1p2h22(θP ,G
d
P )+p2(1−p1)h22(θP ,GsP )+p1(1−p2)h22(θP ,GcP )+(1−p1)(1−p2)h22(θP ,gP )
)
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
Consider the difference in equations (A.6) and (2.21). It follows that:
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case3
− ∂g
∗
P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case4
=
(1− p1)pis + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
p1pid + (1− p1)pis − pi −
pis(1− p1)p2 + pigP (1− p1)(1− p2) + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
p1p2pid + p2(1− p1)pis + p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP − pi
Define the difference in the numerator as
A = (1−p1)pis−(pis(1− p1)p2 + pigP (1− p1)(1− p2)) = (1−p1)(1−p2) (pis − pigP ) > 0
if 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1 since pi
s > pigP . In addition, define B as the difference
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in the denominators:
B = p1pi
d + (1− p1)pis −
(
p1p2pi
d + p2(1− p1)pis + p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP
)
= p1(1− p2)pid + (1− p1)(1− p2)pis − (p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP )
= (1− p1)(1− p2)
(
pis − pigP + p1
1− p1 (pi
d − pic)
)
> 0
if 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1 since pi
d > pic and pis > pigP . It follows that B > A,
then
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case3
<
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case4
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Appendix B
Appendix for chapter 3
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Figure B.1: Share of donors and domestic spending in total malaria investment
Notes: The above figure documents the evolution of the contributions of external aid and govern-
ment spending to the national malaria programme, which highlights the strong dependence of the
health system of the country on donors. This information was extracted from the National Health
Accounts of the DRC, MSP (2017). External aid and government spending amount respectively
to $160 million and $9 million in 2017.
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Figure B.2: Mapping of the full sample of health facilities and mines in the DRC
Notes: The map shows the geo-location of the mines and the health facilities in the Estern DRC
along with provincial level boundaries. The mines and health facilities are located in North and
South Kivu, Ituri, Maniema, Tshopo and Tanganyika.
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Figure B.3: Mapping of health facilities and mines in North Kivu
Notes: The map shows the exact geo-location of the mines and the health facilities in North Kivu,
one of the provinces which contains the most observations in the sample.
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Figure B.4: Paths from health facilities to mines with elevation feature
Notes: This
map plots health facilities and mines along with the algorithm-derived shortest paths based on elevation. The cost path function was used in ArcGIS
10 to estimate the least cost path from each health facility to the closest mine.
169
Figure B.5: Administrative map of the DRC and the selected provinces
Notes: The map shows the provincial boundaries of the DRC and the selection of provinces that
contains the location of health facilities and mines from the data sample: North and South Kivu,
Ituri, Maniema, Tshopo and Tanganyika.
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Figure B.6: Malaria prevalence as a function of the distance to mines
Notes: Each point plots an average value within a bin that represents a 1 km interval. The y-axis
indicates the malaria probability which is defined as the total number of malaria cases divided by
the total population in the catchment area of each health facility.
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Figure B.7: Local polynomial estimations of malaria prevalence as a function of the
distance to mines
Notes: This figure shows the non-parametric estimations of malaria prevalence conditional on the
distance from a health facility to its the closest mine, using a kernel-weighted local polynomial
regression of order 1. The kernel function is epanechnikov and the the bandwidth corresponds to
700 metres. The y-axis represents the malaria prevalence defined as the share of malaria cases in
the population catchment area of the health facility and the x-axis corresponds to the distance
from health facility to the closest mine in metres. The shaded area denotes the 95% confidence
interval of the coefficients.
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Figure B.8: Density of the running variable
Notes: The above figure shows the distribution of the running variable for health facilities in
the sample. The running variable is the distance from the health facility to the mining threshold,
which is located 14.5 km from a mine. The running variable is centred around the threshold, so
distances are negative in the mining areas (left side of the threshold) and positive in non-mining
areas (right side of the threshold). The y-axis shows the percentage of observations within each
bin, where the latter represents a 250 metre-interval.
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Figure B.9: Cumulative Distribution Function
Notes: The above figure shows the cumulative distribution function of health facilities conditional
on the distance to the nearest health facility. The data sample is restricted on health facilities
located within 10 km (red line) and 4 km (blue dashed line) from the threshold. Distances are
reported in metres on the x-axis. The sample is also restricted to health facilities whose maximum
distance to another closest facility is 30 kilometres.
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Figure B.10: RD effect on the stock value of artemisinin-based combination therapy and
sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine commodities
(a) Stock value of ACT
(b) Stock value of SP
Notes: Each point plots an average value within a bin conditional on the distance to the mining
threshold. The distance is in metres and the solid line plots a local cubic regression.
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Figure B.11: Evidence on continuity condition
(a) Expenditure (b) Revenue
(c) Number of births (d) Number of health workers
(e) Government bonus (f) Stock value of total other drugs
Notes: Each point plots an average value within a bin conditional on the distance to the mining
threshold. The distance is in metres and the solid line plots a local cubic regression.
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Figure B.12: Robustness checks
Notes: The figures plot estimates from separate RD regressions of the outcome on mining area.
The regressions include pre-determined covariates for geographic characteristics and use robust
standard-errors. Each graph shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. The band-
width selection follows the data-driven procedures suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014) for figures (B) and (C) and is referred to ”CCT” in figure (A). The vertical red line in figure
(C) plots the 14.5 km cutoff that is used in all baseline results.
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Figure B.13: Local polynomial estimations of aid for malaria as a function of the
distance to mines within mining areas
Notes: This figure shows the non-parametric estimations of aid for malaria conditional on the
distance from a health facility to its the closest mine within mining areas, using a kernel-weighted
local polynomial regression of order 1. The kernel function is epanechnikov and the the bandwidth
corresponds to 700 metres. The y-axis represents the malaria prevalence defined as the share of
malaria cases in the population catchment area of the health facility and the x-axis corresponds to
the distance from health facility to the closest mine in metres. The shaded area denotes the 95%
confidence interval of the coefficients.
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Figure B.14: Prices of antimalarial commodities
Notes: The above document presents the reference pricing of antimalarial medicines negotiated by
the Global Fund through the Pooled Procurement mechanism (reference prices for Rapid Diagnostic
Tests (RDT) and Insecticide-Treated bed Nets (ITNs) were also extracted from the Global Fund’s
documents (The Global Fund, 2018) . The Global Fund’s objectives are to stabilise prices and
ensure market sustainability of health commodities by pooling demand of countries that participate
to the programme (The Global Fund, 2018).
179
Figure B.15: Evolution of aid needed with the additional risk of malaria transmission
Notes: The figure plots the evolution of malaria-related costs that are required to cope with the
additional risk of malaria transmission. The horizontal red dashed line shows the additional aid
for malaria that is received in high burden areas according to the nonparametric RD estimation
(table B.6) of the mining effect. The total cost of malaria diagnosis, prevention and treatment is
calculated from the price list of antimalarial commodities of the Global Fund (figure B.14).
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Figure B.16: Stock value of antimalarial commodities and total malaria investment
Notes: Scatter plot of stock value of antimalarial commodities in 2017 for each of the 23 provinces
of the Democratic Republic of Congo with fitted line versus total malaria investments in each
province.
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Table B.1: Summary statistics and difference-in-means, full sample
Outside mining area Within mining area Difference-in-means
Obs. Sample mean s.d. Obs. Sample mean s.d. Diff-in-means s. e. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Geographic characteristics
Elevation (in metres) 489 1,251.23 24.84 738 1,218.87 19.27 -32.36 31.44 0.30
Slope 489 5.03 0.30 738 6.34 0.31 1.31 0.43 0.00
Distance from closest facility (km) 489 5.56 0.28 738 4.63 0.19 -0.93 0.34 0.01
Distance from closest hospital (km) 436 20.78 0.96 700 20.22 0.68 -0.56 1.18 0.63
Facilities characteristics*
Antimalarial stock value 446 0.08 0.00 652 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
Total other drugs stock value 474 0.11 0.01 724 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Revenue 477 0.90 0.07 709 0.88 0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.85
Investment 316 0.07 0.01 520 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.21
Payroll tax 394 0.03 0.00 595 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03
Government bonus 335 0.04 0.00 557 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
No. nurses 469 0.00 0.00 705 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. births 451 0.02 0.00 686 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46
Local Population** 489 14.43 0.82 738 12.20 0.37 -2.24 0.90 0.01
No. days antimalarial stock outs
Insecticide-Treated bed Nets 423 6.47 0.31 583 5.87 0.24 -0.60 0.40 0.13
Rapid Diagnostic Tests 391 2.83 0.51 524 2.09 0.16 -0.74 0.53 0.16
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine 396 3.73 0.44 532 4.26 0.57 0.52 0.72 0.47
ACT (ages +14) 400 3.41 0.23 529 3.53 0.46 0.12 0.52 0.81
ACT (ages 6-13) 403 3.02 0.20 512 3.39 0.53 0.37 0.57 0.52
ACT (ages 1-5) 407 3.08 0.24 537 3.82 0.24 0.74 0.33 0.03
ACT (ages -1) 409 3.30 0.25 560 4.44 0.26 1.14 0.36 0.00
Notes: Mining area is defined as the geographic area where the distance from a mine to its closest health facility is less than 14.5 km. The unit of observation
is health facility and all financial characteristics as well as commodity stock value are expressed in U.S. Dollars. All indicators correspond to monthly average
numbers. The first six columns show the number of observations, sample mean and robust standard errors for non-mining and mining areas respectively.
The last three columns indicate the difference in means between non-mining and mining area, the robust standard errors for the difference and the p-value
of the test of whether the mean coefficients in the mining and non-mining sample are equal.
* Variables are expressed as share in local population.
** Mean and standard deviation of local population are expressed in thousands.
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Table B.2: Summary statistics and difference-in-means, 8km window around the border
Outside mining area Within mining area Difference-in-means
Obs. Sample mean s.d. Obs. Sample mean s.d. Diff-in-means s. e. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Geographic characteristics
Elevation (in metres) 161 1,319.01 44.37 232 1,217.65 34.40 -101.36 56.14 0.07
Slope 161 5.88 0.47 232 5.91 0.48 0.03 0.67 0.97
Distance from closest facility (km) 161 5.72 0.47 232 5.42 0.37 -0.30 0.60 0.61
Distance from closest hospital (km) 142 21.08 1.50 214 20.89 1.15 -0.19 1.89 0.92
Facilities characteristics*
Antimalarial stock value 145 0.08 0.01 201 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12
Total other drugs stock value 157 0.12 0.01 226 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.55
Revenue 157 0.73 0.06 217 0.73 0.05 -0.00 0.08 0.98
Investment 116 0.05 0.01 157 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.52
Payroll tax 128 0.02 0.00 178 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.07
Government bonus 114 0.03 0.00 158 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
No. nurses 155 0.00 0.00 219 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51
No. births 146 0.02 0.00 216 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82
Local Population** 161 12.36 0.57 232 11.44 0.50 -0.93 0.76 0.22
No. days antimalarial stock outs
Insecticide-Treated bed Nets 132 6.19 0.53 179 5.96 0.45 -0.22 0.70 0.75
Rapid Diagnostic Tests 117 2.38 0.31 159 1.80 0.30 -0.58 0.43 0.18
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine 119 3.83 0.56 165 2.88 0.35 -0.94 0.66 0.16
ACT (ages +14) 115 3.57 0.38 165 4.49 1.41 0.92 1.46 0.53
ACT (ages 6-13) 116 3.19 0.35 156 4.56 1.69 1.37 1.72 0.43
ACT (ages 1-5) 127 3.36 0.42 170 3.40 0.40 0.04 0.58 0.95
ACT (ages -1) 124 3.86 0.51 175 4.12 0.48 0.26 0.70 0.71
Notes: Mining area is defined as the geographic area where the distance from a mine to its closest health facility is less than 14.5 km. The unit of observation
is health facility and all financial characteristics as well as commodity stock value are expressed in U.S. Dollars. All indicators correspond to monthly average
numbers. The first six columns show the number of observations, sample mean and robust standard errors for non-mining and mining areas respectively.
The last three columns indicate the difference in means between non-mining and mining area, the robust standard errors for the difference and the p-value
of the test of whether the mean coefficients in the mining and non-mining sample are equal.
* Variables are expressed as share in local population.
** Mean and standard deviation of local population are expressed in thousands.
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Table B.3: Summary statistics and difference-in-means, 3km window around the border
Outside mining area Within mining area Difference-in-means
Obs. Sample mean s.d. Obs. Sample mean s.d. Diff-in-means s. e. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Geographic characteristics
Elevation (in metres) 68 1,302.82 71.69 81 1,278.82 61.83 -24.01 94.67 0.80
Slope 68 6.81 0.79 81 6.61 1.18 -0.20 1.42 0.89
Distance from closest facility (km) 68 6.10 0.80 81 5.60 0.60 -0.50 1.00 0.62
Distance from closest hospital (km) 58 20.98 2.35 74 22.28 1.91 1.29 3.03 0.67
Facilities characteristics*
Antimalarial stock value 59 0.08 0.01 71 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.29
Total other drugs stock value 67 0.11 0.01 78 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12
Revenue 66 0.76 0.10 76 0.68 0.09 -0.08 0.13 0.56
Investment 51 0.06 0.01 51 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.87
Payroll tax 56 0.01 0.00 59 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.50
Government bonus 47 0.04 0.01 52 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.22
No. nurses 66 0.00 0.00 79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68
No. births 57 0.02 0.00 80 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.63
Local Population** 68 12.72 0.94 81 11.47 0.91 -1.25 1.31 0.34
No. days antimalarial stock outs
Insecticide-Treated bed Nets 59 7.02 0.86 65 6.32 0.81 -0.70 1.18 0.56
Rapid Diagnostic Tests 50 2.18 0.37 59 1.46 0.33 -0.73 0.50 0.15
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine 52 5.03 1.10 59 2.71 0.59 -2.31 1.24 0.07
ACT (ages +14) 51 2.90 0.44 61 3.20 0.57 0.30 0.71 0.67
ACT (ages 6-13) 50 3.11 0.54 60 7.13 4.34 4.02 4.38 0.36
ACT (ages 1-5) 55 3.66 0.81 65 3.17 0.68 -0.48 1.05 0.65
ACT (ages -1) 56 4.49 0.82 64 4.22 0.79 -0.27 1.14 0.81
Notes: Mining area is defined as the geographic area where the distance from a mine to its closest health facility is less than 14.5 km. The unit of observation
is health facility and all financial characteristics as well as commodity stock value are expressed in U.S. Dollars per capita (sing local population catchment
area of the facility). All indicators correspond to monthly average numbers. The first six columns show the number of observations, sample mean and robust
standard errors for non-mining and mining areas respectively. The last three columns indicate the difference in means between non-mining and mining area,
the robust standard errors for the difference and the p-value of the test of whether the mean coefficients in the mining and non-mining sample are equal.
* Variables are expressed as share in local population.
** Mean and standard deviation of local population are expressed in thousands.
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Table B.4: Manipulation Density tests
Density tests (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hmining hnon−mining Nmining Nnon−mining p-value
Separate MSE Optimal bandwidth 3,647 5,348 84 105 0.84
Restricted C.D.F 6,723 6,723 175 129 0.89
Notes: The table shows the results of the manipulation test based on the local polynomial density estimation
technique (Cattaneo et al., 2017) where the density functions of the mining and non-mining areas are equal
under the null hypothesis. The first two columns correspond to the choice of the bandwidth (in metres) on
each side of the threshold, columns (3) and (4) indicate the number of observations used and the last column
gives the p-value of the test. I perform the test using two different MSE optimal bandwidth on each side of
the cutoff for which the results are reported in the first row. The second row corresponds to the density test
where the Cumulative Distribution Functions (C.D.F.) of the running variable on each side of the cutoff are
assumed to be equal.
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Table B.5: Parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
Window selection 3 km 8 km
Control variables* No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid for malaria per capita
RD Mining effect 0.058 0.058 0.072 0.070
s.e. 0.024 0.022 0.027 0.026
Standard p-value 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.007
Obs. 130 130 346 346
Placebo outcomes, standard p-values
Expenditures 0.414 0.614
Revenue 0.693 0.767
No. of health workers 0.768 0.633
No. of births 0.826 0.716
Notes: The table reports the results of the weighted least squares estimations based on specification (3.1).
In the upper part of the table, the dependent variable is the antimalarial stock value and the bottom part
of the table reports the standard p-value of the β1 estimates for a list of pre-determined covariates. Each
of these covariates is used as the dependent variable in order to test the validity of the RD design, and I
report robust standard errors. Columns (1) to (4) report the results obtained using a local linear regression
and columns (5) to (8) present results using a local cubic model that provides more flexibility as the g(.)
function covers a larger support (7 to 10 km).
* Control variables are the geographic characteristics (elevation and slope) and the number of mines sur-
rounding a health facility.
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Table B.6: Non-parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
Control variables* No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bandwidth h (in metres)** 3,997 3,945 8,093 7,755
Aid for malaria per capita
RD Mining effect 0.053 0.054 0.072 0.073
Robust s.e. 0.024 0.022 0.029 0.026
Robust p-value 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.004
Obs. 170 165 348 339
Placebo outcomes, robust p-values
Expenditures 0.539 0.608
Revenue 0.857 0.937
No. of health workers 0.472 0.466
No. of births 0.845 0.795
Notes: The table reports the results from nonparametric estimations of specification (3.1) using a local
linear and cubic model. In the upper part of the table, the dependent variable is the antimalarial stock
value whilst the bottom part of the table presents the robust p-values of the estimates of the mining
effects on several pre-determined covariates following the procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2014).
* Control variables are elevation and slope.
** The bandwidth selection follows the MSE-optimal procedure proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2014), as well as the construction of robust standard errors p-values. The smoothed distribution
function used is the triangular kernel.
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Table B.7: Robustness: Parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas with restric-
tion on the distance between health facilities
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
Window selection 3 km 8 km
Control variables* No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid for malaria per capita
RD Mining effect 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.071
s.e. 0.020 0.022 0.028 0.026
Standard p-value 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.006
Obs. 168 168 344 344
Placebo outcomes, standard p-values
Expenditures 0.897 0.610
Revenue 0.931 0.793
No. of health workers 0.629 0.662
No. of births 0.683 0.765
Notes: The table reports the results of the weighted least squares estimations based on specification (3.1)
and restricting the straight line distance between health facilities to be more than 3 Km. In the upper part
of the table, the dependent variable is the antimalarial stock value and the bottom part of the table reports
the standard p-value of the β1 estimates for a list of pre-determined covariates. Each of these covariates is
used as the dependent variable in order to test the validity of the RD design, and I report robust standard
errors. Columns (1) to (4) report the results obtained using a local linear regression and columns (5) to (8)
present results using a local cubic model that provides more flexibility as the g(.) function covers a larger
support (7 to 10 km).
* Control variables are the geographic characteristics (elevation and slope) and the number of mines sur-
rounding a health facility.
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Table B.8: Robustness: Non-parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas with
restriction on the distance between health facilities
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
Control variables* No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bandwidth h (in metres)** 3,947 3,869 8,202 7,486
Aid for malaria per capita
RD Mining effect 0.056 0.056 0.074 0.072
Robust s.e. 0.025 0.023 0.029 0.027
Robust p-value 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.007
Obs. 163 160 352 325
Placebo outcomes, robust p-values
Expenditures 0.522 0.604
Revenue 0.794 0.927
No. of health workers 0.482 0.479
No. of births 0.915 0.737
Notes: The table reports the results from nonparametric estimations of specification (3.1) using a local
linear and cubic model and restricting the straight line distance between health facilities to be more than
3 Km. In the upper part of the table, the dependent variable is the antimalarial stock value whilst the
bottom part of the table presents the robust p-values of the estimates of the mining effects on several
pre-determined covariates following the procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).
* Control variables are elevation and slope.
** The bandwidth selection follows the MSE-optimal procedure proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2014), as well as the construction of robust standard errors p-values. The smoothed distribution
function used is the triangular kernel.
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Table B.9: Parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas by antimalarial commodity
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
(1) (2)
Window selection (km) 3 8
ACT - Treatment
RD Mining effect 0.016 0.019
s.e. 0.009 0.010
p-value 0.068 0.049
Obs. 147 388
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP) - Prevention
RD Mining effect 0.039 0.046
s.e. 0.011 0.013
p-value 0.001 0.001
Obs. 134 357
Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT)
RD Mining effect 0.006 0.005
s.e. 0.002 0.003
p-value 0.022 0.077
Obs. 145 380
Insecticide-Treated bed Net (ITN)
RD Mining effect 0.002 0.003
s.e. 0.006 0.009
p-value 0.771 0.700
Obs. 134 347
Notes: The table reports the results of the weighted least squares estimations based on specification (3.1) for each
antimalarial commodity, with robust standard errors. Each commodity’s stock value is expressed as a share in the
population catchment area of the facility. For each regression, I control for the government bonus and geographic
characteristics (distance to the closest health facility, elevation and slope) and the number of mines surrounding a
health facility.
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Table B.10: Non-parametric estimation of the effect of mining areas by antimalarial
commodity
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
(1) (2)
ACT - Treatment
RD Mining effect 0.013 0.014
s.e. 0.008 0.010
Robust p-value 0.061 0.180
Bandwidth (metres) 4,178 6,516
Obs. 201 329
Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) - Prevention
RD Mining effect 0.036 0.046
s.e. 0.012 0.014
Robust p-value 0.001 0.001
Bandwidth (metres) 3,131 7,680
Obs. 136 345
Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT)
RD Mining effect 0.005 0.008
s.e. 0.003 0.003
Robust p-value 0.049 0.002
Bandwidth (metres) 4,928 8,063
Obs. 224 268
Insecticide-Treated bed Net (ITN)
RD Mining effect 0.006 -0.002
s.e. 0.008 0.011
Robust p-value 0.332 0.742
Bandwidth (metres) 4,324 5,656
Obs. 186 252
Notes: The table reports the results from nonparametric estimations of specification (3.1) using a local linear and
cubic model for each antimalarial commodity. The bandwidth selection follows the MSE-optimal procedure proposed
by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), as well as the construction of robust standard errors p-values. The
smoothed distribution function used is the triangular kernel. Each commodity’s stock value is expressed as a share in
the population catchment area of the facility. For each regression, I control for the geographic characteristics (elevation
and slope) and the number of mines surrounding a health facility.
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Table B.11: Effect of mining areas on stock-outs, consumption and stock
ACT ACT ACT ACT
SP < 1 1-5 6-13 < 14 ITN RDT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No. of stock-out days per month
RD Mining effect -0.461 -1.144 -1.038 7.869 0.495 1.992 -0.775
s.e. 1.656 1.895 1.686 9.326 1.121 1.731 0.792
Robust p-value 0.977 0.545 0.498 0.317 0.746 0.143 0.290
Obs. 134 221 226 182 122 202 145
Monthly consumption
RD Mining effect 0.006 0.019 0.038 0.005 0.021 0.006 0.059
s.e. 0.003 0.012 0.016 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.040
Robust p-value 0.026 0.071 0.013 0.385 0.032 0.106 0.122
Obs. 180 202 187 168 221 273 214
Monthly stock
RD Mining effect 0.101 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.021 0.169
s.e. 0.036 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.037 0.108
Robust p-value 0.002 0.142 0.124 0.189 0.144 0.520 0.090
Obs. 130 180 163 202 264 220 294
Monthly share of consumption per stock
RD Mining effect -0.165 -1.083 -0.418 -1.396 -0.359 -0.171 -0.839
s.e. 0.088 1.022 1.522 1.120 1.005 0.170 0.448
Robust p-value 0.029 0.208 0.667 0.154 0.741 0.205 0.029
Obs. 164 183 171 178 175 161 193
Notes: The table reports the results from nonparametric estimations of specification (3.1) using local linear regressions for
each outcome. The bandwidth selection follows the MSE-optimal procedure proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014), as well as the construction of robust standard errors p-values. The smoothed distribution function used is the triangular
kernel. ACT drugs are decomposed by age category in columns (2) to (5) and correspond to below 1 year old, between 1 and 5,
between 6 and 13 and above 14 years old respectively. Each commodity’s stock value is expressed as a share in the population
catchment area of the facility. For each regression, I control for the geographic characteristics (elevation and slope) and the
number of mines surrounding a health facility.
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Table B.12: Effect of mining areas on antenatal care and malaria prevalence
Linear model (p=1) Cubic model (p=3)
(1) (2)
No. of prenatal visits per capita
RD Mining effect 0.002 0.005
Robust s.e. 0.004 0.006
Robust p-value 0.456 0.353
Bandwidth h (in metres)* 4,943 8,049
Obs. 224 378
Malaria prevalence
RD Mining effect 0.065 0.079
Robust s.e. 0.028 0.038
Robust p-value 0.011 0.038
Bandwidth h (in metres)* 4,212 7,273
Obs. 202 352
Notes: The table reports the results from nonparametric estimations of specification (3.1) using
local linear regressions for each outcome. The bandwidth selection follows the MSE-optimal pro-
cedure proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), as well as the construction of robust
standard errors p-values. The smoothed distribution function used is the triangular kernel. For
each regression, I control for the geographic characteristics (elevation and slope) and the number
of mines surrounding a health facility.
* The bandwidth selection follows the MSE-optimal procedure proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2014), as well as the construction of robust standard errors p-values. The smoothed
distribution function used is the triangular kernel.
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Data Appendix
I detail in this section the variables that are used in the analysis.
Geographic Characteristics
Elevation: Elevation measured in metres above the sea level. Data on elevation
and terrain features were obtained from NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission
(SRTM) satellite images. Elevation information is provided at a high spatial res-
olution (3 arc-second resolution or approximately 90 metres). Information is then
processed in ArcGIS to obtain elevation data.
Slope: Slope is measured in degrees and is obtained from NASA’s Shuttle Radar
Topography Mission (SRTM) satellite images and processed in ArcGIS.
Distance from closest facility : corresponds to the geographic distance from a
health facility to the closest facility. Distances are calculated with ArcGIS based on
the latitude and longitude of each health facility in the data sample.
Distance from closest hospital : corresponds to the geographic distance from a
health facility to the closest hospital. Distances are calculated with ArcGIS based
on the elevation and surface features, and using the latitude and longitude of each
health facility in the data sample. The function costpath is used in ArcGIS to
calculate the optimal path based on the geographic features; distance information
on the estimated path is then extracted for each health facility.
Facilities Characteristics
Antimalarial stock value: Antimalarial commodity corresponds to any commod-
ity that is used as mean of prevention, identification or treatment of malaria. It com-
prises Insecticide-Treated mosquito Nets (ITNs) and Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine
(SP), (chemoprevention administered to pregnant women and children less than five)
for prevention ; 2) Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT) for identification and Artemisinin-
based Combination Therapy (ACT) for treatment of malaria. Data on the monthly
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stock of each antimalarial commodity is obtained from the DHIS2. The estimated
value is U.S. Dollars and is based on the reference pricing of antimalarial medicines
negotiated by the Global Fund through the Pooled Procurement mechanism for
2017.
Total other drugs stock value: corresponds to the medicines listed as Essential
Medicines from the WHO Model list (https://www.who.int/medicines/publications/
essentialmedicines/en/). Data on the monthly stock of these medicines are ob-
tained from the DHIS2, and the stock value is expressed in U.S. Dollars.
Revenue: is the monthly revenue reported by health facilities in the DHIS2, and
expressed in U.S. Dollars.
Investment : is the monthly investment reported by health facilities in the DHIS2,
and expressed in U.S. Dollars.
Payroll tax : is the monthly payroll tax reported by health facilities in the DHIS2,
and expressed in U.S. Dollars.
Number of nurses : is the monthly number of nurses who are working in the
health facility as reported in the DHIS2. The number includes nurses with two
different qualification levels, A1 and A2.
Number of births : is the monthly number of birth in the health facility as reported
in the DHIS2.
Stock outs days antimalarial
Insecticide-Treated mosquito Net : corresponds to the average monthly number
of days the health facility ran out of ITNs in 2017.
Rapid Diagnostic Test : corresponds to the average monthly number of days the
health facility ran out of RDTs in 2017.
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine: corresponds to the average monthly number of days
the health facility ran out of SPs in 2017.
ACT (ages +14): corresponds to the average monthly number of days the health
facility ran out of Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) for patients above
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14 in 2017.
ACT (ages 6-13): corresponds to the average monthly number of days the health
facility ran out of Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) for patients be-
tween 6 and 13 in 2017.
ACT (ages 1-5): corresponds to the average monthly number of days the health
facility ran out of Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) for patients be-
tween 1 and 5 in 2017.
ACT (ages -1): corresponds to the average monthly number of days the health
facility ran out of Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) for patients below
1 in 2017.
Evidence of Data quality in the DHIS2
DHIS2 is notoriously known for varying data quality performance across African
countries where it is implemented. Even within the DRC, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the completeness of reported data depending on the type of in-
dicators. In particular, indicators (number of patients, stock and consumption of
commodities, number of stock-out days, estimated number of affected population)
pertaining to diseases heavily funded by donors (HIV, malaria) exhibit significantly
higher quality performance than those related to disease mostly funded by govern-
ment funding (such as non-communicable diseases). Moreover, two provinces which
contain most of health facilities analysed in this study (North and South Kivu) have
the highest state of data completeness across provinces in the country.
To ensure the validity of the data, I also cross-validated the epidemiological and
financial data with two external sources. For data on malaria prevalence, I com-
pare the obtained numbers from DHIS2 with the most recent Demographic Health
Surveys in the DRC that was conducted in 2013/2014 and I do not find significant
variations. Furthermore, I estimated the stock value of antimalarial commodities
from the reported stock at health facility level and the cost of procurement of each
commodity, the latter being obtained from the Pooled Procurement Mechanism
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Reference Pricing of the Global Fund (Figure B.14, Appendix B). I then calculated
for each province of the DRC the sum of the estimated stock value of antimalarial
commodities of each health facility. Furthermore, information on total malaria’s
funding at the provincial level was obtained from the three most important donors
for malaria in the DRC (namely the Global Fund, U.S. Government (USAID) and
U.K. Government (DFID)), representing approximately 97% of total donors’ fund-
ing for malaria in the country (MSP, 2017). Figure B.1 graphs the scatter plot of
the estimated stock value of antimalarial commodities at the provincial level on the
donors’ malaria funding. The estimated coefficient indicates that the stock value of
antimalarial commodities represents 48% of total malaria investment (Figure B.16,
Appendix B). This information is consistent with the findings from a recent audit
report of the Global Fund in the DRC (The Global Fund, 2016) which estimates
that 53% of total the Global Fund’s investment is dedicated to the procurement of
antimalarial commodities1.
1This estimate was obtained from the financial information of the Global Fund’s local partners
and the estimated annual budget of the malaria control programme.
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Appendix C
Appendix for chapter 4
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Figure C.1: Daily cost of European and Congolese hospitals
Notes: The graph plots the country average daily cost of hospitalisation for European and Con-
golese (dashed line) hospitals between 1937 and 1948. The estimated cost of hospitalisation includes
health treatment costs, salary, provision of drugs and health equipment and general maintenance
costs. Source: Archival data from annual medical report in Belgian Congo for each year of the
covered period.
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Figure C.2: Development Assistance for Health in the DRC, 1990-2017
Notes: The graph plots the total Development Assistance for Health between 1990 and 2017 in
millions of 2018 USD in the DRC and its share in total health expenditure starting from 2004.
Source: author’s computations using the Development Assistance for Health Database 1990-2018
from IHME Global Health Data Exchange (http://ghdx.healthdata.org/) and Global Health
Observatory data from WHO (http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.home).
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Figure C.3: Administrative boundaries
(a) 1895 boundaries (provinces) (b) 1908 boundaries (districts) (c) 2015 provinces
Notes: The figures illustrate the evolution of the administrative boundaries in Congo from the colonial period to the present day (since 2015). The
Belgian Congo was divided into 6 provinces and 22 districts. Since 2015, the DRC is composed of 26 provinces that approximately correspond to
the colonial districts, while most colonial names have been changed.
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Figure C.4: Mapping of colonial medical structures in 1953
Notes: The map depicts the location of all major health infrastructures in 1953. Source: Ministry
of Colonies.
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Figure C.5: Mapping of Christian missions in 1929
Notes: The map depicts the location of Christian missions (Catholics and Protestants) in 1929.
Source: Ministry of Colonies.
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Figure C.6: Mapping of the full sample of colonial and post-independence hospitals
Notes: The map shows the geo-location of the hospitals that were built during the colonial period
between 1920 and 1956 and those that were built after independence in 1960.
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Figure C.7: Distribution of hospitals in the data sample
(a) Hospital distribution by ownership
(b) Hospital distribution within the public sector
Notes: The two graphs plot the distribution of hospital by ownership (A) and by size (B) when
restricted to the public sector (the size refers either to General Referral Hospital (HGR) or to all
other public hospitals (district or provincial hospitals)). Each graph plots the number of hospitals
within the full data sample (green bars) and within the restricted sample of hospitals with colonial
origin (red dashed). Source: author’s computations.
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Figure C.8: Share of domestic health spending in total budget, 1927-2016
Notes: The graph plots the share of domestic general government health expenditure as a percentage of total budget between 1927 and 2016. Note
that no data was found for the period directly following independence in 1960. Source: author’s computations using Annuaire statistique de la
Belgique et du Congo Belge and Rapport annuel, Direction Ge´ne´rale des services me´dicaux du Congo Belge 1929-58 for the colonial period; World
Bank and IMF data for 1970-2000 and Global Health Observatory data from WHO after 2000 (https://www.who.int/gho/health_financing/
public_exp_health/en/).
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Figure C.9: DRC Gross National Income per capita in 2018 USD, 1948-2018
Notes: The graph plots the Gross National Income per capita of the DRC in 2018 USD between
1948 and 2018. Source: World Bank national account data (https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD).
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Figure C.10: Communication channels in 1928
Notes: The map shows the communication channels organised in public services in 1928: railways
(black), waterways (blue) and roads (red). Source: Institut Cartographique militaire Service
Cartographique du Ministe`re des Colonies.
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Figure C.11: QQ plots
Notes: Each graph plots the average distance between the empirical quantile distributions of
the colonial and post-independence groups calculated over the full sample (left) and the matched
sample (right) for the matching covariates of interest: longitude, latitude and population served.
In the matched samples, unmatched units are pruned to improve balance. For a perfect matching
of the distributions, the covariate values should lie on the 45 degree line. The quantile-quantile
(QQ) plots are produced using the MatchIt package in R (ho2011).
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Figure C.12: Evidence of common support assumption
Notes: Each graph plots the kernel density estimation using the Epanechnikov kernel for colonial
(dashed blue) and post-independence hospitals. The graphs show the density distribution of the
three variables of interest: longitude, latitude and population served.
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Figure C.13: Matching estimate sensitivity to bandwidth selection
(a) Government funding (b) Investments
(c) Beds (d) Medical staff
(e) Malaria case treated (f) Emergency case
Notes: Each graph plots estimates from a one-to-one nearest neighbour matching procedure
with replacement, using the biased-corrected matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens
(2011). The regressions include all matching covariates presented above and use robust standard
errors. Each graph shows the point estimates with the 95% confidence interval. The bandwidth
corresponds to the distance to the nearest hospital, ranging from 5 to 100 km.
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Figure C.14: Kernel density of colonial settlements and the presence of sleeping
sickness in 1933
Notes: The map depicts the kernel density of colonial health settlements and the geographic
distribution of the sleeping sickness (in brown) by health zones (district level) as reported in the
public health data of the Ministry of Colonies between 1928 and 1933 (Lyons, 2002). A health
zone is reported with sleeping sickness when the prevalence of the disease is at least equal to 1%.
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Figure C.15: Distribution of sleeping sickness in the DRC in 2016
Notes: The map depicts the geographical distribution of sleeping sickness (human African
trypanosomiasis) through the reported number of new cases between 2012 and 2016. Source:
the map is produced by Franco et al. (2017) and accessed from the WHO website (https:
//www.who.int/trypanosomiasis_african/country/foci_AFRO/en/).
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Table C.1: Summary statistics and difference-in-means
Post-Independence Colonial Difference-in-means
Obs. Sample mean s.d. Obs. Sample mean s.d. Diff-in-means s. e. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Financial characteristics
Expenditure 682 6,965 1,033.56 197 7,291 1,081.92 327 1,496.26 0.83
Revenue 674 6,786 652.33 197 9,800 1,437.80 3,014 1,578.86 0.06
Government funding 441 1,168 323.02 150 1,522 303.28 354 443.08 0.42
Investment 447 466 90.37 151 286 49.76 -180 103.17 0.08
Total value of drug stock 634 5,820 693.00 197 5,687 633.69 -133 939.05 0.89
Value of drug purchase 578 1,558 243.08 188 2,008 619.92 451 665.88 0.50
Structural characteristics
No. of days with electricity 587 9 0.35 149 12 0.72 3 0.80 0.00
No. Beds 785 52 1.66 204 92 5.08 40 5.35 0.00
Birth 771 19 0.84 191 20 1.67 1 1.87 0.59
Staff
Physician 861 5 0.51 207 8 1.28 3 1.38 0.02
Nurse 893 16 0.84 208 33 4.43 17 4.51 0.00
Health services
Severe malaria treated 828 41 1.78 202 66 3.65 25 4.06 0.00
Inpatients 786 117 4.85 204 192 11.96 75 12.91 0.00
No. consultations 838 341 19.33 202 374 28.79 33 34.67 0.34
Emergency case 713 49 3.78 196 82 8.59 33 9.39 0.00
Length of stay 726 39 3.13 199 38 2.30 -1 3.89 0.83
Population covered 190 185,141 79,665.11 104 148,563 38,452.55 -36,578 88,459.76 0.68
Notes: The unit of observation is health facility and all financial characteristics are expressed in 2018 U.S. Dollars. All indicators correspond to monthly average
numbers. The first six columns show the number of observations, sample mean and standard deviation for post-independence and colonial hospitals respectively.
The last three columns indicate the difference in means between post-independence and colonial hospitals, the robust standard errors for the difference and the
p-value of the test of whether the mean coefficients in the two samples are equal.
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Table C.2: Colonial investment effect on health facility performance
No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Financial characteristics Government Funding Investment
Colonial settlement 0.510*** 0.332** 0.445*** 0.481** 0.307 0.306
(0.166) (0.160) (0.168) (0.214) (0.240) (0.250)
Medical staff 1.271*** 1.047*** 0.963*** 0.883*** 0.849*** 0.863***
(0.109) (0.108) (0.121) (0.121) (0.141) (0.145)
Population served 0.011 0.066
(0.212) (0.304)
Observations 588 441 438 596 423 417
R-squared .338 .32 .338 .303 .287 .314
Panel B. Inputs Beds Nurses
Colonial settlement 0.303*** 0.194*** 0.125** 0.203*** 0.169*** 0.186***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
Medical staff 0.666*** 0.591*** 0.633***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.038)
Population served -0.069 0.165***
(0.051) (0.053)
Observations 976 618 608 976 618 608
R-squared .531 .533 .565 .549 .557 .619
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access
to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by districts (health zones). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.2: Colonial investment effect on health facility performance (continued)
No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel C. Production function Malaria treated Emergency cases
Colonial settlement 0.129 0.102 0.053 0.259** 0.148 0.020
(0.083) (0.085) (0.087) (0.103) (0.111) (0.111)
Medical staff 0.674*** 0.498*** 0.509*** 0.833*** 0.734*** 0.742***
(0.047) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.073) (0.076)
Population served -0.402*** -0.344*** -0.276*** -0.321*** -0.188* -0.118
(0.076) (0.090) (0.085) (0.086) (0.105) (0.101)
Observations 1007 609 607 890 582 580
R-squared .356 .315 .382 .344 .312 .332
Panel D. Health care demand Outpatient visit Deliveries
Colonial settlement 0.039 0.064 0.021 0.112 0.138 0.204
(0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.115) (0.121) (0.132)
Physician 0.542*** 0.430*** 0.415***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.051)
Midwife -0.059 0.001 -0.025
(0.064) (0.067) (0.073)
Observations 1012 614 604 701 466 460
R-squared .318 .287 .309 .134 .194 .207
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both
access to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.2: Colonial investment effect on health facility performance (continued)
No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel E. Structural characteristics Stock-out days Days with electricity
Colonial settlement 0.020 -0.011 -0.080 0.288** 0.196 0.185
(0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.142) (0.138) (0.148)
Medical staff 0.068** 0.036 0.090*** -0.101 -0.416*** -0.344***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.074) (0.098) (0.094)
Population served -0.126** -0.421***
(0.055) (0.147)
Observations 967 602 593 733 457 453
R-squared .18 .216 .262 .181 .177 .231
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access
to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
217
Table C.3: Colonial investment effect on input utilisation
No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic No Control Access facility Access facility + Geographic
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Bed occupancy Length of stay
Colonial settlement -0.068 -0.067 -0.081 0.329*** 0.211** 0.076
(0.047) (0.050) (0.054) (0.094) (0.085) (0.077)
Medical staff 0.109*** 0.073** 0.074** 0.864*** 0.682*** 0.752***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.036) (0.052) (0.050) (0.053)
Observations 976 618 608 928 600 590
R-squared .14 .163 .186 .435 .431 .47
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three rows in each panel. Column (3) controls
for both access to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table C.4: Robustness to different cutoff radii for spatial clustering
Dependent variable Government funding Investment Stock-out days Days with electricty Bed capacity Medical staff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient
Colonial settlement 0.397** 0.274 -0.088 0.186 0.125*** 0.186***
Standard errors with following cutoffs
50 km 0.170** 0.260 0.055 0.136 0.046*** 0.054***
100 km 0.191** 0.252 0.064 0.134 0.044*** 0.056***
200 km 0.204* 0.300 0.062 0.124 0.043*** 0.054***
300 km 0.231* 0.320 0.063 0.156 0.040*** 0.049***
Controls:
Human capital Y Y Y Y Y N
Physical capital Y Y Y Y N Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Variables not shown include provincial fixed effect, log of population served and geographic controls. Following Conley (1999) standard errors are adjusted for
spatial dependence by clustering observations within circles of varying distances. The first row reports the coefficient of the colonial settlement from equation 4.4 and the
following rows report the standard errors when changing the variance-covariance matrix through a change in the distance cutoff of the spatial clusters. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Financial characteristics Government Funding Investment
Colonial settlement 0.405** 0.880** 0.688** 0.231 -0.154 0.034
(0.168) (0.347) (0.318) (0.254) (0.471) (0.411)
Hospital type
General Referral Hospital 0.134 0.552*
(0.303) (0.293)
Private hospital -1.072*** -0.146
(0.325) (0.377)
Faith-based hospital -0.140 0.238
(0.180) (0.234)
Colonial type
Europeans -0.248 -0.476
(0.318) (0.319)
Congolese -0.417 0.745*
(0.368) (0.448)
Colonial funding source
Colonial government -0.432 0.454
(0.336) (0.371)
Private -0.378 0.040
(0.451) (0.503)
Religious 0.075 0.195
(0.373) (0.369)
Observations 438 438 438 417 417 417
R-squared .373 .342 .342 .324 .32 .316
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4 with additional controls for hospital ownership,
colonial type and colonial funding source. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three rows
in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust standard
errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel B. Inputs Beds Nurses
Colonial settlement 0.115** 0.186* 0.240*** 0.145*** 0.133 0.038
(0.050) (0.097) (0.089) (0.054) (0.111) (0.098)
Hospital type
General Referral Hospital 0.061 0.194**
(0.101) (0.097)
Private hospital -0.191* -0.033
(0.109) (0.091)
Faith-based hospital 0.224*** -0.251***
(0.047) (0.051)
Colonial type
Europeans -0.063 0.193**
(0.067) (0.080)
Congolese -0.049 -0.016
(0.097) (0.115)
Colonial funding source
Colonial government -0.169** 0.267***
(0.084) (0.098)
Private -0.127 0.145
(0.110) (0.120)
Religious -0.050 -0.015
(0.089) (0.098)
Observations 608 608 608 608 608 608
R-squared .59 .566 .567 .641 .622 .625
Physical capital N N N Y Y Y
Human capital Y Y Y N N N
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4 with additional controls for hospital ownership,
colonial type and colonial funding source. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three
rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust
standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table C.5: Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel C. Production function Malaria treated Emergency cases
Colonial settlement 0.021 -0.051 0.185 -0.010 0.052 0.185
(0.088) (0.215) (0.142) (0.112) (0.235) (0.204)
Hospital type
General Referral Hospital 0.241 0.197
(0.154) (0.198)
Private hospital -0.217 -0.210
(0.151) (0.215)
Faith-based hospital 0.162* 0.021
(0.086) (0.112)
Colonial type
Europeans -0.312** -0.384**
(0.156) (0.186)
Congolese 0.252 0.117
(0.249) (0.261)
Colonial funding source
Colonial government -0.154 -0.165
(0.145) (0.200)
Private -0.023 -0.111
(0.208) (0.297)
Religious -0.204 -0.245
(0.143) (0.236)
Observations 607 607 607 580 580 580
R-squared .403 .388 .384 .341 .337 .333
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4 with additional controls for hospital own-
ership, colonial type and colonial funding source. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over
the three rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access to facility and the geographic covariates.
Robust standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel D. Health care demand Outpatient visit Deliveries
Colonial settlement 0.006 -0.020 0.066 0.210 0.020 0.031
(0.066) (0.157) (0.133) (0.130) (0.250) (0.256)
Hospital type
General Referral Hospital 0.227* 0.077
(0.127) (0.177)
Private hospital 0.185 0.113
(0.134) (0.191)
Faith-based hospital 0.180** -0.094
(0.072) (0.141)
Colonial type
Europeans -0.058 -0.008
(0.101) (0.206)
Congolese 0.073 0.246
(0.171) (0.250)
Colonial funding source
Colonial government -0.076 0.220
(0.131) (0.270)
Private 0.105 0.232
(0.158) (0.332)
Religious -0.108 0.158
(0.148) (0.267)
Observations 604 604 604 467 467 467
R-squared .321 .309 .311 .186 .186 .186
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4 with additional controls for hospital
ownership, colonial type and colonial funding source. The dependent variable is indicated as the header
over the three rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access to facility and the geographic
covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10,
5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Decomposition of the colonial investment effect by type and source (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel E. Input efficiency Bed occupancy Length of stay
Colonial settlement -0.095* -0.085 -0.038 0.042 0.141 0.207
(0.056) (0.122) (0.089) (0.075) (0.173) (0.152)
Hospital type
General Referral Hospital 0.163 0.288**
(0.103) (0.112)
Private hospital 0.071 -0.174
(0.104) (0.114)
Faith-based hospital -0.028 0.251***
(0.055) (0.074)
Colonial type
Europeans -0.244*** -0.323***
(0.085) (0.111)
Congolese 0.103 0.052
(0.139) (0.183)
Colonial funding source
Colonial government -0.030 -0.208
(0.088) (0.149)
Private -0.090 -0.171
(0.104) (0.179)
Religious -0.046 -0.015
(0.090) (0.156)
Observations 608 608 608 590 590 590
R-squared .192 .197 .186 .501 .477 .473
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4 with additional controls for hospital ownership,
colonial type and colonial funding source. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three
rows in each panel. Column (3) controls for both access to facility and the geographic covariates. Robust
standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table C.6: Colonial investment effect with provincial hospital and ancient colonial set-
tlements
HGR only All hospitals HGR only All hospitals
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A. Financial characteristics Government Funding Investment
Colonial settlement 0.515*** 0.274
(0.181) (0.282)
Colonial settlement before 1936 0.377** 0.134
(0.167) (0.216)
Observations 349 438 326 417
R-squared .384 .335 .355 .311
Panel B. Inputs Beds Nurses
Colonial settlement 0.086 0.150***
(0.053) (0.056)
Colonial settlement before 1936 0.083* 0.187***
(0.050) (0.057)
Observations 455 608 455 608
R-squared .566 .563 .597 .619
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y
Population served location Y Y Y Y
Provincial FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table presents the OLS estimates of equation 4.4 with additional controls for hospital ownership
and the duration of colonial settlements. For the latter, I construct a dummy equal to one if the medical
missions started after 1936. The dependent variable is indicated as the header over the three rows in each
panel. Column (1) restrict the data sample to HGR and column reports the estimates with the full data
sample of hospitals. Robust standard errors clustered by districts. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.7: Matching estimates
Panel A. Financial characteristics Government Funding Investment
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Colonial settlement 0.361* 0.457*** 0.279 0.030
(0.191) (0.172) (0.250) (0.237)
Observations 439 434 419 412
Panel B. Inputs Beds Nurses
Colonial settlement 0.211*** 0.183*** 0.044 0.039
(0.065) (0.055) (0.062) (0.060)
Observations 618 610 618 610
Panel C. Outputs Malaria treated Emergency cases
Colonial settlement 0.157* 0.182* 0.100 0.122
(0.084) (0.093) (0.150) (0.123)
Observations 617 609 590 582
Matching covariates
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y
Geographic location Y Y Y Y
Population served N Y N Y
Notes: The table reports the results from a one-to-one nearest neighbour matching procedure
with replacement, using the biased-corrected matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens
(2011). The matching covariates are the geographic coordinates and population served. Robust
Abadie–Imbens standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Government funding is divided by
the number of medical staff. Government funding as well as the dependent variables in panel C have
also medical staff as a matching covariate. All variables are taken in natural logarithm. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.8: Matching estimates by hospital ownership
Hospital type Public Private Faith-based HGR Public Private Faith-based HGR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Financial characteristics Government Funding Investment
Colonial settlement 0.470*** 0.118 0.199 0.433** 0.165 1.012* 0.332 0.118
(0.183) (0.720) (0.342) (0.195) (0.269) (0.544) (0.452) (0.300)
Observations 375 74 135 350 349 79 135 328
Panel B. Inputs Beds Nurse
Colonial settlement 0.137*** 0.392** -0.095 0.126** 0.038 0.611*** 0.338*** 0.063
(0.052) (0.177) (0.128) (0.059) (0.065) (0.221) (0.114) (0.067)
Observations 480 134 174 457 480 134 174 457
Panel C. Outputs Malaria treated Emergency cases
Colonial settlement 0.132 0.488 0.092 0.174* -0.024 -0.127 -0.097 0.099
(0.087) (0.656) (0.135) (0.103) (0.120) (0.352) (0.265) (0.128)
Observations 479 139 174 453 460 125 168 442
Matching covariates
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic location Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The table reports the results from a one-to-one nearest neighbour matching procedure with replacement, using the biased-corrected
matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). Robust Abadie–Imbens standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Columns (1-4)
report respectively the matching estimates for public, private, faith-based and General Referral Hospital (Hoˆpital Ge´ne´ral de Re´fe´rence, HGR). The
dependent variable nurse corresponds to the ratio of nurse by the number of beds. Government funding as well as the dependent variables in panel
C have also medical staff as a matching covariate. All variables are taken in natural logarithm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.9: First-stage IV estimations
Second stage dependent variable:
Government funding Investment Bed capacity Medical staff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excluded instrument
Sleeping sickness 0.502*** 0.521*** 0.502*** 0.498***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 364 338 479 476
F-statistic 116.2 126.8 156.8 154.6
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y
Notes: Each column reports the first-stage estimates for the IV regression in table C.10. The dependent variable
in the first-stage is the indicator equal to one for the presence of colonial settlement. Variables not shown include
log of population served and geographic controls. Following I. Andrews et al. (2019), I use the efficient F -
statistic for the weak instrument test proposed by Olea and Pflueger (2013) that is robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering (note that in the present case of single endogenous regressor, the F -statistic is equivalent to the
Kleibergen-Paap statistic). Robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table C.10: IV estimations for public hospitals
Second stage dependent variable Government funding Investment Bed capacity Medical staff
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Colonial settlements 0.479*** 0.311 0.316 0.363 0.097* 0.202** 0.177*** 0.110
(0.175) (0.334) (0.265) (0.433) (0.051) (0.094) (0.058) (0.111)
Population covered 0.176 0.186 0.267 0.265 0.030 0.026 0.190*** 0.194***
(0.225) (0.212) (0.238) (0.230) (0.066) (0.063) (0.061) (0.059)
Additional controls
Medical staff 0.709*** 0.733*** 0.714*** 0.707*** 0.553*** 0.538***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.174) (0.166) (0.045) (0.045)
Beds 0.683*** 0.693***
(0.047) (0.046)
Observations 364 364 338 338 474 474 474 474
R-squared .385 .384 .357 .357 .568 .565 .613 .612
95% AR confidence interval [-.411899, .938882] [-.482336, 1.11407] [-.147482, .316568] [ .070989, .431993]
Controls:
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Variables not shown include provincial fixed effect, log of population served and geographic controls. For each dependent variable, the table reports the OLS and IV estimates from
the sample of public hospitals. The table also reports the Anderson-Rubin (AR) confidence interval for the Colonial settlements coefficient which formed by inverting the AR test for weak
IV. Robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.11: IV estimations for General Referral Hospitals
Second stage dependent variable Government funding Investment Bed capacity Medical staff
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Colonial settlements 0.506*** 0.421 0.249 0.446 0.083 0.212** 0.154*** 0.046
(0.180) (0.339) (0.277) (0.405) (0.052) (0.098) (0.056) (0.110)
Population covered 0.153 0.158 0.382* 0.366 0.031 0.023 0.144** 0.151**
(0.224) (0.211) (0.231) (0.225) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063) (0.060)
Additional controls
Medical staff 0.741*** 0.754*** 0.587*** 0.561*** 0.568*** 0.551***
(0.148) (0.149) (0.173) (0.161) (0.043) (0.042)
Beds 0.695*** 0.709***
(0.050) (0.050)
Observations 349 349 326 326 455 455 455 455
R-squared .383 .383 .348 .347 .565 .56 .596 .593
95% AR confidence interval [-.303646, .987222] [-.440855, 1.03785] [-.164225, .277551] [ .056255, .407909]
Controls:
Human and physical capital Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population served Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Variables not shown include provincial fixed effect, log of population served and geographic controls. For each dependent variable, the table reports the OLS and IV estimates from
the sample of HGRs. The table also reports the Anderson-Rubin (AR) confidence interval for the Colonial settlements coefficient which formed by inverting the AR test for weak IV. Robust
standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.12: Aid support to colonial hospitals
Dependent variable Aid support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Colonial settlement 0.075* 0.059 0.054 0.062
(0.039) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050)
Physician 0.022 -0.008 -0.010
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Population served -0.047
(0.036)
Observations 1097 1052 628 620
Provincial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic location No No Yes Yes
Population served No No NO Yes
Notes: The table reports the results from the estimation of equation
(4.8) with a linear probability model. Aid support is a binary variable
equal to one if the hospital has stock of HIV or tuberculosis related
drugs. All variables are taken in logarithm. Robust standard errors are
clustered by districts (health zones). *, ** and *** indicate significance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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C.1 Data Sources and variables definitions
C.1.1 DHIS2 data
The following variables are extracted from the DRC DHIS2 (https://snisrdc.
com/):
District population: Log of population covered by a hospital (approximately
equal to district population).
Government funding: Funding allocated from the central government to a
hospital, usually for covering medical staff salaries. The amount is expressed in
2017 US Dollars, as a monthly average between January 2017 and December 2018.
Investment: Log of hospital investment. The amount is expressed in 2017 US
Dollars, as a monthly average between January 2017 and December 2018.
Nurse: Total number of nurses working in a hospital, including A1, A2 and L2
levels. The amount corresponds to the monthly average between January 2017 and
December 2018.
Beds: Total number of beds in a hospital as reported in the DHIS2.
Inpatients: Monthly average of inpatients between January 2017 and December
2018.
Outpatient visits: Monthly average of outpatient visit between January 2017
and December 2018.
Childbirth: Monthly average of childbirth between January 2017 and December
2018.
Malaria treated: Monthly average of severe malaria cases treated between
January 2017 and December 2018. Severe malaria treatment relies on artesunate
injection and differs from uncomplicated malaria treatment (artemisinin-based com-
bination therapies).
Length of stay: Monthly average number of days that patients stay in hospital
between January 2017 and December 2018.
232
C.1.2 Historical and modern maps
Distance to the coast: The geodesic distance from each hospital to the nearest
coastline measured in km. Colonial hospital locations are obtained from multiple
maps from colonial archival data between 1929 and 1956. Examples of such maps
are presented in figures C.4 and C.5.
Access: The geodesic distance from each hospital to the nearest transporta-
tion mode, which comprises railways, paved road and main rivers as navigation
mode measured in km. The communication channels during the colonial period are
obtained from a 1928 map on public services in Belgian Congo from the Institut Car-
tographique militaire Service Cartographique du Ministe`re des Colonies. Euclidean
distances are calculated with ArcGIS.
Distance to the provincial city: The geodesic distance from each hospital to
the main provincial city during the colonial period measured in km (Leopoldville,
Costermansville, Albertville, Elisabethville, Stanleyville).
Distance to armed conflicts: The geodesic distance from each hospital to
a civilian conflict (defined as political violence and protest). The data is obtained
from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) which reports
georeferenced information on political violence and protests between January 2017
and December 2018
Distance to Regional Distribution Centre: The geodesic distance from
each hospital to the nearest Regional Distribution Centre (Centrale de Distribution
Re´gionale, CDR). The 19 CDRs across the DRC supply public, private and faith-
based health facilities with essential medicines and other pharmaceutical products.
The list of CDRs in 2017 was obtained from the Department of Pharmaceuticals
and Medicines (Direction de la Pharmarcie et du Me´dicament), Ministry of Health
(https://http://dpmrdc.org/BASE-DES-DONNEES).
Malaria parasite rate: indicator of the malaria parasite transmission intensity
in 2017 obtained from the Malaria Atlas Project to account for the spatial hetero-
geneity of malaria transmission in the DRC. The Plasmodium falciparum parasite
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rate (PfPR) is an index of malaria transmission intensity which estimates the pro-
portion of children aged 2 to 10 who carries the parasite (Hay and Snow, 2006).
Annual median of PfPR in 2017 was obtained at approximately 5 km resolution
from the Malaria Atlas Project (https://map.ox.ac.uk).
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C.2 Conceptual framework
The hospital production function is modelled by a Cobb-Douglas function with
constant return to scale (CRTS), and the output is given by the following equation
yi = Aik
α
i
where i indicates the type of hospital (Colonial C, or post-independence P ) and
k refers to the capital to labour ratio K/L. The stock of physical capital equals
investment
K = I
Consider the central government’s objective which allocates health resources be-
tween colonial (with subscript C) and post-independence hospitals (subscript P ) to
maximise the overall output production of health services. The government max-
imisation problem is
Max
kC ,kP
ACk
α
C + APk
α
P
subject to the budget constraint
τ(yC + yP ) ≥ kC + kP
Assume the government health grant is used for investment in physical capital.
The government maximisation problem can then be re-written as
Max
kC
ACk
α
C + AP (τ − kC)α
The First-Order Condition with respect to kC gives
AC(
1
kC
)1−α = AP (
1
kP
)1−α (C.1)
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